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When individuals disagree on elementary justice, their most
insoluble conflict is between institutions . ... The more severe the
conflict, the more useful to understand the institutions that are
doing most of the thinIing. Exhortation will not help. Passing laws
against discrimination will not help.... Only changing institutions
can help. We should address them, not individuals, and address
them continuously, not only in crises.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the Los Angeles grand jury indicted thirteen activists on
charges ranging from disturbing the peace to conspiracy for their roles in
supporting a series of student protests in the predominantly Mexican-
American area of East Los Angeles.2 The defendants, represented by Oscar
Acosta and others, claimed the protections of both the First and the
Fourteenth Amendments.3 In 1970, they prevailed on free speech grounds.'
Meanwhile, however, three of the original thirteen defendants were among
six persons indicted in 1969 on arson and burglary charges arising from
protests staged at the Biltmore Hotel in downtown Los Angeles during a
banquet talk by Ronald Reagan, then California's governor.5 Again
1. MARY DOUGLAS, How INSTITUTIONs THINK 125-26 (1986).
2. See People v. Castro, No. A-232902 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1968). During the week of March 5.
1968, 10,000 students walked out of the high schools of East Los Angeles. Protesting the abysmal
conditions in those schools, the students caried signs that read "Education Not Contempt." "We
Demand Schools that Teach," "Good Schools for All," and -Brown is Beautiful." The walkouts
marked the mass entrance of Mexican-American youth onto the turbulent field of civil rights
protest. See CARLOS MUNoz, JR., YOUTH, IDENTITY, POWER: THE CHICANO MOVEMENT at xi
(1989). On this era, see generally IGNACIO M. GARC[A, CHIcANISMO: THE FORGING OF A
MILrrANT ETHOS AMONG MEXICAN AMERICANS (1997). On the history of Mexican Americans
in Los Angeles, see generally RODOLFO F. ACUR A, A COMMUNrTY UNDER SIEGE: A CHRONICLE
OF CHICANOS EAST OF THE Los ANGELES RIvER, 1945-1975 (1984); RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL
CASTILLO, THE LOS ANGELES BARRIO, 1850-1890: A SOCIAL HISTORY (1979); RICARDO ROMo,
EAST LOS ANGELES: HISTORY OF A BARRIO (1983); and GEORGE J. SANCHEZ. BECOMING
MEXICAN AMERICAN: ETHNICrrY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN CHIcANO Los ANGELES. 1900-
1945 (1993).
3. Oscar Acosta, a former legal aid attorney in Oakland and a self-described "revolutionary."
carved a volatile figure. Acosta memorialized his remarkable life and especially his years in East
Los Angeles in OSCAR ZETA ACOSTA, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BROWN BUFFALO (1972); and
OSCAR ZETA ACOSTA, THE REVOLT OF THE COCKROACH PEOPLE (1973). See also ILAN
STAVANS, BANDIDO: OSCAR "ZETA" ACOSTA AND THE CHICANO EXPERIENCE (1995).
4. See Castro v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (Ct. App. 1970).
5. See People v. Montez, No. A-244906 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1969). The setting was the California
Department of Education's third annual Nuevas Vistas (" New Horizons") Conference, dedicated
to exploring educational issues salient to the Mexican-American community in California. As
Governor Reagan rose to speak, a fire ignited by emergency road flares broke out in a linen
storage area on the hotel's tenth floor. Within minutes, new blazes erupted on the ninth, fourth,
and second floors, as well as in the ballroom adjacent to where Governor Reagan was speaking.
Firefighters quickly extinguished the flames, forestalling the evacuation of anyone from the hotel.
See Fires, Protests Jar Reagan Talk, L.A. HERALD EXAMINER. Apr. 25, 1969, at Al. Unaware of
the commotion, Governor Reagan continued his speech. He was soon interrupted, however, by a
dozen demonstrators in the audience who rose to their feet, shouting and clapping in protest.
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represented by Acosta, but this time without a plausible free speech
argument, the defendants raised anew the equal protection defense. The
judge hearing the case rejected their constitutional challenge, though a jury
subsequently acquitted the defendants.6 In both cases, the defendants were
tried before the Los Angeles superior court.
I use these cases, known respectively in the Mexican-American
community as East LA 13 and Biltmore 6, to address the nature of
institutional racism. The defendants' Fourteenth Amendment challenge
rested on the claim that the selectors of the 1968 and 1969 Los Angeles
grand juries had excluded Mexican Americans Significantly, however,
Los Angeles superior court judges had nominated all grand jurors, and the
defendants' strategy for proving their discrimination claim involved
examining on the witness stand more than 100 judges over the course of
both cases. Although the records in these cases are incomplete, a transcript
exists of Acosta's questioning of thirty-three judges in East LA 13.' This
transcript, which records Acosta's interrogation of the judges regarding
how and why they made the selections they did, constitutes the principal
raw material for this Article. The transcript's most striking aspect is this:
While the record reveals in stark numbers the near total exclusion of
Mexican Americans from service on grand juries in Los Angeles over the
decade preceding these cases, each judge testified that he harbored no
intention to discriminate.9
Almost immediately, police rushed the banquet room and hustled the protesters out. After the
police swept through, the audience gave the Governor a standing ovation, and he resumed his
speech, calling on Mexican Americans to advise the government on "the most effective ways to
reach the youngster from a Latin cultural background and motivate him to make the adjustment
into our competitive, English-speaking society." Tom Newton, Demonstration Disrupts Talk by
Governor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1969, at I; see also Help Us Help You, Reagan Tells Hispano
Educators, L.A. HERALD EXAMINER, Apr. 25, 1969, at A3.
6. See Ron Einstoss, Two Acquitted After Biltmore Jurors Deadlock: Remaining Two
Granted Mistrial by Judge; Jury Cites Witness Credibility, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14. 197 1, § II. at I:
see also Montez v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736, 738 (Ct. App. 1970).
7. A comment regarding nomenclature is appropriate here. In this Article. I principally
address the experiences of "Mexican Americans," by which I mean all permanent immigrants to
the United States from Mexico and their descendants, as well as persons descended from Mexican
inhabitants of the region acquired by the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. A
longstanding debate surrounds this term as well as others intended to refer to Mexican Americans.
See RODOLFO ACUIRA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS at ix-x (1988); MUNOZ,
supra note 2, at 7-12. In addition, I sometimes refer to "Latino/as," permanent immigrants from.
or descendants of persons from, one of the Spanish-speaking countries of the Western
Hemisphere. I adopt the convention of using a virgule at the end of "Latino," rendering it
"Latino/a," in response to the gendered grammar of Spanish. See Ian F. Haney L6pez. Race.
Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143. 1143 n.1
(1998). I also capitalize all racial group names, White included. See IAN HANEY LPiz. WHirri;
BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE at xiv (1996)
8. See Motion to Quash Indictment, People v. Castro, No. A-232902 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1968)
[hereinafter Transcript] (on file with the Oscar Zeta Acosta Papers, California Ethnic and
Multicultural Archives, Department of Special Collections, University of California. Santa
Barbara).
9. I use the masculine pronoun advisedly, as all of the judges to testify in East LA 13 were
male. See Appendix A.
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This Article seeks to elaborate a theory of racism capable of reconciling
the statistical evidence of judicial discrimination with the judges' insistence
that they never intended to discriminate.'" More generally, it sets out to
build a theory of racism that explains organizational activity that
systematically harms minority groups even though the decision-making
individuals lack any conscious discriminatory intent. This more general
goal is important because, in the contemporary setting, such racism
constitutes a significant source of social harm; on balance, it may well
constitute the greatest source of ongoing harm to minority communities.
To fashion such a theory of racism, I turn to institutional analysis,
and in particular to New Institutionalism, a genre within organizational
sociology." New Institutionalism rejects the rational action theories that
animate so much of social science. 2 Instead, New Institutionalism posits
that frequently repeated but largely unexamined social practices or patterns
at once structure and give meaning to human interaction. This claim has
both cognitive and cultural components.
On the cognitive level, institutional analysis postulates that through the
operation of various mental processes. frequently repeated patterns of
activity relatively quickly take on an unexamined, rule-like status such that
they are spontaneously followed and disrupted only with difficulty. Put
differently, New Institutionalism argues that to a significant degree human
behavior is not consciously motivated, or at least not principally so, but
instead stems from the unconsidered repetition of cognitively familiar
routines. Institutional analysis posits that we often act in definable ways
without a consciously formulated purpose, simply because it is "the way it
is done."
It is not mere habit, however. New Institutionalism also makes the
cultural claim that routinized sequences of behavior eventually come to
define normalcy, or more broadly, reality. 4 Established constellations of
action are seen but not noticed, relied upon but not considered, to such an
10. For an extended argument that discrimination against Mexican Americans constitutes
"racial" discrimination, see Haney L6pez supra note 7; and Ian F. Haney l,pez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,. Fabrication. and Choice. 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
11. New Institutionalism as a named project within sociology traces back to Paul J.
DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. 48 Am. SOC. REV. 147 (1983). References to
New Institutionalism here are to the genre most common to sociology. There are also "new
institutionalisms" in political science and economics. See STRUCTURING POLITCS: HISTORICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Sven Steinmo et al. eds.. 1992); OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
12. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 22-27 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds.. 1991).
13. See Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford. Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices.
and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTIrrTONALISM IN ORGANIzATONAL
ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 232.
14. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 54 (1966).
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extent that they become natural-" the world of daily life known in
common with others and with others taken for granted." I" Thus, accepted
complexes of action become paths for forming judgments about the social
world, even as they provide the terms by which one acts in that world.
These frequently repeated, rule-like, socially ordering grammars constitute
the "institutions" at the heart of New Institutionalism.
"Institution" thus takes on a distinct technical meaning: In New
Institutionalism, it refers not to organizations, but rather to practices.16
Drawing on the cognitive and cultural insights described above, New
Institutionalism does not treat particular organizations as institutions so
much as it treats the "appropriate" form and structure of organizations
as institutionalized. 7 For New Institutionalists, the most decisive aspects
of any particular organization lie not in its formal features, but rather in the
way they more generally reflect received templates. The general form
adopted by organizations engaged in particular tasks, the means that
are regularly chosen and those that are not, the expected goals, the
accepted measures of success or failure-all of these reflect unexamined
understandings of what is organizationally appropriate. Institutional
analysis suggests that it is these, the institutionalized aspects of
organizational life, that most deserve critical attention. Thus, the Los
Angeles superior court exists both as a specific organization and as a
particular embodiment of institutionalized "court-like" practices, but it is in
the latter sense, rather than as a unique organization, that this court is of
interest here.
I seek to develop a theory of individual behavior within organized
settings because "whatever the scale of the organizational context all
15. HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 35 (1967).
16. Ronald Jepperson describes "institutions" as follows:
[I]nstitutions are those social patterns that, when chronically reproduced, owe
their survival to relatively self-activating processes.... All institutions are frameworks
of programs or rules establishing identities and activity scripts for such
identities.... Institutions are taken for granted ... in the sense that they are both
treated as relative fixtures in a social environment and explicated (accounted for) as
functional elements of that environment.
Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, in TIE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 143, 157 (footnotes
omitted). Jepperson suggests that the following qualify as institutions: marriage, sexism, the
contract, wage labor, academic tenure, the Presidency, the vacation, the handshake, the
corporation, insurance, and voting. See id. at 144. Note that whereas institutions consist of
unconsidered practices, organizations can be understood as systems of coordinated activities
structured in complex networks of formal relations. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan,
Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in TIE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 41.
17. According to DiMaggio and Powell, "[N]eoinstitutionalists view institutionalization as
occurring at the sectoral or societal levels, and consequently interorganizational in locus.
Organizational forms, structural components, and rules, not specific organizations, are
institutionalized. Thus, where the old institutionalism viewed organizations as organic wholes, the
new institutionalism treats them as loosely coupled arrays of standardized elements." DiMaggio
& Powell, supra note 12, at 14.
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discrimination involves individual actors." '" However, many New
Institutionalists stress structural approaches to action that essentially ignore
individualist models of social activity.' 9 Although rooted in the work
of social constructionist scholars who studied individual interactions, such
as Harold Garfinkel, Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckmann,2 New
Institutionalism focuses on organizational structures rather than on
individuals. This Article develops a theory of institutional analysis that
borrows from New Institutionalism even as it emphasizes--more so than
other writings within that genre-Harold Garfinkel's earlier theorizing on
individual cognition. By emphasizing Garfinkel's insights and combining
these with New Institutionalism's study of organizations, I develop an
approach that looks not to organizations per se, but to individual behavior
within organized settings.2' As with New Institutionalism, the institutional
approach I follow rejects models of behavior that posit that actors
principally pursue tasks either out of a strategic calculation of their interests
or as a conscious effort to abide by internalized value systems. Rather,
I advance an institutional analysis in which organizational actors follow
elaborate scripts, spontaneously triggered complexes of behavior. I also
argue that even when specific scripts do not develop or are not followed,
paths come into play, unexamined background understandings that
effectively specify the range of legitimate action.
I intend to shed light on judicial decision-making processes that give
rise to discrimination by applying institutional analysis to the Los Angeles
superior court's grand juror selection practices. Judges in particular and law
as a whole have not received much sustained attention from New
Institutionalism.' Instead, New Institutionalism tends to depict law in a
rather formal way, as an undifferentiated constraint on organizational life.'
18. JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOKER FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE 25
(1986).
19. See Jepperson, supra note 16, at 154.
20. See GARFINKEL, supra note 15; BERGER & LUCKMANN. supra note 14. DiMaggio and
Powell note the influence of Garfinkel's as well as Berger and Luckmann's work on the rise of
New Institutionalism. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 12, at 19-22.
21. Note that there is no sharp distinction between the institutional analysis I employ here and
that typical of New Institutionalism; rather, they are largely compatible. Indeed, although
somewhat in the minority, some New Institutionalists also focus on individual behavior. See. e.g.,
Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence, in THE NEw
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 12. at 83. The point is that my
focus on individual behavior within organizations provides a subtle but significant difference in
emphasis relative to the theorizing of much, but not all, New Institutionalist scholarship.
22. For a recent exception in the area of corporate law, see Donald C. Langevoort. Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Wy Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause
Other Social Harns), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997).
23. According to Mark Suchman and Lauren Edelman, "The legal environment depicted by
institutional theory is, largely, an environment of 'law-on-the-books': Rules are clear.
enforcement is firm, and legal effects are substantive. The ambiguity, the politicization, and the
symbolism of the 'law-in-action' tend to fade from view." Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: 77Te New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition,
21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 903, 905 (1996) (reviewing THE NEv INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 12); see also id. at 928 (" The institutionalist outlook
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Nevertheless, legal scholars such as Lauren Edelman, Mark Suchman, and
Edward Rubin correctly observe that law constitutes an institutional setting
that directly molds the behavior of those within its sphere. 4 Judges, Rubin
rightly notes, "are not individual guardians of the law; they are members of
an institution .... - 25 The decision calculus of judges has recently come
under scrutiny, principally by those searching for strategic action. 6 Here, I
argue that institutional analysis brings into view important features of the
judges' nonintentional decision-making processes-their reliance on
scripts, their dependence on paths. Institutional analysis suggests that
judicial conduct pursuant to such unexamined decision making often
produces discrimination, racial and otherwise.
I do not, however, principally intend to study judicial cognition itself,
so much as to theorize a particular form of racism. 27 When applied to the
actions and the words of the superior court judges brought to the stand in
East LA 13, institutional analysis illuminates the dynamics of a type of
conduct perhaps best described as "institutional racism." Stokely
Carmichael and Charles Hamilton introduced that term the year before the
East Los Angeles student protests.2 8 It gained popularity in the 1970s and
often comes uncomfortably close to naive Legal Formalism."). Walter Powell agrees with
Suchman and Edelman's assessment. See Walter W. Powell, Fields of Practice: Connections
Between Law and Organizations, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 959 (1996).
24. See Lauren B. Edelman, Constructed Legalities: Socio-Legal Fields and the Endogeneity
of Law, in BENDING THE BARS OF THE IRON CAGE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND PROCESSES
(Walter W. Powell & Daniel L. Jones eds., forthcoming 2000) (manuscript on file with the
author); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environment of Organizations, 23
ANN. REV. Soc. 479 (1997); Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary
as an Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265 (1997) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)); Suchman & Edelman, supra note 23.
25. Rubin, supra note 24, at 281. Rubin argues not only that institutional analysis of law is
desirable, but also that such analysis may afford a possible basis for "a new synthesis of scholarly
discourse about law," one incorporating the insights of post-legal-process scholarship, such as law
and economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Critical Race Theory. Edward L. Rubin, The New
Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1393, 1393-94 (1996).
26. Consider, for instance, the following thesis:
[J]ustices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals
depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, of the choices they expect
others to make, and of the institutional context in which they act. We, and others, call
this a strategic account because the key ideas it contains are drawn from the rational
choice paradigm ....
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The New Institutionalism (pt. 2), LAW & CTS. (American Political
Science Ass'n, St. Louis, Mo.), Spring 1997, at 4; see also Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges
and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. I
(1993).
27. Institutional analysis has not previously been applied to racism. Sociology in general, of
course, has a long history of interest in the subject. For a longitudinal compilation of sociological
writings on race relations, see THE SOCIOLOGY OF RACE RELATIONS: REFLECTION AND REFORM
(Thomas F. Pettigrew ed., 1980).
28. See STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLIrICs
OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4-5 (1967). Carmichael and Hamilton wrote:
Racism is both overt and covert. It takes two, closely related forms: individual
whites acting against individual blacks, and acts by the total white community against
the black community. We call these individual racism and institutional racism....
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1980s as a means of highlighting the continued systematic production of
inequality,29 despite declines in overt acts of individual racial hostility.
"Institutional racism" continues to be frequently invoked by many,
including critical race theorists." Nevertheless, "institutional racism"
seems to function more often as a label for a problem than as a theory of
social behavior. A theory of " institutional racism" has been elusive.
For some, institutional racism amounts to intentional racism in
institutions-that is, purposeful discrimination in formally organized
settings." For others, it refers to widespread race-neutral practices that
impose harmful effects on minority communities, irrespective of the actions
or attitudes of individual decision makers.32 Note that the first model
focuses on motivated individual actions, while the second moves in the
opposite direction, denying the relevance of individual behavior altogether.
I reject both of these approaches.
I propose a model of institutional racism that neither relies on
motivated behavior nor dismisses behavior altogether, but rather one that
focuses on the sort of nonintentional behavior emphasized by institutional
analysis. In this way, the term "institutional racism" functions here on both
When white terrorists bomb a black church and kill five black children. that is an
act of individual racism, widely deplored by most segments of society. But when in that
same city-Birmingham, Alabama-five hundred black babies die each year because
of the lack of proper food, shelter and medical facilities... that is a function of
institutional racism.
Id. at 4.
29. See Nijole Benokraitis & Joe Feagin. Institutional Racism: A Perspective in Search of
Clarity and Research, in BLACKIBROWN/WHITE RELATIONS: RACE RELATIONS IN THE 1970s. at
121, 122 (Charles V. Willie ed., 1977).
30. Critical Race Theory has long insisted on the importance of institutional racism, broadly
conceived. See Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT at xvi (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds.. 1995): see also Frank 1. Michelman,
Foreword: "Racialism" and Reason, 95 MICH. L. REV. 723, 728 n.25 (1997) ("[Tlhe CRT
premise... is, of course, precisely that of an institutional racism whose extent and effects far
exceed the kinds of expression of it that colorblind law can remedy."). Among the important
Critical Race Theory works addressing racism generally are JODY DAVID ARMOUR.
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA
(1997); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMIANENCE OF RACISM
(1992); John 0. Calmore, Race/tsm Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thiry. 52 U.
MIAMI~ L. REV. 1067 (1998); Anthony Cook, Cultural Racism and the Limits of Rationality in the
Saga of Rodney King, 70 DENy. U. L. REV. 297 (1993); Peggy C. Davis. Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); and Charles R. Lawrence I11. The ld. the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism. 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
31. David Wilkins and Mitu Gulati make a similar observation, as do Nijole Benokraitis and
Joe Feagin. See Benokraitis & Feagin, supra note 29. at 128: David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati.
Why Are Tere So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis. 84
CAL. L. REV. 493, 509 (1996).
32. See GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISN AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFILMATIVE ACTION 9
(1991) ("Institutional racism occurs when a firm uses a practice that is race-neutral (intrinsically
free of racial bias) but that nevertheless has an adverse impact on blacks as a group."): FEAGIN &
FEAGIN, supra note 18, at 31-33 (discussing "indirect institutionalized discrimination"). For
others, institutional racism means any sort of discrimination produced by large-scale. stable social
arrangements, whether generated through individual action (bigoted or otherwise) or not. See
Louis L. KNOWLES & KENNETH PREWrTT. INSTITUTIONAL RAcISM IN AMERICA 5 (1969).
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technical and popular levels. In the technical sense, the phenomenon at
issue is institutional racism because it involves unconsidered actions rooted
in the sorts of institutions contemplated by New Institutionalism: the
background scripts and paths that mark social and organizational life.33 In
the popular sense, it is institutional racism because it describes activity
more likely to arise within the formally organized bodies commonly
referred to as institutions-for example, the courts.34
This Article is organized as follows. Parts II and III consist of the
various elements that together frame the background facts to this Article. In
Part II, I outline the grand jury nomination process as provided for by
statute. I then examine the actual practices described by the judges in their
testimony-the nomination of their friends and neighbors-while also
noting the judges' emphatic denials of discriminatory intent. I then turn to
the numerical evidence of discrimination, which shows that while Mexican
Americans accounted for one of every seven persons in Los Angeles
County during the 1960s, they accounted for only one of every fifty-eight
Los Angeles County grand jurors. I also review evidence demonstrating the
widespread nature of the discrimination evident in East LA 13-widespread
in the sense that Mexican Americans were not the only group victimized,
and in the sense that such anti-Mexican-American discrimination formed
only a small part of a larger pattern of discrimination against that group in
the justice system throughout the Southwest. Finally, I discuss the
importance of nondiscrimination in grand juror selection.
In Part III, I detail the history of reform-or more pointedly, the lack
thereof-in the grand jury system in the years immediately following East
LA 13 and Biltmore 6. I also examine contemporary practices of grand juror
selection in twenty California counties, finding that in all but one, judges
still wield substantial discretionary power. Notably, judges in Los Angeles
continue to nominate all grand jurors. I couple this finding with evidence
that in the 1990s, Los Angeles superior court judges excluded Latino/as
from grand jury service at a six-to-one ratio that rivals the eight-to-one
exclusion of Mexican Americans in the 1960s. Institutional racism of the
sort ascribed to practices of thirty years past seems to be almost equally
prevalent today.
In Part IV, to clarify the theoretical problem this Article addresses, I
detail the failure of purposeful action theories of racism to resolve the
paradox of discrimination absent discriminatory intent evident in East LA
13. In particular, I critique a recent Harvard Law Review article by Richard
33. Cf. Jepperson, supra note 16, at 143 (discussing popular references to "institutional
racism" in relation to more technical understandings of the term "institution" ).
34. I delay offering more precise definitions of "racism" and "institutional racism" until
near the end of this Article. Developing an institutional analysis of racism does not require careful
definitions of those terms at the outset, and such definitions placed early on might prove
distracting. See infra notes 350-352 and accompanying text.
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McAdams that modeled racism as rational action.35 McAdams's article
exhibits several problems in its discussion of racism, but among the most
telling is its failure to offer a credible explanation of racist action by those
who genuinely claim to have no racist intentions. After highlighting the
theoretical challenge posed by nonintentional action, in Part V, I turn to
New Institutionalism. There I emphasize the foundational work of Harold
Garfinkel and position New Institutionalism in terms of other social science
theories of behavior, in particular rational choice theory. I also use this Part
to distinguish between competing conceptions of institutional dynamics,
suggesting the new language of script and path institutionalism.
Applying New Institutionalism to the facts underlying East LA 13, I
begin to develop in Part VI a model of institutional racism. I argue that
script and path institutionalism account for many facets of the judges'
nomination practices, including features otherwise difficult to explain under
other social science theories. In Part VII, I more fully develop the theory of
institutional racism. To demonstrate that the judges' institutionalized
actions amounted to racism, I introduce the notion of racial institutions,
widely shared but unconsidered understandings of race.' I explain the
actions of the Los Angeles superior court judges as a function of their
subscription to and reliance on racial institutions, positing that such
dependence converted institutionalized behavior into institutional racism.
To facilitate the discussion, I develop a typology that distinguishes between
purposeful and institutional racism, and that further divides the latter along
the lines of script and path. I also offer a general definition of racism,
explaining my decision to use that loaded term to describe the social
practices of exclusion examined here, and finally I address limits to the
theory of institutional racism.
To conclude the Article, I consider in Part VIII some doctrinal and
normative ramifications of institutional racism theory." To begin with, I
point out that while many social science theories of racism conceive of that
phenomenon as exceptional and therefore impermanent, institutional theory
pictures racism as both ubiquitous and largely intractable. I then use
institutional racism theory to critique central facets of the Supreme Court's
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence-its exclusive fascination
with purposeful racism, and its increasingly strict equation of purposeful
35. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
36. The emphasis on racial institutions makes clear the extent to which the approach taken in
this Article is indebted to, but quite different from, the methodological individualism set forth in
perhaps the best known legal work on unconscious racism. Charles Lawrence's The Id. the Ego.
and Equal Protection. See Lawrence, supra note 30. at 317.
37. Though I do not explore this point further, note that while the methodology relied on here
is predictive, it is not prescriptive in the manner common to legal scholarship. See Edward L
Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WiS. L. REv. 521. 537, 542. 1 do not offer
prescriptions based on the analysis offered here, though of course prescriptive implications of this
analysis abound.
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racism with the open consideration of race. Institutional analysis
demonstrates that the current Supreme Court's reasoning is exactly
backward: Racism occurs frequently-and perhaps predominantly-
without any specific invocation of race, while the explicit consideration of
race may have as its aim racism's amelioration rather than perpetuation.
Finally, I turn from doctrinal to normative concerns, considering
whether the pallid language of institutionalism is appropriate to the terrible
scourge of racism. I argue that because much if not most racial harm now
stems from the attenuated cognitive processes described here, we cannot
afford to eschew institutional analysis as a theoretical tool. We should view
those processes not merely as institutional, however, but as institutional
racism-thereby emphasizing the force and urgency of our obligation to
respond to these immensely harmful but previously little-recognized social
and organizational dynamics.
II. DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION OF Los ANGELES
COUNTY GRAND JURORS
Unlike trial jurors, who sit for at most a few civil or criminal trials,
grand jurors usually sit for an entire year and serve an independent, quasi-
judicial, quasi-investigative function.38 In California, each county must seat
a grand jury, and the juries play two important roles: They operate as part
of the criminal justice system, voting or refusing criminal indictments; and
they serve as a watchdog over local government, examining the conduct of
county officials.39 In this Part, I set out the means by which Los Angeles
County superior court judges nominated grand jurors, and examine
evidence of discrimination against Mexican Americans.
A. Discretion Codified
In the decade leading up to 1970, the California Penal Code provided a
complex set of instructions regarding the selection of grand jurors.0 To a
large extent, these instructions focused on the role of jury commissioners.4
A state statute charged the jury commissioner with the duty to "diligently
inquire and inform himself in respect to the qualifications of persons
38. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN
INSTITUTION ON TRIAL (1975) (examining the history and operation of grand juries).
39. See California Rural Legal Assistance, A Study of Grand Jury Service by Persons of
Spanish Surname and by Indians in Selected California Counties, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN TIlE SOUTIIWEST 112,
113 (1970) [hereinafter CRLA Grand Jury Study].
40. For a contemporaneous overview of grand juror selection procedures. see William George
Prahl, Comment, The Civil Petitioner's Right to Representative Grand Juries and a Statistical
Method of Showing Discrimination in Jury Selection Cases Generally, 20 UCLA L. REV. 581,
631-34 (1973).
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 903.1 (West 1972).
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resident in his county who may be liable to be summoned for grand jury
duty,"4 2 and to "return to the judges the list of persons recommended by
him for grand jury duty."43 In turn, " [t]he judges of the superior court [were
to] examine the jury list so returned and from such list a majority of the
judges may select, to serve as grand jurors ... such persons as, in their
opinion, should be selected for grand jury duty.""
In fact, however, jury commissioners rarely prepared such lists, and
even when they did, judges rarely selected from them. Instead, judges
routinely nominated their personal acquaintances. Despite the elaborate
procedures spelled out in adjacent provisions of the Penal Code, the Code
authorized superior court judges to nominate whom they would, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required of all grand jurors: 5
The judges are not required to select any names from the list
returned by the jury commissioner, but may, if in their judgment
the due administration of justice requires, make all or any
selections from among the body of persons in the county suitable
and competent to serve as grand jurors regardless of the list
returned by the jury commissioner.'
Picking nominees from among social acquaintances constituted the
standard practice, the one followed by almost all superior court judges,
including Los Angeles County's.47 As one contemporary commentator put
it, "The usual practice is for Superior Court judges to submit nominations
of whomever they wish for prospective grand jurors.""
42. Id. § 903.2.
43. Id. § 903.3.
44. Id.
45. Prerequisites for grand jury service included the possession of U.S. citizenship, being 21
years of age, one year of residence within the pertinent county, "sufficient knowledge of the
English language," and being of ordinary intelligence. CAL. CI'. PROC. CODE § 198 (West 1982).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 903.4. Not surprisingly. jury commissioners rarely bothered to
compile jury lists. As one court held in rejecting a defendant's claim to have suffered harm
because a jury commissioner failed to compile a jury list:
[Ilt would be unreasonable to interpret the statute to require ithe jury
commissioner] ... to prepare a list of persons qualified to serve as grand
jurors... [where the judges] determined the due administration of justice required
them to make the selection of grand jurors from among the body of persons in the
county.
People v. Goodspeed, 99 Cal. Rptr. 696, 701 (Ct. App. 1972).
47. See CRLA Grand Jury Study, supra note 39. at 115.
48. Patricia Mar, The California Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy. I PAC. L. 36, 41
(1970). Despite the ability to nominate anyone otherwise qualified for grand jury service, judges
did not typically select grand jurors directly. Rather, a final step in the selection process placed the
gloss of chance over a process that was otherwise largely discretionary. Judicial nominations were
compiled into a list, and from this list the county clerk either wrote the names on pieces of paper
or assigned markers, placing these in a box from which grand jurors were randomly selected. See
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 900, 912.
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B. Judicial Practice: Friends and Neighbors
The testimony of Los Angeles superior court judges in East LA 13
confirms that the judges turned almost exclusively to their acquaintances in
selecting nominees for grand jury service. Drawing from a list of each
judge's nominations over the previous decade, Acosta asked the testifying
judges to specify their relationship to each nominee. The results were
startling, as judge after judge explained the close social relations he
maintained with the persons he nominated; they were, in effect, the judges'
friends and neighbors.
Consider the testimony of Judge Joseph Call, on the Los Angeles
superior court since 1957."9 Acosta here questions Judge Call about several
of his nominees:
Q ..... Do you know a Dora Rombeau, R-o-m-b-e-a-u?
A. Very well.
Q. How long have you known Mrs. Rombeau?
A. Well, it would go back to approximately the very early, early
1950s .... She is the wife of Dr. Rombeau, an outstanding
physician, I believe, in Burbank. I know Dr. Rombeau and Mrs.
Rombeau because they have been members of the Los Angeles
Tennis Club since the early '50s, where I am, met them as
members of the club. I see them twice a week on the courts at
the Los Angeles Tennis Club, and have since 1950.
Q. Do you know a Maureen Campbell?
A. Oh, yes, indeed. Yes, indeed.
Q. And how long have you known her?
A. Well, let's see. I place the time through her husband, Mr. Alex
Campbell of the Los Angeles Herald, and that would go back to
the time he joined the Los Angeles Tennis Club .... I joined
there in 1932, '33, and Campbell came in in about 1955, and
that is when I met his wife, so I'd say from 1955.
Q. Thank you. Do you know a Mr. George Goman?
A. Very well.
Q. Is Mr. Goman a member of the tennis club, too?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know Mrs. Leona McNeill?
A. Very well.
49. See KENNETH JAMES ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 292-93
(1968).
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Q. Is she a member of the tennis club?
A. Well, I don't know whether she is. I know she plays there on
weekends. She may have what is known as an associate
membership through her husband, who is a member.50
Judge Call nominated a total of ten people to be grand jurors over the
course of twelve years. He knew the five he mentioned in the above
exchange as friends from the Los Angeles Tennis Club. In addition, Judge
Call testified that he also knew his sixth, seventh, and eighth nominees
through the same club.5 Of the two nominees he did not know through
tennis, Judge Call described one as "an outstanding citizen" whom he had
known for approximately ten years when he nominated him, while the other
he described as "a forthright member of the community, a housewife, if I
remember correctly." 52
Judge Call may be atypical in his nominating practices, but only to the
extent that he drew from a narrower circle than did most;" to the extent that
Judge Call nominated his friends, his conduct typified that of the other
judges. The following colloquy between Acosta and Judge Bayard Rhone
regarding the latter's nominees, though lengthy, demonstrates more fully
the tendency of judges to select nominees from among close acquaintances:
Q. Do you know a Grant Goodale?
A. Ido.
Q. In what capacity do you know Mr. Goodale?
A. Oh, I have known him for 30 years, I guess.
Q. In what capacity have you known him?
A. A business acquaintance, friend, socially.
Q. Do you know a Mrs. Ruth Stransky?
A. Ido.
Q. How long and in what capacity have you known Mrs.
Stransky?
A. I don't know. I suppose 10 or 12 years, neighbor.
Q. Do you know a Colonel K. Charles Bean, B-e-a-n?
A. Yes.
Q. How long have you known Colonel Bean, and in what
capacity?
50. Transcript, supra note 8. at 378-81; see also id. at 561-65 (testimony of Judgc Kenneth N.
Chantry).
51. See id. at 395-96 (testimony of Judge Call regarding Grace Van der Hof. Cornwall
Jackson, and Patricia Yeomans).
52. Id. at 376-77 (testimony of Judge Call regarding Mrs. Marius Biencourt).
53. Cf. id at 561-65 (testimony of Judge Kenneth N. Chantry regarding nomination of
acquaintances from the Wilshire Country Club).
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A. Well, I guess I have known him about 25 years, and I have met
him through the church association.
Q. Did you know a Kenneth Payne?
A. Ido.
Q. How long and in what capacity did you know Mr. Payne?
A. Oh, probably 15 years, and I met him also through the church.
Q. Do you know a Charles Fuller?
A. Ido.
Q. Was Mr. Fuller a friend of yours?
A. Yes, we eventually became very friendly.
Q. Do you know a Harold Dryden, D-r-y-d-e-n?
A. Ido.
Q. How long have you known Mr. Dryden?
A. About eight or nine years.
Q. In what capacity do you know Mr. Dryden?
A. I met him through various Camellia societies that he belongs to
and that I belong to.
Q. Sorry, what kind of societies?
A. Camellia societies.
Q. Do you know a Mr. Raymond Abernathy?
A. Ido.
Q. How long did you know Mr. Abernathy prior to 1965?
A. I suppose 20 years.
Q. Was he a friend of yours?
A. Yes....
Q. Do you know a Philip Couturier, C-o-u-t-u-r-i-e-r?
A. Ido.
Q. How long had you known Mr. Couturier prior to 1965?
A. I met him, I think, in 1952.
Q. In what capacity did you know[ ] Mr. Couturier?
A. He was a member of my Masonic Lodge.
Q. Do you know an Avery Munger?
A. Ido.
Q. How long and in what capacity did you know Mr. Munger?
A. I think I got acquainted with him through our children in
Sunday school, and they must have been about eight or nine
then, and that would make it about 20 years ago.
Q. [Do you know a] Mr. William Coberly?
A. Ido.
Q. How long and in what capacity did you know Mr. Coberly?
Institutional Racism
A. Let's see. I have known him about six or seven years. He is a
member of the board of trustees of my church.
Q. What church is this, Your Honor?
A. First Congregational Church of Los Angeles.5
Judge Rhone's nominees included a friend of thirty years, a neighbor of
ten, church acquaintances of fifteen and twenty-five years, a fellow
Camellia society member, a fellow Mason, and a member of the board of
trustees of his church.55 Judge Rhone traveled in a particular orbit,
apparently wider than that of Judge Call, but still quite restricted. The
judges' social orbits, however, seemed to mark the outer boundaries of the
set of potential grand jurors. Exercising the responsibility to nominate
grand jurors, Judges Call and Rhone nominated their neighbors and friends.
From outside this circle they drew virtually no one.
C. Inside the Circle
In their nominating practices, Judges Rhone and Call typified the
conduct of the other superior court judges. In this respect, consider
Appendices A and B. Appendix A, which draws from the testimony of the
thirty-three judges whom Acosta put on the stand in East LA 13, compiles
tables of the judges' nominees. It also excerpts the judges' descriptions of
their relationships to the persons they nominated, and characterizes those
relationships in several ways-for instance, as "friend" or "neighbor."
Appendix B summarizes the results.
Among other things, Appendix B shows the following: The thirty-three
judges submitted 255 nominations in the years between 1959 and 1968,
though because they nominated several persons more than once, individual
nominees numbered only 230.56 Keeping in mind that the judges described
some nominees in more than one way-for example, as both friend and
neighbor-note that the judges characterized fifty-three percent of their
nominations as friends, and described twenty-six percent as co-members of
a church, civic organization, or club. The judges also described eight
percent as neighbors, seven percent as the spouses of acquaintances, and
two percent as family members.57 In addition, the judges testified that
54. 1& at 660-66.
55. See id.
56. Judge Emil Gumpert proved the most persistent in nominating the same person over and
over, nominating Georges M. George every year between and including 1959 and 1968. See id. at
295. When Acosta asked Judge Gumpert whether he had -made any attempts whatsoever to find
qualified persons of Spanish surname to serve on the Grand Jury." the judge answered: "No. I
thought that I would try to have Mr. George selected, and then I would go from there for another
10 years." Id. at 299.
57. The percentages given are measured in terms of total nominations, rather than in terms of
individual nominees. Thus, when Judge Gumpert nominated his friend Georges George 10 times.
his brother-in-law twice, and his neighbor once, see id. at 295. 304. the percentages would show
that 77% of the nominations were of a friend (10 nominations of Georges George out of 13 total
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thirteen percent, or thirty-four, were business acquaintances. However, the
judges described twenty-eight of these thirty-four as also friends, neighbors,
or co-members of a church, civic organization, or club.58 The judges failed
to identify just forty-four, or seventeen percent, of all of the nominations, as
some sort of social acquaintance. Put the other way, the judges counted
fully eighty-three percent of their nominations as social acquaintances (211
out of 255). 9
While astounding, these numbers should not lead one to conclude that
forty-four nominations-those not described as a social acquaintance of
some sort-came from outside the judges' social circles. Of these forty-
four, the judges explained that seventeen were recommended by a friend,
family relation, fellow club member, or another judge-another seven
percent of the total nominations.' In only one case did a judge describe
soliciting a nominee's name in order to achieve a cross section of the
community on the grand jury.61
Two points bear emphasizing here. First, nine out of ten nominees came
from within the judges' social circles-the eighty-three percent involving a
friend, neighbor, family member, spouse of an acquaintance, or co-member
of a club, organization, or church, and the seven percent ascribed to
recommendations made by someone within those same circles or a fellow
judge. If you did not personally know a judge, or know someone who did,
there was little to no chance of serving on the Los Angeles County grand
jury. Second, all of the thirty-three judges testified to effectively the same
nominations), 15% were of a family member (two out of 13), and 8% were of a neighbor (one out
of 13). While the percentages offered in this example sum to 100%, that is only because Judge
Gumpert described each of his nominees in a manner that could be characterized in a single
fashion.
58. Compare Judge Rhone's description of nominee Grant Goodale, see id. at 661 ("Oh, I
have known him for 30 years, I guess.... A business acquaintance, friend, socially."), with Judge
William H. Levit's description of nominee Desmond Moody, see id. at 583 ("I'd say [I have
known him for] in excess of 20 years.... I knew him in business when I practiced law. I think he
has been at my house and I have been at his house. I wouldn't say that we are intimate social
friends, anything like that, but I know him.").
59. See Appendix B.
60. Compare Judge John Frazer's description of nominee James Cantlen, see Transcript,
supra note 8, at 532 (" [H]is name was suggested to me by one of the other Judges... and we
both had a very dear mutual friend in San Francisco, and I knew of him by reputation .... ") with
that of Judge Thomas C. Yager regarding nominee Elizabeth Snayd, see id. at 814 ("1 have no
recollection of her, except as I have indicated about a few of the others, that I had met her and had
a discussion with her, and she was recommended, and I nominated her.").
61. Judge Raymond R. Roberts described his nomination of Eleanor Brown in 1968 in the
following terms:
I made a canvass of all of my friends and acquaintances in public life to get people
nominated from minority, ethnic, and geographical areas. Either Councilman Bradley
or Councilman Mills nominated her as a person who was of the black race and lived in
the Watts area, and on their recommendations I nominated her, because there was a
paucity of nominees from that area.
Id. at 736. Although not in response to a question about a particular nominee, one judge did imply
that he nominated "the only Negro lady that has served on the Jury for years" out of a concern for
securing the representation of a cross section of the community. Id. at 566 (testimony of Judge
Kenneth N. Chantry).
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system in selecting nominees: They picked persons casually from among
their personal acquaintances.62 For some, as for Judge Call, this meant
primarily their friends at the club.63 For others, as for Judge Rhone, it
included their friends at church.' For yet others, it amounted to their
friends in the business world,65 or their neighbors, or their colleagues in
civic organizations. 67 Sometimes, to be sure, they relied on the
recommendations of fellow judges, but otherwise no judge described a
different method of selecting nominees, save the one judge who reported
that, once, he had solicited a nomination to increase community
representation on the grand jury.6 In short, then, the testimony of the
judges with respect to the persons they actually nominated suggests that the
judges all followed the same practice of nominating persons from within
their circle of friends and acquaintances.'
D. Outside the Circle
While the judges selected nominees from within their social circle,
much of Los Angeles County lived beyond their ken. In particular, the
judges knew few, if any, Mexican Americans.
Consider again Judge Call. Acosta, noting that Judge Call had drawn
eight of his ten nominees from the Los Angeles Tennis Club, questioned the
judge regarding the club membership of any Mexican Americans. The
judge claimed that tennis champions Pancho Segura and Pancho Gonzales
had honorary memberships, as did the captain of the Mexican Davis Cup
62. Consider a former grand juror's description of the typical selection practice:
Sometimes I think [making grand juror nominations) is lost in the shuffle and
maybe a week or a month before grand jury nominations are called for they start around
and find out who they play bridge with and this man's wife is part of the bridge circuit.
This man is wanting retirement. This man is tired of golf.
2 CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
EFFICIENCY AND ECON., TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON THE CALIFORNIA COUNTY GRAND JURY
SYSTEM 36 (1967) [hereinafter EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY] (testimony of Skipper Rostker,
member of the 1966 Los Angeles County grand jury).
63. See supra notes 51-52; see also Transcript. supra note 8. at 561-64 (Judge Chantry).
64. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 8, at 662, 665 (Judge Bayard Rhone).
65. See, e.g., idU at 583-86 (Judge William Levit).
66. See, e.g., id. at 404,408, 410 (Judge George A. Dockweiler).
67. See, e.g., id. at 782-87 (Judge William B. Neeley).
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69. The numbers derived from the East LA 13 transcript correspond to similar calculations
based on a 1969 survey of Los Angeles superior court judges regarding their nominations in two
years, 1962 and 1968, conducted as part of the defense in the trial of Sirhan Sirhan for the
assassination of Robert F. Kennedy. See Mar, supra note 48, at 41-42. The data in Sirhan
demonstrated the following:
Fifty-one percent of the nominees were personal friends or neighbors of the judges
who nominated them. Another 42 percent were either professional acquaintances,
fellow members of a social or service group, or recommended by a friend of the judge.
The addresses of the nominees were clustered around the addresses of the judges in the
more affluent areas of the county. Few of the nominees were selected from areas where
minority groups were concentrated.
Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
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team, though he could not say whether any other Mexican Americans
belonged to the 500- to 700-member club.70
Acosta also asked Judge Call whether he knew any Mexican Americans
generally:
Q. Do you know any Mexican-Americans, Judge?
A. Well, the gentleman that is a gardener at my house is a
Mexican-American. I just signed his citizenship papers. I guess
now he is a double-fledged citizen, if that's what you mean.
Q. Do you know any persons of Mexican descent who were born
here in this country?
A. Mexican descent? If I do, I can't recall them. I probably do.
Over the period of my life I have met thousands, hundreds. I
have met many, many, but I can't recall it from memory.
Undoubtedly, undoubtedly I know many of them. Certainly I
do.
Let me see. Born in this country? You are asking the
question, saying born here, did you? Or is that right?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Well, of course I do. But I can't enumerate them. It takes in
such a vast field.
Q. But you do know some?
A. Undoubtedly.7'
Or consider the questioning of Judge Harold W. Schweitzer, on the
bench since the spring of 1952:
Q. I would like to ask you whether or not during the past 10 years
you have known any persons of Spanish surname?72
A. Yes, I have known many.
Q. Approximately how many, Your Honor?
A. I'd say hundreds... [d]own in Mazatldn, Mexico.
Q. Not here in the United States, then?
A. No.
70. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 389-90, 399. Judge Call assured Acosta, "lIm sure
honorary memberships have been given to all of those men. They are frequent visitors at the club,
frequent." Id. at 390.
71. Id. at 386-87.
72. "Persons of Spanish Surname" reflects the use of surname as a basis for classification by
the U.S. Census Bureau. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WE Tile
MEXICAN AMERICANS, NOSOTROS LOS MtXICO AMERICANOS 4 (1984); see also FRANK D.
BEAN & MARTA TIENDA, THE HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 45 (1987)
("Information about Spanish surnames ... was begun in 1950 as a means of identifying the native
or native parentage population of Mexican origin.").
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Q. Okay. I'm referring to persons here in the United States, Your
Honor, specifically in the California area. Do you know any
persons of Spanish surname within the area here, the general
area?
A. Yes, I know some.
Q. Approximately how many do you know?
A. Oh, when you say "know them," I know them only on a
speaking basis, just to say hello, and maybe call them by their
name, and they maybe know me by name; I'd say several
dozen, I'd say, around the Civic Center here.
Oh, some of them were working inside the Courthouse
building, men that I would see almost daily, and others would
be working around as gardeners, around the Civic Center.
Q. Then are the persons that you said that you know with Spanish
surnames, are these persons that worked around and inside the
Courthouse?
A. Both in and around the Courthouse area.73
Judges Call and Schweitzer did not hesitate to claim to know persons
with Spanish surnames. Indeed, they initially claimed to know many.
Nevertheless, they could not actually recall the name of even one Mexican-
American acquaintance. There is little reason to include excerpts from the
testimony of other judges, because all answered to more or less the same
effect: They could never name more than one or two Mexican Americans,
and even then, they frequently named gardeners or servants.' The judges
made a practice of nominating persons to serve as grand jurors from within
their social circles, yet few Mexican Americans moved within those
bounds.
73. Transcript, supra note 8, at 310-11, 316.
74. Consider the following exchange between Acosta and Judge Samuel Greenfield:
Q. Do you know any Spanish-surnamed persons in Los Angeles County?
A. One or two.
Q. Are these persons friends of yours?
A. No, they are domestics.
Q. Do they work as domestics for you, or for other people?
A. For us.
Q. Do you know any other Spanish-surnamed persons other than these two?
A. That is, I personally know them, is that what you are asking?
Q. Well, yes, your Honor.
A. The answer is no.
Id. at 722; see also id. at 419 (testimony of Judge George A. Dockweiler) ("The only Mexican-
American man I know is the man who runs the gasoline station at Larchmont and First Strect. He
is of Mexican extraction.").
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E. Extraracial Discrimination
Of course, others besides Mexican Americans lived beyond the circle of
the judges' familiarity. As one would expect, numerous social biases
informed the jury nomination process. Consider in this context the
testimony of the 1966 Los Angeles County grand jury foreman, Averill
Munger, describing to a legislative committee on grand jury reform his
elevation to that post:
Munger. [W]hen our group of 23 ... became jurors, then the
presiding judge of the Superior Court, Judge Nix, last year, and
Judge Alarcon, the criminal calendar judge, presiding judge of the
criminal calendar court, those two men called four or five of the
male jurors, and there were only, I think, nine of us. We were
outnumbered by women for the first time in the history of the grand
jury. At any rate, these two men picked four or five of us who they
thought might be good foremen, and we were interviewed in the
judges' chambers.
[Committee Chair] McMillan. They didn't think any women
would make good foremen?
Munger. Well, evidently not. Actually, when I was appointed
the judge asked me if I belonged to any group that threatened a
change in our government, and I said, yes, I did-I belonged to the
Republican Associates, and I guess with Judge Nix being a strong
Republican, they made me foreman. So that's how I became
foreman.75
As in so many places, the dryness of the transcript leaves us wondering.
In what tone did Munger relate the easy exclusion of women from
consideration as jury foreman? How long was the pause between Munger's
"evidently not" and his "Actually, .. ." and on to the next subject? The
tone and the pause might help us to understand whether the exclusion of
women troubled Munger, or seemed to him insignificant. But perhaps we
can simply infer a light tone and a short pause, for up until this century,
women were routinely excluded from positions of public office, including
juries, "because of a defect of sex," as Blackstone explained.76 And
through this century, such discrimination has continued in subtle, seemingly
natural ways." Among the judges, as apparently for Munger, women
seemed to warrant diminished confidence as a matter of routine.
75. EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY, supra note 62, at 59-60 (testimony of Averill Munger).
76. FRANKEL & NAFFALIS, supra note 38, at 34 (quoting Blackstone).
77. The first case to hold squarely that the exclusion of women from jury venires violated the
Constitution did not come until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). In that decision, eight
justices reasoned that "the fair-cross-section requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion
of women .... [A] flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded." Id. at 531-32
(citations omitted). Justice Rehnquist entered the lone dissent, chastising the majority because
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Notice also Munger's elevation to grand jury foreman seemingly by
virtue of his Republican credentials, so wittily invoked. The close
juxtaposition of the way Munger benefited from gender and political party
affiliation usefully demonstrates the range of social norms implicated in the
judges' selection of grand jurors. Some of the norms relied upon, such as
those involving race and gender, drew on what we now regard as among the
most injurious myths of difference. Others, such as party affiliation or
country club membership, seem by current standards only moderately
pernicious. And still others, such as class and profession, currently seem to
lie somewhere in-between. Yet all operated to skew the distribution of
grand jurors away from one reflecting a cross section of the community.
The discrimination apparent in the judges' selection practices favored a
narrow group of people, and excluded many, many more. Though the
favored group supposedly represented the population as a whole, it instead
reflected one version of the elite, a group of people on the higher rungs of a
host of social hierarchies.78
F. Discrimination by the Numbers
To gain a clearer perspective on the extent of the exclusion of Mexican
Americans, consider Table 1. In doing so, keep in mind that Mexican
Americans constituted approximately ten percent of the population of Los
Angeles County in 1960, and just over eighteen percent in 1970.
"this 'flavor' is not of such importance that the Constitution is offcnded if any given petit jury is
not so enriched. This smacks more of mysticism than of law." Id. at 542 (citation omitted).
78. A more exact sense of the skew in typical grand juries emerges from a study of their
operation in Alameda County, which includes Oakland, over the 1 I years from 1959 to 1969. See
Prahl, supra note 40. The study's findings include the following: Judges nominated men ahead of
women, and Republicans over Democrats, by a ratio of seven to three in both cases. See id. at 640.
Judges nominated Whites more often than Blacks, Asians, Mexican Americans, and Native
Americans combined by almost nine to one. See id. Judges nominated persons over 50 at four
times the rate of persons under that age; persons with some higher education over persons with a
secondary education or less by a margin of seven to two; and persons with an annual income of
$12,000 or more ahead of persons with an annual income of S10.000 or less at a rate of nine to
one. See id. Finally, more than half of the Republican grand jurors knew more than six other grand
jurors from other panels, and 30% of the Republicans knew between 1 and 30 other grand jurors.
See id. at 641. Out of Alameda's total population, those selected to serve as grand jurors
constituted a very small group of people, many if not most of them friends or friends of friends.
79. See I BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POPULATION 6-24 tbl.7 (1963); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUN'Y
AND CITY DATA BOOK, 1972, at 16-32 tbl.2 (1973); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME, at 195 tbl.15 (1963).
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TABLE 1. PARTICIPATION OF SPANISH-SURNAMED PERSONS ON
Los ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURIES, 1959-1969
Year Total Number of Number of Number of
Nominations Spanish- Grand Jurors Spanish-
Surnamed Surnamed
Nominees Grand Jurors
1959 132 1(0.8%) 19 0
1960 146 2(1.4%) 19 0
1961 148 3 (2.0%) 19 0
1962 144 4 (2.8%) 19 0
1963 140 5(3.6%) 19 0
1964 155 7(4.5%) 23 0
1965 152 6(3.9%) 22 2(9.1%)
1966 162 5(3.1%) 23 0
1967 151 4 (2.6%) 24 1 (4.2%)
1968 171 3 (1.8%) 23 1(4.3%)
1969 189 7(3.7%) 23 0
TOTAL 1690 47 (2.8%) 233 4(1.7%)
Source: Edward A. Villalobos, Comment, Grand Jury Discrimination and the Mexican
American, 5 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 87, 109-10 (1972).
Stark numbers buttress Acosta's charge that the judges of the Los
Angeles superior court discriminated against Mexican Americans in the
nomination of grand jurors. In the eleven years between and including 1959
and 1969, Los Angeles superior court judges made 1690 grand juror
nominations, but the number of nominated Mexican Americans totaled only
forty-seven. Of these, a single judge nominated twelve."' Thus, Mexican
Americans constituted less than three percent of the grand jury
nominations, and if the actions of a single judge are set aside, the
percentage drops to no more than two percent. The number of Mexican
Americans actually seated as grand jurors is even more dismal. Members of
this community constituted only four of 233 grand jurors in the years
between 1959 and 1969; that is, they constituted no more than 1.7% of all
grand jurors in that period. If one assumes that Mexican Americans
constituted on average fourteen percent of the population of Los Angeles
County during this period, they were underrepresented on Los Angeles
grand juries by a ratio of eight to one.8 Put another way, during the 1960s,
80. See Edward A. Villalobos, Comment, Grand Jury Discrimination and the Mexican
American, 5 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 87, 109 (1972).
81. According to one study of grand jury discrimination, "The principles espoused by both
judges and mathematicians would indicate that a long continued disparity of 3:1 or more between
the percentage of minority grand jurors and the minority group percentage of the community
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Mexican Americans counted for one of every seven persons in Los
Angeles, but only one of every thirty-six nominees and one of every fifty-
eight grand jurors. It seems safe to assume that prior to the 1960s, the
exclusion of Mexican Americans was even greater." These numbers
bespeak discrimination, whether or not as a result of the conscious decision
of any individual judge.83
G. Jury Discrimination and the Southwestern Justice System
In 1970, the United States Commission on Civil Rights published a
report entitled Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice in the
Southwest.84 As part of this study, the Commission engaged California
Rural Legal Assistance, a legal aid organization, to study grand juror
selection across the twenty California counties with the largest Mexican-
American populations8s The CRLA study confirmed the claims of Acosta
and the East LA 13 and Biltmore 6 defendants that Los Angeles County
substantially excluded Mexican Americans from grand jury service.' The
study also found similar manners and levels of discrimination across the
twenty counties examined: "Generally speaking, the judges nominate as
grand jurors those whom they or other prominent persons they know deem
qualified. As a result, the racial, ethnic, social and economic composition of
grand juries in California is limited by the acquaintanceship of the superior
court judges." 87 And "in every county studied, the percentage of the
minority group grand jurors was significantly less than the minority group
percentage of the general population, the disparity varying from substantial
in the best counties to grotesque in the worst." 88
The discrimination against Mexican Americans evident in East LA 13
and Biltmore 6 was not unique. Rather, the CRLA grand jury study
indicated that nearly every superior court judge in California nominated
raises a presumption of unconstitutional selection. A 3:1 disparity is 'very decided.- CRLA
Grand Jury Study, supra note 39, at 115.
82. A study of the Los Angeles grand jury published in 1945 noted that -[a]s far as the writer
was able to discover no Mexicans have ever been chosen for jury duty." Edwin M. Lemert. The
Grand Jury as an Agency of Social Control, 10 AM. Soc. REV. 751. 753 (1945).
83. Consider the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Hernandec %,. Texas.
Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain class will
serve on a particular jury or during some particular period. But it taxes our credulity to
say that mere chance resulted in there being no members of this class among the over
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The result bespeaks discrimination.
whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury
commissioner.
347 U.S. 475,482 (1954).
84. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN A.MERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST (1970).
85. See CRIA Grand Jury Study, supra note 39. at 112.
86. See id. at 123-24.
87. Id. at 114.
88. Id. at 119.
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friends and acquaintances to, and routinely excluded Mexican Americans
and other minorities from, grand jury service. Moreover, such routine
mistreatment overflowed the narrow sphere of grand jury nominations and
spread throughout the whole judicial system. Thus, the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights report located grand jury discrimination within a larger
pattern of discrimination against Mexican Americans in the administration
of justice. The report's findings demonstrated that the justice system
throughout the Southwest replicated the substantial mistreatment of
Mexican Americans evident in the grand juror selection practices of the Los
Angeles superior court judges.89
H. Nondiscrimination
The exclusion of Mexican Americans from California grand juries,
whether in the 1960s or today, may seem relatively minor when considered
against the weight of all discriminations suffered by minority communities,
and so it is.9" Nevertheless, such exclusion is far from trivial, especially to
the extent that it reflects, as this Article argues it does, ubiquitous forms of
institutional racism. Even on its own terms, however, the social importance
of nondiscrimination in the empanelment of grand juries can be measured
on ideal, pragmatic, and symbolic levels.
1. Ideals
Nondiscrimination is a deeply embedded ideal in our society, one long
extolled as an essential if often imperfectly realized feature of the grand
jury system. In 1970, the Supreme Court wrote,
89. The Commission's report recorded the following problems. In the interaction between
the police and the members of Mexican-American communities: (1) incidents of excessive police
violence; (2) discriminatory treatment of juveniles; (3) discriminatory enforcement of motor
vehicle ordinances; (4) excessive use of "stop and frisk" techniques and "investigation" arrests:
(5) general discourtesy; and (6)instances of law-enforcement interference with "Mexican
American organizational efforts aimed at improving the conditions of Mexican Americans in the
Southwest." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 84, at 88. In bail proceedings:
(1) application of unduly rigid standards for release of Mexican Americans on their own
recognizance; (2) failure to give bail hearings until long after persons were taken into custody; and
(3) a practice of "setting of excessive bail to punish Mexican Americans rather than to guarantee
their appearance for trial." Id. With respect to juries: (1) failure on the part of judges and
jury commissioners to undertake affirmative efforts to obtain a cross section of the community;
(2) extensive use of preemptory challenges to remove Mexican Americans from petit juries; and
(3) in general, a "serious and widespread underrepresentation of Mexican Americans on grand
and petit State juries." Id. Finally, in terms of employment within law enforcement organizations:
(1) "neither police departments, sheriffs' offices, nor State law enforcement agencies employ
Mexican Americans in significant numbers"; and (2) "[o]ther agencies in charge of the
administration of justice-courts, district attorneys' offices, and the Department of Justice-also
have significantly fewer Mexican American employees than the proportion of Mexican Americans
in the general population." Id. at 89.
90. On contemporary grand juror selection practices, see infra notes 145-151 and
accompanying text.
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Whether [grand] jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a
duty, the State may no more extend it to some of its citizens and
deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously
discriminate in the offering and withholding of the elective
franchise .... That kind of discrimination contravenes the very idea
of a jury--" a body truly representative of the community .... ." 9t
For the Court, the grand jury resembles the vote: Both institutions
serve democracy, while racial discrimination in either undermines it. In
this ideal view, popular self-governance and racial nondiscrimination are
inextricably tied together. Thus, on one level, the cherished national ideals
of racial nondiscrimination and democracy require efforts to ensure the
representation of a cross section of the community on grand juries.'
2. Pragmatic Concerns
On a less ideal level, nondiscrimination should govern grand juror
selection because grand juries carry considerable civic responsibility. In this
context, recall the California grand juries' sweeping responsibility to vote
or refuse indictments. Given these powers, the absence of members of the
groups most directly affected by the criminal process-the poor, the young,
and minorities-raises questions of basic fairness.93 More directly, the
presence of minorities on the 1968 and 1969 Los Angeles grand juries
might have resulted in closer scrutiny of cases such as East LA 13 and
Biltmore 6.94
Recall also that California required grand juries to investigate and
report on county government, including the conduct of public officials and
the expenditure of public funds.9 As one commentator observed, "In terms
of the California grand jury's overall effort ... the indictment function is
relatively minor (in some counties, nonexistent) compared to its
91. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970). Carter marks the first time that the
Supreme Court recognized the right of potential jurors, rather than defendants, to challenge jury-
selection practices under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
92. Vikram Amar argues at length that "the link between jury service and other rights of
political participation such as voting is an important part of our overall constitutional structure."
Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L REv.
203, 206 (1995); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 95 (1998) (noting the historical link between popular participation on juries
and self-governance).
93. See FRANKEL & NAFTALiS, supra note 38, at 98.
94. See CRLA Grand Jury Study, supra note 39, at 113-14.
95. See CAL- PENAL CODE §§ 919(b)-(c), 925, 928. 933 (West 1972). See generally Bruce
Trevor Olson, The California Grand Jury: An Analysis and Evaluation of Its Watchdog Function
(1966) (unpublished M.C. thesis, University of California (Berkeley)) (on file with the Boalt Hall
Law Library). One statute provided that "[elvery grand jury shall investigate and report upon the
needs of all county officers in the county, including the abolition or creation... (and] the method
or system of performing the duties of, the several offices." CAL. PENAL CODE § 928. Another
required that "[tihe grand jury shall annually make a careful and complete examination of the
accounts and records, especially those pertaining to revenue, of all the officers of the county." Id
§ 925.
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responsibilities as community watchdog." 96 Here again, over the years Los
Angeles grand juries might have taken different routes had a cross section
of the community been on the panels.97 Instead, where the grand juries
pursued investigations, they seemed content with superficial studies that
praised the county's conduct.98
Of course, to expect grand jury activism on behalf of minority
communities may be to expect too much. In criminal matters, grand juries
often serve, at best, as little more than a rubber stamp for the prosecutor
and, at worst, as an accomplice in the abuse of power.99 In civil matters,
96. Olson, supra note 95, at 3; see also Note, Some Aspects of the California Grand Jury
System, 8 STAN. L. REv. 631, 631 (1956) ("Today, the California grand jury typically devotes
most of its time not to considering criminal cases but to watching over the needs of the county, the
conduct of public officials and the expenditure of public funds."). Los Angeles grand juries
devoted approximately one-third of their time to performing such watchdog functions. See Mar,
supra note 48, at 58-59 & n.125.
97. Concerning the grand juries' general investigative powers, the 1970 CRLA study
speculated as follows:
In the course of its general inquiries into governmental affairs, the grand jury
could probe into racial or ethnic biases in city and county hiring ... or in the operation
of housing projects or other local welfare programs. In monitoring the operations of
local government, the grand jury can determine whether all sections of the community
are equally enjoying the benefits of such services as police and fire protection, sewer
and water lines, sidewalks, streets, street lights, parks, swimming, and other
recreational facilities.
CRLA Grand Jury Study, supra note 39, at 113. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights echoed this
sentiment. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 84, at 39.
98. Consider a grand juror's description of a study of the county jail system:
The jails committee is a very light and fascinating job. The big duty was to go up
to the jail in the Hall of Justice for a beautiful luncheon served on the ladies' side and to
be addressed by our sheriff, Peter Pitchess, and others on his staff. Most of the jurors
spent their time enjoying the luncheon. Mr. Dunfore, the Chairman, asked me as the
secretary to make the report, so I went in the kitchen. The cook said... no grand jury
had ever been in the kitchen, and asked me if I would like to taste the clam chowder.
Then I went back and visited the nurse. I examined the medical facilities. I went into
the cells. ... I have heard a lot of criticism, but I was very satisfied.
EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY, supra note 62, at 102 (testimony of Juanita Sayer Erickson, 1962
Los Angeles County grand juror).
99. Consider the following appraisals of grand juries in general: "Day in and day out. the
grand jury affirms what the prosecutor calls upon it to affirm-investigating as it is led, ignonng
what it is never advised to notice, failing to indict or indicting as the prosecutor 'submits' that it
should." FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 38, at 22. Or consider the opinion of a judge and
former prosecutor on the undue influence of prosecutors over grand juries: "Today, the grand jury
is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody.
at any time, for almost anything, before any grand jury." William J. Campbell, Eliminate the
Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973). These general assessments match a
1962 Los Angeles County grand juror's description of the grand jury's indicting function, offered
in response to a question about the proportion of cases brought to them by the district attorney that
resulted in indictments:
Most of them were indictments, because the evidence was good. These people are
not dam fools, especially on a criminal complaint. That's the creme de la creme.
They're not dam fools. If the District Attorney or his aides and the law enforcement
officials with the Attorney General don't have enough evidence, they are not going to
waste our time or theirs. So most of them resulted in indictments .... I call them
revolving door cases .... They come in one door and go out the other, they just keep
this up. Those were all indictments. What did we know?
EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY, supra note 62, at 112-13 (testimony of Juanita Sayer Erickson, 1962
Los Angeles County grand juror).
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they perform only a little better." We should not imagine that the
proportional presence of minorities on California's grand juries would
significantly impact the way they function, either in the criminal sphere or
as community watchdogs. We should, however, expect some effect, even if
not a dramatic one.
3. Symbolic Importance
Finally, nondiscrimination should prevail in grand juror selection for
symbolic reasons as well. Exclusion from organs of self-government
communicates an inferior social position, while participation bespeaks full
civic membership. Consider the opinion of two Mexican-American law
students writing in 1971 on the importance of Mexican-American
participation on California grand juries. Not only did "the exclusion of
Chicanos from Grand Juries remove[] possible safeguards against
misconduct," they wrote, but "misconduct is even encouraged to the extent
that the Chicanos are made to appear inferior, alien and legally outcast." 101
The Supreme Court made a similar point when it wrote in 1970 that "[t]he
exclusion of Negroes from jury service because of their race is 'practically
a brand upon them... an assertion of their inferiority."' 1 2 In contrast,
participation signals acceptance. Consider the comment of Lydia L6pez, a
1971 Los Angeles County grand juror from East Los Angeles: "[S]ince I
am on the grand jury the people from my area feel they have a voice, they
feel terrific about my position." 103
Substantial ideal and pragmatic concerns warrant nondiscrimination in
the selection of grand jurors, but the most important reasons for
nondiscrimination may well be symbolic. In the context of a society that
stereotypes many groups as racially inferior, the equal public representation
of such groups may proclaim the falsity of such ideas, both to the group
That grand jurors should defer to prosecutors is not at all surprising- they are laypersons
temporarily integrated into a highly professionalized criminal justice system. For a description of
how the grand jury's organizational characteristics undermine its independence, see DEBORAH
DAY EMERSON, GRAND JURY REFORM: A REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 21 (1983). See also Andrew
D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused. 80 CORNELL L REV.
260, 264 (1995) ("The only issue jurors are asked to decide is whether the prosecutor's evidence
is legally sufficient to justify an indictment .... [Alssigning this role to a jury... ensures that
even reasonable, independent-minded jurors will defer to the prosecutor's judgment .... " ).
100. The most complete study of California grand juries to focus on their civil watchdog
function concluded that "the California panel is quite socially passive, rarely exercising its
somewhat unusual, and potentially dynamic, powers." Olson. supra note 95. at 226.
101. Lorenzo Arredondo & Donato Tapia, El Chicano y rite Constitution: Tire Legacy of
Hernandez v. Texas Grand Jury Discrimination. 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 129, 135 (1971). The term
"Chicano" is often used to refer to Mexican Americans. especially by politicized members of that
community.
102. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (quoting Strauder v. WVest Virginia.
100 U.S. 303,308 (1879)).
103. Villalobos, supra note 80, at 121 n.201.
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members and to the larger society. Full participation, it might be said,
would symbolize a new society.
III. GRAND JURY REFORM
East LA 13 and Biltmore 6 did not constitute the first attempts to raise
the issue of discrimination in the selection of California grand jurors. For
example, as early as 1964, the California legislature in hearings on the
grand jury system heard the Los Angeles NAACP's legal counsel urge "a
better cross section of citizens within the county on the grand jury." 10
Unrepresentative grand juries also attracted attention in 1967, when a
legislative committee held a hearing in Los Angeles under the following
charge:
We are vitally interested in the selection and composition of county
grand juries for the very reason that this is a judicial body and
grand jurors are officers of the Superior Court in each county where
they serve. Are they selected in a representative fashion so that we
can say that they are a random cross-section of this community? Is
it equally possible for every eligible citizen-those residents of the
county and over twenty-one-to be selected to serve on this august
body? Or do only persons of certain backgrounds and upper income
levels get nominated?' °5
Thus, problems in the selection of grand jurors, particularly in Los Angeles,
appeared on the radar screen well before the East Los Angeles cases.1" In
this context, despite the defendants' failure to prevail on their equal
protection arguments, East LA 13 and Biltmore 6 placed additional pressure
on the courts and legislature to reform grand juror nomination practices. In
this Part, I consider the limited legislative and judicial reforms regarding
grand juror selection undertaken during the early 1970s. Perhaps few will
104. CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIA GRAND JURY SYSTEM 26 (1964) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (testimony of Thomas G. Neusome). Neusome added that "[o]n several
occasions I have had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the Presiding Judge of the Superior
Court in Los Angeles County." Id. The same hearings also generated the following assurances
from a Los Angeles County superior court judge:
We have made-I can only tell you this in Los Angeles County-a conscientious
effort to see to it that members of various ethnic groups are represented on the grand
jury. This year we are especially fortunate in having an outstanding grand jury. We do
have one negro on the grand jury, one man of Spanish ancestry, and there were some of
Chinese ancestry nominated but, unfortunately, the names were not drawn.
Id. at 39 (testimony of Los Angeles County superior court judge Joseph A. Wapner).
105. EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY, supra note 62, at 2 (testimony of chair Lester A.
McMillan).
106. One author traces the impetus for grand jury reform back to 1963, when the California
Assembly passed a resolution calling for the study of whether current selection methods ensured
the representation of a cross section of the community on grand juries. See Mar, supra note 48, at
38 (citing H.R. Res. 266 (Cal. 1963)).
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be surprised to learn that instead of heralding a new society, such reforms
substantially preserved the old.
A. Legislative Grand Jury Reform
1. Pressure for Reform
As mentioned, during the 1960s concern surfaced in the legislature over
the methods used to select grand jurors. In that decade, legislators
introduced perhaps a half-dozen reform bills, although none passed. One
commentator's opinion given in 1970 seems broadly applicable: "The bills
failed to pass not so much because of active opposition, but because of lack
of legislative support for major changes in the grand jury system." "
Nevertheless, by 1970 the spectacle of the East Los Angeles cases, the
striking evidence of Mexican-American underrepresentation in the CRLA
study, and the implicit moral condemnation of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights report increased the pressure on the legislature. Impetus for
change came from other sources as well. Several other legal challenges to
the grand juror selection system arose, most prominently one launched in
defense of Robert Kennedy's assassin, Sirhan Sirhan, in Los Angeles in
1969.108 In addition, at least three articles published in California law
reviews called for reform. 9 Finally, the federal government led by example
when in 1968 Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act,
providing that "all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall
have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community." "o
2. Criminal Grand Juries
No doubt influenced by these various forces, in 1972 the California
legislature passed a version of grand jury reform by giving counties the
option to empanel, in addition to a regular grand jury, a second grand jury
107. Id.
108. See People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 112 (Cal. 1972); People v. Sirhan. No. A-233421 (Cal.
Super. CL 1969), discussed in Mar, supra note 48, at 41-43.
109. See Arredondo & Tapia, supra note 101; Mar. supra note 48; Villalobos. supra note 80.
110. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 54 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1861
(1994)). According to the House Committee on the Judiciary, the bill's provisions were intended
to "provide the best method for obtaining jury lists that represent a cross section of the relevant
community and [to establish] an effective bulwark against impermissible forms of discrimination
and arbitrariness." H.R. REP. No. 90-1076 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1793.
Adding to the weight in favor of reform, in 1970 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act that effectively
encouraged all states to model their grand juror selection laws on the federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968. See Vincent L. McKusick & Daniel E. Boxer. Uniform Jury Selection and
Service Act, 8 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 280 (1971).
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limited to handling criminal indictments."' Regarding the selection of
jurors for the new "criminal grand jury," the legislature provided that
"I[t]he presiding judge may select persons, at random, from the list of trial
jurors in civil and criminal cases." 112 (Although the act originally mandated
random selection, it was made optional as a condition of the bill's
passage.)" 3 In effect, reform amounted to allowing counties to seat a
second grand jury limited in jurisdiction to criminal matters-and so,
directly supervised by the prosecutor's office-with regard to which
counties could, if they desired, draw members randomly." 4 Otherwise, the
1972 reforms required no changes in the grand jury system or the
nomination practices of the superior court judges. Existing provisions
continued to govern regular grand juries, allowing judges to persist in
appointing any otherwise qualified person they wished." 5
B. Judicial Grand Jury Reform
Much of the pressure mounting against the legislature to reform the
grand jury nomination system acted on the California superior courts as
well, though the courts also experienced an additional impetus for reform.
Ever greater numbers of superior courts found themselves and their actions
under appellate scrutiny in the wake of the East Los Angeles cases.
1. Early Cases
Initially, when considering challenges to the personal nomination
system employed below, appellate courts sympathized with their judicial
colleagues on the lower bench. Or at least the appellate courts' ready
acceptance of the trial courts' findings that no discrimination occurred
suggests a certain level of uncritical commiseration. Consider a 1970 case
involving Black Panther leader Huey Newton. There, an appellate court
rejected Newton's challenge to the composition of Alameda's 1967 grand
jury, finding that the grand jury was not "constitutionally infirm in any
111. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6 (West 1985).
112. Id. § 904.6(b).
113. See S. 947, 1st Legis. Sess., CAL. SEN. J., June 13, 1972, at 3612.
114. Random selection was made mandatory in 1991. The 1991 amendment added the
following subdivision:
It is the intent of the Legislature that all persons qualified for jury service shall
have an equal opportunity to be considered for service as criminal grand jurors in the
county in which they reside, and that they have an obligation to serve, when summoned
for that purpose. All persons selected for the additional criminal grand jury shall be
selected at random from a source or sources reasonably representative of a cross section
of the population which is eligible for jury service in the county.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6(e) (West Supp. 1999).
115. Because federal grand juries bear responsibility only in the criminal area, a fair
argument can be made that California nearly matched the 1968 federal reforms when it provided
for the creation of separate criminal grand juries with potentially randomly selected members.
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respect pertaining to its selection." 116 Or consider that in 1972, an appellate
court endorsed the finding that the San Diego County superior court
"judges in selecting the nominees for the 1969 grand jury did not
discriminate against or exclude any class or grouping of individuals for
race, color, age, economic status, education, employment history, and I am
including for any reason.... They have failed to show any exclusion at
all." 117
2. Biltmore 6
The 1970 appellate decision in Biltnore 6 started a different trend."' In
considering the defendants' equal protection challenge, superior court judge
Arthur Alarcon found no statistical evidence of discrimination in the
composition of the 1969 Los Angeles grand jury, and so refused Acosta's
request to call superior court judges as witnesses." 9 In response, however,
Acosta sought a writ of prohibition to stop the trial until he presented his
discrimination claim fully, including evidence obtained through the direct
examination of judges who had nominated grand jurors.
Breaking with the pattern established by other appellate courts,
Biltmore 6 did not simply adopt Judge Alarcon's finding that no
discrimination had occurred. Rather, the appellate court agreed with Acosta
that Judge Alarcon's ruling "in effect, permitted [the defendants] to call
their judicial witnesses only if the statistical evidence made it unnecessary
for them to do so." " The court noted that because the issue was exclusion
and not proportional representation, Alarcon erred in forbidding the
defendants to show discrimination by calling the grand juror selectors to the
stand.121 The court described the defendants' evidentiary strategy as
follows:
What [the defendants] did contend and offered to prove was that
the system of nominating grand jurors employed in Los Angeles
County systematically deprived eligible members of their class
from being considered for grand jury duty. In a nutshell they
intended to show that, with very few exceptions, the judges of the
respondent court were by reason of birth, education, residence,
wealth, social and professional associations and similar factors not
acquainted with the qualifications of eligible potential grand jurors
116. People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394. 413 (Ct. App. 1970) (emphasis added).
117. People v. Goodspeed, 99 Cal. Rptr. 696. 704-05 (Ct. App. 1972) (first emphasis added)
(quoting the findings of the trial court).
118. See Montez v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Ct. App. 1970). In East LA 13, the
Second District Court of Appeal held for the defendants on their First Amendment claim, and so
did not consider their Fourteenth Amendment grand jury challenge. See Castro v. Superior Court.
88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (Ct. App. 1970).
119. SeeMontez, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
120. ld. at 739.
121. See id. at 738.
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of petitioners' class and that they did not make an adequate effort to
overcome this alleged deficiency.122
Although the appellate court rejected the implication that the defendants
might succeed in showing "any such thing," 123 the court nevertheless
pointedly stated that in seeking to examine the judges in their capacity as
grand juror selectors, "petitioners unquestionably were on safe ground." 24
In granting Acosta's request for a writ, the appellate court put superior
court judges on notice that they were subject to extensive investigations
into their conduct in nominating grand jurors, even to the extent of being
forced onto the witness stand.
3. California Appellate and Federal District Court Oversight
Biltmore 6 heralded a new approach among appellate courts. For
instance, in 1971, in another Black Panther case that effectively reversed
the approach taken in Huey Newton's challenge, an appellate court ruled
that where superior court judges "constitute[d] themselves collectively as
the nominating body" for the grand jury, they must "be made available for
examination to determine whether constitutional standards were met." 125
Responding to the contention that dragging judges into the witness box
unduly disrupted the business of the trial courts, the appellate court
admonished, "If such proceedings become burdensome, the judges are free
to return the function [of selecting grand jurors] to the jury
commissioner." 126
Or consider a 1974 decision that strongly criticized the Penal Code
sections governing grand juror selection, including by implication the 1972
reforms. The appellate court wrote, "The California Penal Code's flaccid
directions for grand jury selection contain no effective assurance of broad
socio-economic representation." 12' Noting that "an unrepresentative grand
jury. . . is detrimental to community aspirations and incompatible with the
egalitarian aims of the Fourteenth Amendment," the court then stated,
"When discriminatory methods damage the community... a representative
lawsuit is available to redress the community's wrong. To put the matter
concretely, California superior court judges are subject to civil process to
compel constitutionally sanctioned grand jury selections." 128 The appellate
court in effect invited civil lawsuits challenging the superior court judges.
122. Id. at 740.
123. Id. at 740 n.9.
124. Id. at 740.
125. People v. Wells (Wells 1), 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (Ct. App. 1971).
126. Id.
127. People v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (Ct. App. 1974). The court added,
"The continued absence of meaningful statutory controls only burdens the courts with repeated
attacks on grand jury selection methods." Id.
128. Id. at 976.
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Within a few weeks of the above decision, when a federal district court
upheld the right of plaintiffs to sue the San Francisco superior court for
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, it became apparent that other
courts had already been thinking along similar lines.'
The San Francisco superior court responded to the federal court's
decision by empanelling a criminal grand jury with members selected at
random, but did not otherwise alter its practice of personal involvement in
the selection of regular grand jurors. A year and a half later, the superior
court found itself back in federal court, defending the latter practice. The
federal district court rejected the superior court judges' assertion "that the
civil investigative grand jury can and should be a so-called 'blue ribbon'
panel, chosen from a 'narrower base' defined by more rigorous
standards." 13 Concluding that "[a]lthough there are nebulous references in
the affidavits of the defendant judges to a preference for civic experience
and education, it is clear that the application of the so-called higher
qualifications was done in a completely ad hoc, discretionary manner," 1
31
the federal court ruled that the personal nomination system violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Following the decision, the San Francisco superior
court adopted random selection for all grand juries. 32
4. The Limits of Superior Court Reform
Despite San Francisco's example, the majority of counties avoided
wholesale reform in grand juror selection. To be sure, some change
occurred. For example, the number of Mexican-American nominees in Los
Angeles County went from a low of three in 1968 to seven in 1969, and
then to ten, thirteen, and fifteen over the next three years.'33 And even
before the San Francisco case got under way in federal court, the
percentage of minorities on grand juries there jumped from 5.3% in 1970 to
36.8% in 1971 and 26.3% in 1975." Despite these numerical indicators of
change, however, reforms seem to have been limited.
129. See Quadra v. Superior Court (Quadra 1). 378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
130. Quadra v. Superior Court (Quadra If), 403 F. Supp. 486, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The
plaintiffs noted that the "defendants [the superior court judges] have provided no objective
statement of the necessary qualifications [and] have merely chosen from among their friends and
friends of friends in the guise of applying special qualifications." Id.
131. Id. at498.
132. See Quadra v. Superior Court (Quadra 111), 411 F. Supp. 451. 452 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Random selection, it should be noted, was not the only alternative. The Supreme Court has upheld
the imposition of higher qualifications for so-called blue ribbon grand juries. See Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261, 270 (1947). The Fourteenth Amendment focuses not on the rigor of the
standards, but on the means of their application. In this regard, the court in Quadra III expressed
disappointment that the San Francisco superior court had adopted a system of random selection.
133. See Villalobos, supra note 80, at 109. Despite these increases. Mexican Americans
never constituted more than eight percent of the nominees between 1970 and 1972, while their
population rose to approximately 18% of Los Angeles County's total population. See supra note
79 and accompanying text.
134. See Quadra II, 403 F. Supp. at 495 tbl.
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Consider the reform undertaken by Sacramento County. In the wake of
press criticism of the "select your friends" system,' 35 in 1968, the
Sacramento judges committed to selecting the majority of grand jurors from
a list of 100 nominees culled from voter registration rolls.' 36 The judges did
not, however, draw nominees from that list at random, but rather by
interview. Thus, the judges continued to exercise significant discretion over
who served on the grand jury. In the words of one commentator, "[T]he
judges often apply the same qualifications in selecting names from the list
as they did when nominating on their own." 137 Still, the reform must be
counted as something of an improvement. Noting the presence of the first
African American on a Sacramento grand jury in over a decade, the same
commentator concluded, "At least it is no longer necessary to know a judge
in order to be selected to serve on the grand jury in Sacramento County." 138
The scope of actual change also seems limited insofar as some judges
apparently adopted the language of reform even in reform's absence. Recall
the 1971 appellate decision permitting the Black Panther defendants to call
superior court judges to the stand.139 This decision required Alameda
County judges to testify about their actions of four years earlier, when they
had nominated the 1968 grand jury challenged in the case. After hearing
their testimony, the trial judge found that no discrimination had occurred,
and this ruling was upheld on appeal. 4 ° Note, however, how the appellate
court summarized the testimony of the superior court judges regarding their
1967 practices:
[V]irtually all of the judges testified that they had personally tried
to insure representation of a cross-section of the community,
especially in regard to black citizens. Many of the judges testified
that they had sought the help of leaders in the black community for
that purpose. Almost all of the judges testified that they had
acquainted themselves with black citizens in order to insure
community representation. 4'
Perhaps the Alameda judges exercised more care in their 1967 nominations
than did the Los Angeles judges in the same year. Numbers, however,
suggest otherwise. Only four of Alameda County's sixty 1968 grand juror
nominees were Black, a proportion of 6.7% while Blacks constituted 12.4%
of the community.4 2 Moreover, as the CRLA study noted, between 1957
and 1968, Mexican Americans constituted only six of the 228 grand jurors
135. See Mar, supra note 48, at 46.
136. See id. at 46-47.
137. Id. at 47.
138. Id.
139. See Wells 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. I, 7 (Ct. App. 1971); see also supra notes 125-126 and
accompanying text.
140. See People v. Wells (Wells 11), 114 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (Ct. App. 1974).
141. Id.
142. See Wells 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
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who served Alameda County.'43 It seems more likely, then, that by 1971 the
Alameda judges had learned to censor testimony about nominating one's
friends, and to emphasize instead efforts to search high and low for a cross
section of the community. That is, they had learned the language of reform
and used it even where no reform had occurred."
5. Grand Juror Selection Practices ii 1999
A still greater reason exists to suspect that there were only limited
reforms in the 1970s: the persistence of a functionally similar grand juror
selection system in the 1990s. A contemporary survey of the twenty
California counties studied by CRLA in its 1970 report reveals that in
virtually every one of those counties judges exercise considerable discretion
over the nomination of potential grand jurors.' 5 To be sure, eleven counties
now actively invite citizens to volunteer for grand jury service, for example,
by advertising in local papers or by soliciting applications from civic
groups. And five counties rely on the petit jury pool, which in turn is
randomly drawn from voter registration roles and the California
Department of Motor Vehicle lists.' 6 Nevertheless, eleven counties,
including Los Angeles, continue to rely on judicial nominations."'
Much more significantly, however, all but three counties have instituted
procedures whereby judges vet potential jurors before admitting them to a
small pool from which the grand jury is finally drawn.' 8 Irrespective of
143. See CRLA Grand Jury Stud, supra note 39, at 123 tbl. 1.
144. With this example in mind, perhaps we could be forgiven some skepticism concerning
Judge Alarcon's finding in Biltmore 6, issued after hearing the testimony of his fellow judges:
"The evidence shows that a substantial number of the selectors of the 1969 Los Angeles County
Grand Jury took affirmative steps to find eligible and qualified persons identifiable as Mexican-
Americans to serve on the 1969 Los Angeles County Grand Jury." People v. Ramirez, No. A-
244906, slip op. at 13 (Cal. Super. CL Mar. 31, 1971). quoted in Arredondo & Tapia. supra note
101, at 143.
145. The information provided in this section is detailed in Appendix D.
146. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 197 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
147. Los Angeles County accepts applications for grand jury service. However, the superior
court does not automatically consider applicants for selection. Instead, according to the Los
Angeles grand jury web site,
Each... applicant is interviewed by a member of the Grand and Trial Jurors
Committee. The Judge assigns a qualification rating to each volunteer interviewed. The
volunteers' application forms are then circulated among the superior court judges for
possible nomination.
From a final list of persons nominated by the judges. forty names and ten
alternates are selected by lottery. After these people have been screened by law
enforcement agencies, a second drawing takes place and the final twenty-three jurors
and four alternates are drawn.
How Is a Person Chosen for the Grand Jury? (visited Sept. 24. 1999) <http://vww.co.la.ca.usl
grandjury>. In short, nomination by a judge continues to be a prerequisite for service as a grand
juror in Los Angeles County.
148. The three "exceptions" are Los Angeles. San Bernardino. and Imperial counties. In Los
Angeles County, every potential grand juror must be nominated by a judge, although once
nominated, actual selection is random. See id. In San Bernardino County. the judges usually name
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whether counties generate the names of potential jurors randomly, by
application, or by judicial nomination, almost all counties require judges to
screen nominees to establish a restricted group, usually of no more than
thirty, from among whom the actual grand jurors are randomly selected.
Thus, any movement toward openness in the grand juror selection system
over the last three decades has been more than matched by a new and
almost uniform practice wherein judges sift and select the narrow set of all
potential grand jurors.
The judges' continuing exercise of extraordinary discretion in the
nomination of grand jurors suggests a potential for high contemporary
levels of discrimination on California county grand juries. In Los Angeles
County between 1960 and 1969, Mexican Americans accounted for four of
the 214 grand jurors seated, or slightly under two percent of the total.'49
Have the numbers changed much over three decades? Consider the
following table:
TABLE 2. PARTICIPATION OF HISPANICS ON Los ANGELES COUNTY
GRAND JURIES, 1990-1999150













TOTAL 230 15 (6.5%)
Source: Letter from Gloria M. Gomez, Manager, Juror Services Division, Los
Los Angeles County Superior Court (Jan. 14, 2000) (on file with the author).
Mexican-American participation on Los Angeles grand juries more
than trebled from the 1960s to the 1990s, from under two to over six
the grand jurors directly. Telephone Interview with Sue Shooie, Court Executive Office and
Administration, San Bernardino County (Mar. 9, 2000). Out of the 20 counties surveyed, only
Imperial County gives judges no discretion in the selection of grand jurors.
149. See supra Table 1.
150. The numbers reflect racial breakdowns of successive grand juries as determined by the
Los Angeles superior court. The use of "Hispanic" is the court's. See also Penelope McMillan,
Grand Juries' Racial Makeup Under Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, at 1.
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percent. But recall that during the 1960s, Mexican Americans accounted for
fourteen percent of Los Angeles County's total population, while in the
1990s, Latino/as numbered closer to forty-one percent.' s t Thus,
proportional to their presence in Los Angeles County as a whole, Latino/as
were excluded from grand jury service by an eight-to-one ratio during the
1960s, and by six-to-one during the 1990s. The continuing exclusion of this
community from grand jury service in Los Angeles County in the last
decade almost equals the relatively extreme exclusion of Mexican
Americans during the 1960s. What little reform occurred in the 1970s
apparently did not endure long enough or reach deep enough to alter the
levels of exclusion in the grand juror selection system of the 1990s.
IV. THE LIMITs OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION MODELS
Return now to the defendants' arguments in East LA 13 and Biltmore 6.
Despite the racial exclusivity of the Los Angeles grand juries, the
defendants' jury discrimination claims ultimately foundered on a model of
racism that stressed intentional behavior. Intentional action has since
emerged as a core concept in equal protection jurisprudence, and in theories
of racism more generally. In particular, purposeful action is the defining
element in discrimination models employing rational choice theory. In this
Part, I review the importance of intent in defeating the Fourteenth
Amendment challenge in East LA 13, and then consider intentional racism
models recently advanced by law-and-economics scholars.
A. The Centrality of Intent in Discrimination Models
In the extensive testimony Acosta elicited from the judges, evidence
abounded that the judges looked almost exclusively to social acquaintances
when nominating grand jurors, and that the judges counted few Mexican
Americans among that group. However, such testimony apparently did not
trouble the prosecutor too much. In responding to the defendants' equal
protection claim, the prosecutor did not ask the judges to clarify their
testimony regarding their selection practices, or otherwise seek to recast
such testimony in any way. Rather, on cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked each judge only whether he had intended to discriminate. The
exchange between the prosecutor and Judge Call is typical:
151. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. In 1990, Hispanics constituted 37.8% of the
population of Los Angeles County. See 1990 US Census Data, Database C9OSTFIA. Los Angeles
County (visited Jan. 10, 2000) <httpi/venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup947540548>. In 1999,
Hispanics amounted to 43.9% of the population of Los Angeles. See County of Los Angeles
Statistical Data (visited Jan. 10, 2000) <http.//www.co.la.us/statistics.hti>. Given these numbers,
it is not unreasonable to assime that on average Latino/as accounted for 41% of the population of
Los Angeles during the 1990s. During the 1960s. Mexican Americans constituted virtually all
persons now considered Hispanic in Los Angeles County. while in the 1990s Mexican Americans
accounted for 75% of Los Angeles Hispanics. See 1990 US Census Data. supra.
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Q. In considering or determining whom you were going to
nominate, was it your purpose to deliberately exclude any
member of any particular racial or ethnic group?
A. Under no condition.
Q. And in actually placing in nomination the persons whose names
have been mentioned here in court, did you intend to
intentionally, arbitrarily, and systematically exclude from
Grand Jury service any member of any particular racial or
ethnic group?
A. No way at all.
Q. Did you nominate those persons whom you did in fact




This brief exchange represents virtually the entire cross-examination of
Judge Call. The prosecutor posed these same questions, and few if any
others, to nearly every judge, and each answered in nearly exactly the same
fashion. 53
At the end of the testimony of the thirty-three judges called by Acosta,
the prosecutor, without presenting evidence of his own, asked the court to
dismiss the equal protection challenge. He argued "that the defendants have
not sustained their burden of proof to show that there was any purposeful
systematic discrimination of persons of Spanish surname in selecting the
jury." 154 He insisted,
There was no evidence at all of any intent on the part of any of the
Judges or the Jury Commissioner or anyone else involved in the
system of selecting the Grand Jurors in this County, to exclude any
152. Transcript, supra note 8, at 400.
153. Consider as an additional example the questioning of Judge Rhone:
Q. By [District Attorney] Hecht. Your Honor, in determining whom you are going to
approach or solicit as a Grand Jury nominee, did you attach any importance
whatsoever to the racial or ethnic background of such person?
A. No, I did not.
Q. In considering whom to nominate for Grand Jury service, was it your purpose to
deliberately exclude members of any particular racial or ethnic group?
A. It was not.
Q. And by actually placing in nomination those persons whose names have been
mentioned here in court as being your nominees over the past 10 years, did you
intend to intentionally, arbitrarily, and systematically exclude from Grand Jury
service members of any particular racial or ethnic group?
A. No.
Q. Did you nominate those persons whom you did in fact nominate for Grand Jury
service because you felt that they were highly qualified to serve in that capacity?
A. That is the only basis that I ever nominated them.
Mr. Hecht. Thank you. I have nothing further.
Id. at 680-8 1.
154. Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
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person, or to treat any person differently on account of his race or
his ethnic group. 55
For the prosecutor, intent formed the touchstone of discrimination."
For his part, Acosta disputed the need to prove intentional
discrimination, and refrained from claiming that any such animus existed.
Instead, Acosta labored to show that the practice of nominating
acquaintances itself amounted to a denial of equal protection, regardless of
whether the judges had intended to discriminate. Acosta explained,
I am not arguing that the Judges wake up every morning and
say, "I'm not going to look for any Mexicans today. I'm not going
to submit any Mexican names today."
But the whole question of discrimination is not predicated upon
any morality or conscious evil, we are talking about facts, we are
talking about the results of a system ....
I'm not saying that the Judges are evil persons by any means
whatsoever, and I'm not saying that they are even evil in the sense
they don't name nominees of Spanish surname.
What is pathetic, tragic, is that none of them know any of them.
Now, since they are nominating their friends, how in the world
are they ever going to nominate us since they don't know us? We
don't exist.157
155. Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
156. To be sure, the prosecutor's emphasis on intent resonated with. though it was not
compelled by, a powerful current within equal protection doctrine. lWashington v. Davis. 426 U.S.
229 (1976), came down eight years after the arguments in East LA 13. Thus, in 1968 it was still a
relatively open question whether one had to show an intentional "purpose" to discriminate.
Indeed, if anything, the weight of the cases suggested that a showing of purpose was not
required. Through 1968, several Supreme Court cases concerning grand jury discrimination
explicitly rejected an intentional discrimination standard where those responsible for selecting
jurors had done so from among personal acquaintances. Thus, in Smith v. Teras, 311 U.S. 128
(1940), the Court held, "Where jury commissioners limit those from whom grand juries are
selected to their own personal acquaintance, discrimination can arise from commissioners who
know no negroes as well as from commissioners who know but eliminate them. If there has been
discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand."
Id. at 132. Along the same lines, the Court held in Hill v. Texas. 316 U.S. 400 (1942), that
"[d]iscrimination can arise from the action of commissioners who exclude all negroes whom they
do not know to be qualified and who neither know nor seek to learn whether there are in fact
any ... qualified negroes available for jury service." ld. at 404. And again, in Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282 (1950), a plurality of the Court held, "'The statements of the jury commissioners that
they chose only whom they knew, and that they knew no eligible Negroes in an area where
Negroes made up so large a proportion of the population, prove the intentional exclusion that is
discrimination in violation of... constitutional rights." Id. at 290. Of course, as this last quotation
demonstrates, intent nevertheless operated powerfully in antidiscrimination law in the years
leading up to East LA 13, albeit less powerfully than after Davis. See infra note 415 and
accompanying text.
157. Transcript, supra note 8, at 923-24. Acosta also put his argument this way: "I'm not
saying they consciously were looking for Whites to the exclusion of the other races, but that just
happens to be the case. Judge after Judge after Judge testified that he normally and quite naturally
selected and asked his friends." Id. at 913.
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Acosta urged upon the court a model of discrimination that did not turn
on intention, purpose, deliberation, or conscious action. He readily
conceded that the judges were not engaged in "conscious evil," that they
had no formulated intention to discriminate against Mexican Americans. In
rejecting the purposeful discrimination model, however, Acosta did not turn
to a purely effects-based approach. Rather, he urged the court to identify as
discriminatory a system of selecting grand jurors that consistently resulted
in the exclusion of Mexican Americans. He argued that the superior court
judges systematically (though not purposefully) excluded Mexican
Americans because in submitting nominations, they drew on narrow circles
of friends and neighbors that did not include members of that community.
Acosta urged the court in East LA 13, and subsequently in Biltmore 6, to
appreciate that a nomination process in which Mexican Americans "did not
exist" amounted to discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Acosta's argument did not sway those courts, however. When the
presiding judge in East LA 13 granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss
the equal protection claim, she cited the lack of any evidence of a "willful
or intentional desire" to exclude on the part of her colleagues. 58 In
Biltmore 6, the court reached a similar conclusion, finding no evidence that
any judge "consciously, deliberately, [or] intentionally" discriminated
against Mexican Americans.'59 These judges relied on and imposed the
model of discrimination urged by the prosecutor, the model that required
proof of intentional, purposeful discrimination in order to prevail under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment, Acosta correctly
described the grand jury nomination process as racially discriminatory.
Time after time, each judge "normally and quite naturally selected and
asked his friends." '6 Though in doing so the judges perhaps harbored no
consciously formulated purpose to exclude Mexican Americans-or, for
that matter, Blacks and other racial groups, the less well-off, or otherwise
socially marginal classes-exclusion necessarily followed. Because the
judges chose from among their friends, those outside such relatively rarified
circles effectively ceased to exist as potential grand jurors. Like those in the
158. Judge Kathleen Parker ruled as follows:
I don't see any evidence of any willful or intentional desire on the part of those
that are charged with the responsibility of selecting the Grand Jury to keep persons of
Spanish surname, or Mexican-Americans, from the Grand Jury.
Accordingly, the portion of your motion relating to the selection of the Grand Jury
on the grounds that the Grand Jury is illegally constituted, is dismissed ....
Id. at 1006.
159. Judge Arthur Alarcon ruled in part as follows: "No evidence was presented that any
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court consciously, deliberately, intentionally or
arbitrarily discriminated against persons of the class of persons identifiable as Mexican-
Americans in the selection of nominees for the 1969 Grand Jury." People v. Ramirez, No. A-
244906, slip op. at 11-12 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1971), quoted in Arredondo & Tapia, supra
note 101, at 142.
160. Transcript, supra note 8, at 913 (remarks of Oscar Acosta).
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Mexican-American community, other outsiders may not have been
"intentionally and purposefully" excluded, but year after year they were
just as surely absent from Los Angeles grand juries.
B. Rational Choice Theories of Discrimination
If Acosta's argument that the grand juror selection process normally
excluded Mexican Americans seems correct, he nevertheless tells us little
about the dynamics of the process. How did discrimination arise? Did the
judges lie about their intentions? If not, did the judges' lack of familiarity
with Mexican Americans as a group matter? Might socially pervasive
stereotypes about Mexican Americans have influenced the judges' actions,
and if so, how? Institutional analysis answers these questions. To place the
answers in context, however, we must first consider rational choice
explanations for discrimination. Rooted in a tradition of intention similar to
that relied upon by the prosecutors and judges in the East Los Angeles
cases, rational choice explanations of racial discrimination struggle to
answer the questions raised by the East LA 13 transcript.
Rational choice theory encompasses various ideas and principles."'
Nevertheless, the basic claims of rational choice theory may be stated
informally as follows: (1) Actors know their interests; (2) actors
consciously weigh alternative means of maximizing their interests; and
(3) actors act to maximize their interests.16 In light of these claims, intent
forms a key component. The intentional pursuit of specific results bridges
the evaluation of alternatives and the maximization of interests. Rational
choice theory strongly presumes that, absent some mistake, actors intend
the results of their actions. 63
Rational choice theorists have advanced several explanations of racial
discrimination. Each approach assumes an intent to discriminate but offers
a different conception of the ends that discriminators seek to maximize.
Two theories have long predominated, the associational and the statistical.
Under the associational model, offered more than three decades ago by
Gary Becker, people discriminate because they have a "taste" for
association or disassociation with some groups." The simplest and most
161. Rational choice theories, in the plural, might therefore be a more accurate formulation.
Given the general nature of the discussion here, however, the singular form suffices.
162. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY:
A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 17 (1994) (" In sum, rational choice
theorists generally agree on an instrumental conception of individual rationality, by reference to
which people are thought to maximize their expected utilities in formally predictable ways.").
163. Though intentions are presumed to guide actions, rational choice theorists often read
intent from the actions themselves, rather than from other sources, such as an actor's self-
reporting. This idea is often expressed as "revealed preferences"; it is also often the subject of
criticism. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 322-24 (1977).
164. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRINATION 6 (1957) (" If an individual has
a 'taste for discrimination,' he must act as if.he were willing to pay something, either directly or in
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widely accepted of the rational discrimination theories, the associational
model in effect asserts that people discriminate because they want to. In
contrast, the statistical model posits that discrimination is rational when
race or other indicia of group identity serve as readily observable markers
for characteristics that are relatively more difficult to observe. 
6
-
Discrimination occurs not because it possesses any independent utility,
but because, in the calculus of information-gathering, discrimination is
efficient. 166 These theories, of course, are not mutually exclusive.67
the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others."). Becker
asserted that racial discrimination is costly, and that a perfect market would drive out
discriminators. See id. at 35-37. John Donohue has argued to the contrary, see John J. Donohue
III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986), as has Cass Sunstein, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 22. See
also David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The
Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1631-43 (1991). Note that Becker's views
accord with a general sense among many social scientists that racism is an aberration. "essentially
irrational," and so subject to relatively straightforward eradication. FEAGIN & FEAGIN, supra note
18, at 5.
165. See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 659 (1972). The statistical model has gained considerable currency in some circles, where it
is referred to as "rational discrimination." For example, Dinesh D'Souza writes,
[T]here are many indications that black cultural pathology has contributed to a
new form of discrimination: rational discrimination. High crime rates of young black
males, for example, make taxi drivers more reluctant to pick them up, storekeepers
more likely to follow them in stores, and employers less willing to hire them. Rational
discrimination is based on accurate group generalizations that may nevertheless be
unfair to particular members of a group.
DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 24 (1995).
Richard Epstein relies on the statistical model in arguing that antidiscrimination laws in the
workplace are counterproductive. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: TItE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 33-35, 40-41 (1992). He also relies on the taste
model. See id. at 41-47; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production Sideshow: Why the
Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1085 (1995). Robert Cooter
modulates Epstein's conclusion through the proposal of various market mechanisms to reduce
racial discrimination. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133.
138, 157, 167 (1994).
166. A more recent version of the statistical model postulates that even where actors believe
that underlying group characteristics do not differ, discrimination will occur because "people can
distinguish between high- and low-character individuals more accurately when the people being
sorted are of a similar cultural type." Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, Culture, Information. and
Screening Discrimination, 104 J. POL. ECON. 542, 543 (1996). It is important to note the
definition of "cultural type" offered: "Cultural type here is interpreted broadly to include groups
defined by language, religious belief, ethnic background, race, sex, sexual preference,
neighborhood upbringing, schooling, or membership in social organizations." Id. Unlike
statistical theory, screening-discrimination theory posits that group identities do not convey but
instead occlude information about group members. Just as in the statistical approach, however,
information costs render group discrimination efficient. In an earlier version of the same thesis,
Cornell wrote that "[i]ronically, this implies that discrimination is not generated by racial bias. but
by the inability to 'discriminate' between opportunists and honest people in an unfainiliar
population." Bradford Cornell, A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination, 7
RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 4, 8 (1995).
167. Richard Posner employs both the associational and statistical models. He writes, for
example, that "[s]ome people do not like to associate with the members of racial, religious, or
ethnic groups different from their own and will pay a price to indulge their taste." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 715 (5th ed. 1998). He also postulates,
To the extent that race or some attribute similarly difficult to conceal (sex, accent,
etc.) is positively correlated with the possession of undesired characteristics, or
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Two additional rational discrimination theories have been advanced
recently in the pages of law reviews: the group-status model and
the cooperation-signal approach. In 1995, Richard McAdams proposed
the former in the Harvard Law Review,' s arguing that group-based
discrimination generally, and racial discrimination in particular, can be
explained insofar as "individuals who seek to maximize the esteem they
receive from others have selfish reasons to contribute to group status"
through the celebration or the denigration of others.' 61 Here again, as in the
statistical approach, the utility of race discrimination lies in what it achieves
for the discriminator-in this case, status. Thus, McAdams encourages
us to "understand race discrimination as an especially virulent
and pathological form of status production." 70 He suggests that
"[d]iscrimination and racist behavior generally are processes by which one
racial group seeks to produce esteem for itself by lowering the status of
another group." '
In another recent rational discrimination theory, Eric Posner suggests a
cooperation-signal model in a 1998 Journal of Legal Studies article., He
uses game theory, in particular the repeat prisoners' dilemma, to argue that
racial discrimination should be viewed as a form of signaling.' Posner
postulates that persons who desire to establish cooperative relations over
the medium term (" cooperators" or "high types") seek signals by which to
distinguish themselves from persons relatively more interested in short-term
returns ("cheaters" or "low types" ).74 Such signals succeed, according to
Posner, only where cooperators can afford to engage in the signaling
(because of relatively greater expected medium-term returns), but cheaters
negatively correlated with desired characteristics, it is rational for people to use the
attribute as a proxy for the underlying characteristic with which it is correlated
("statistical discrimination" ).
Id. at 725. Kenneth J. Arrow's well-known rational choice article on discrimination similarly
draws on both the associational and statistical models. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Te Theory of
Discrimination, in DIScRiMINATION IN LABOR MARKErS 3. 6, 23-24 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert
Rees eds., 1973). For an overview of these two theories, see Strauss. supra note 164, at 1621-23.
168. See McAdams, supra note 35.
169. Id. at 1009.
170. Id. at 1044.
171. Id.
172. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J.
LEGAL STuD. 765 (1998).
173. See a at 767-69. The prisoners' dilemma involves a highly stylized interaction between
two persons who must decide whether to "cooperate" or "defect." In the typical formulation, if
both "cooperate," each receives a midlevel return. If one "'cooperates" but the other "defects."
the defector receives a high return but the cooperator receives nothing or a negative return. If both
"defect," both receive nothing or a negative return, but still more than each would have received
had he or she cooperated when the other person defected. An "iterated prisoners' dilemma"
involves repeated interactions, allowing an opportunity to extrapolate from past behavior and to
signal future behavior. See generally PETER C. ORDESHOOK. A POLTIcAL THEORY PRLMER 164-
80 (1992) (explaining and giving examples of the prisoners' dilemma and the iterated prisoners'
dilemma). In game theory, variations on this hypothetical interaction abound; Posner's principal
variation lies in postulating that actors can signal to one another through cooperation and
defection across a range of behavior.
174. Posner, supra note 172, at 768.
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cannot.175 Posner then argues that group discrimination presents the
appropriate cost structure to function as an effective signal "[b]ecause
members of the out-group have skills and other desirable qualities [such
that] refusal to deal with them commercially or socially is costly for a
member of the in-group." 176 Thus, he concludes, "[d]iscrimination against
members of a minority group can serve as a signal of cooperativeness." 177
To provide a more concrete example, Posner cites antimiscegenation and
Jim Crow laws, writing that "[t]hese laws do not so much enforce
segregation as constantly remind everyone that everyone else is sending the
signal." '7 Under this approach, then, discrimination against racial
minorities amounts to an effort by Whites to indicate their "cooperative"
character, at least vis-t-vis other Whites.
179
C. Intent in Rational Discrimination Theories
A number of criticisms can be leveled against each of the above
theories, both within and outside the terms of rational choice theory.'
Here, however, I focus on a problem common to rational discrimination
theories: an inability to account for discrimination that is not intentional.
When engaged in discrimination, how many recognize having a "taste" for
it, or think that race is a useful proxy in their search for information, or
intend to enhance their racial group's standing or signal a low discount
rate? Moreover, consider those situations in which people discriminate but
175. See id.
176. Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 788. Rational choice theorists often purport not to explain just racial
discrimination, but rather "discrimination" generally, treating the former as a subset of the latter.
Posner follows this trend, suggesting that his theory offers important insights not only into Jim
Crow laws and so on, but also into patriotism, McCarthyism, and homophobia. See id. at 791.
Similarly, Becker asserts that his theory explains "'discrimination' and 'nepotism' in all their
diverse forms." BECKER, supra note 164, at 3.
179. Posner's terminology of "cooperators" and "cheaters" invites comment. In the context
of racial discrimination-where, according to Posner's model, "cooperators" and "high types"
discriminate, while "those who fail to discriminate against [minorities] are the 'cheaters,"'
Posner, supra note 172, at 787-his labels seem backward. Presumably, Posner would reply that
these terms reflect only a preference for cooperators over defectors, perhaps justified by the
observation that under game theory, conditions of cooperation maximize the "prisoners"' total
utility. Posner might also note that rational choice theorists often employ similar terms. See
Cornell, supra note 166, at 542. While these factors may have spurred Posner's easy reference to
high and low types, such considerations apply poorly to the social world Posner purports to
explain. Racism in the United States does not comport with the simple dynamics suggested by a
prisoners' dilemma, and so the simple moral judgments generated by the latter ought not to be
applied uncritically to the former.
180. For internal critiques, see generally Donohue, supra note 164; McAdams, supra note 35,
at 1036-43; and Sunstein, supra note 164. For external critiques, see RICHARD DELGADO, WHEN
EQUALITY ENDS: STORIES ABOUT RACE AND RESISTANCE 27-52 (1999), which postulates the
importance of nonmarket forces-for example, human "evil"-in explanations of racial
discrimination; and Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics
of Race, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1183 (1993) (book review), which criticizes Richard Epstein's
arguments regarding the inefficiency of Title VII in EPSTEIN, supra note 165.
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do not perceive themselves to be discriminating at all. How can rational
choice models that stress conscious intent and strategic action assist us in
fathoming discriminatory conduct when people genuinely believe they have
no intention to discriminate? This last question may be the most pressing
challenge currently facing theories of discrimination, since in today's
world unintentional discrimination may exceed the conscious sort in both
prevalence and social harm. Richard McAdams in his article on group-
status production is one of the few rational choice discrimination theorists
to recognize the import of such questions. The response he offers, however,
serves only to highlight the problem.
To explain unintentional action, McAdams relies heavily on an analogy
to the ideology of cartels drawn from the work of Richard Posner.' Before
addressing this facet of McAdams's argument, however, a fuller sketch of
his theory of discrimination is helpful. McAdams bases his model of racial
discrimination on the claim that people actively pursue esteem as a "basic
pleasure" or interest." 2 He then argues that esteem results in part from
group membership, and that individuals enhance esteem by either raising or
lowering the status of their group." 3 Discrimination, according to
McAdams, occurs when individuals enhance their status by lowering the
position of other groups: "When members of a group pursue the indirect
production strategy of lowering the status accorded other traits," he writes,
"they engage in 'discrimination.' "" For McAdams, racial discrimination
amounts to status production: "Discrimination and racist behavior generally
are processes by which one racial group seeks to produce esteem for itself
by lowering the status of another group." '
In analogizing racial discrimination to status conflict, McAdams's
model is helpful. By focusing on status, McAdams correctly identifies
group aggrandizement and denigration as core facets of discrimination,
181. See McAdams, supra note 35, at 1059 (citing Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of
Jurisprudence, 69 IND. LJ. 1. 10 (1993)).
182. Id at 1020 (quoting GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMic APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 145 (4th ed. 1992)).
183. See id at 1045.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1044. Notice that such statements imply that all racism takes the form McAdams
identifies. To this extent, he seems to fall victim to a tendency in racial theorizing that David
Goldberg previously identified, the assertion of a unitary theory of racism:
If commentators have mostly assumed race to have a single transhistorical
meaning, so too have they narrowed the concept of racism always to connote the same
phenomenon.... I want to insist that there is no generic racism, only historically
specific racisms each with their own sociotemporally specific causes. There is no single
(set of) transcendental determinant(s) that inevitably causes the occurrence of racism-
be it nature, or drive, or mode of production, or class formation. There are only the
minutiae that make up the fabric of daily life and specific interests and values, the
cultures out of which racialized discourses and racist expressions arise.
DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLrnCS OF MEANING 90
(1993).
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thereby centering needed attention on social hierarchies.186 Of course,
drawbacks to status models exist. First, such models tend to overemphasize
the symbolic aspects of discrimination-those aspects that convey the
meaning of social action-and consequently may underemphasize the
material conditions of inequality. 8 7  Second, analogizing racial
discrimination to status may obscure the particularities of race and racism,
phenomena that deserve extensive study in their own right. 88 Nevertheless,
McAdams's invocation of status advances our understanding of aspects of
racial discrimination.'89
Still, McAdams's theory of status production encounters the same
general problem that all rational discrimination theories encounter when
applied. Individuals rarely engage consciously in the complicated
calculations specified by such theories-in McAdams's case, the calculus
of lowering the status of another group in order to enhance the status of
their own group and hence the esteem in which they are individually held.
Unlike most rational choice theorists, however, McAdams confronts the
problem head-on, acknowledging that few if any actors proceed from a
conscious interest in esteem. 9 Instead, he posits that discrimination can be
explained by an interest in status production, coupled with an "ideology" in
which discriminators deceive themselves regarding that interest.191
"Ideology," then, serves a core role in McAdams's theory of racial
discrimination as status production. With it, his theory is generally
applicable; without it, McAdams's theory applies only in those rare
circumstances where persons consciously pursue status interests through
racial discrimination.
186. Cf. KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN
THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 67-111 (1993) (using a status model to explore
the Supreme Court's treatment of race); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J.
2313 (1997) (developing a general model of status subordination); Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual
Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. REV. 321 (1987) (using a status model to assess
conflicts over bilingual education); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (discussing gender discrimination as a form
of status hierarchy); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997) (discussing gender and racial
discrimination as status hierarchy).
187. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 186, at 2323 ("[A] status hierarchy is sustained by a system
of social meanings in which one group receives relatively positive associations and another
correspondingly negative associations."); id. at 2327 (" [Slymbolic struggles are forms of status
competition."); see also KARST, supra note 186, at 9-10 ("A group's status in American society.
like any other cultural creation, is an amalgam of the meanings that Americans assign to
membership in the group."). McAdams's article exhibits this tendency, as he largely equates
status with meaning rather than with material privilege.
188. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 186, at 2313, 2320, 2326, 2349-50 (examining race, sexual
orientation, gender, religion, and nobility as status). To be clear, Balkin does not purport to focus
on race. Because McAdams's article examines racial discrimination rather than status in general,
his article does not suffer from this tendency.
189. Indeed, like McAdams, I rely on status notions to understand the dynamics of racism.
See infra notes 353-356 and accompanying text.
190. See McAdams, supra note 35, at 1060.
191. See id. at 1060-61.
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What are the source and nature of McAdams's theory of ideology? In
a section entitled "Using Status Production To Explain Racial Beliefs,"
he introduces the notion of "ideology" by turning to an article
by Richard Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, published in
the Indiana Law Jounial in 1993192 McAdams draws from Posner
the notion that certain groups-in Posner's example, cartels or guilds-
engage in self-deception about their interests and motivations. 93 The result,
argues McAdams, is "[s]elf-interested self-deception" :t" Groups develop
"ideological commitment[s]" 195 that amount to earnestly held but false
beliefs that serve their real but unrecognized interests. Applying this to
racial discrimination, McAdams conjectures as follows:
Members of Posner's representative guild do not openly declare,
even among themselves, that they desire to restrain competition in
order to charge higher prices and earn monopoly profits. Similarly,
whites never explain their discriminatory behavior as serving the
function of status production. Even in the Jim Crow South, whites
attempted to justify segregation not by reference to naked self-
interest but by claims that blacks were inherently inferior, that
blacks preferred segregation, or that segregation somehow reflected
the natural order of things. 96
McAdams might simply mean that discriminators do not own up to an
interest in status production, even though they consciously subscribe to it.
But in fact, he seems to mean something different. Using the ideas of "self-
interested self-deception" and "ideological commitments," he seems to
claim that discriminators pursue an unrecognized interest in status,
rationalized through the ideology of racism."7 McAdams thus purports to
explain not only discrimination per se, but also the rise and evolution of
racism itself.98
192. See id. at 1059 (citing Posner, supra note 181).
193. See id. at 1060.
194. Id. at 1059-60.
195. Id. at 1059.
196. Id. at 1060-61.
197. McAdams writes,
[Wlhites are more accurately described as the subset of cartels that Posner calls
"guilds," that is, cartels with "social cohesiveness." Based on a morality emphasizing
loyalty and conformity, these guilds have an - ideology" -a set of beliefs that serves to
inhibit free-riding--specifically that blacks tend to be inferior, that whites should not
interact ,with blacks in certain ways, and that whites must " stick together."
Id. at 1070 (citations omitted). Note that McAdams is not concerned with unintentional
discrimination, but rather with action prompted by unrecognized motives. In his account, people
are aware of their racial prejudice, but not its role in hiding their unrecognized desire for status
enhancement. Nevertheless, at root McAdams here grapples with the same question that lies at the
base of unmotivated discrimination, namely, how to explain action that is substantially
nonconsciously directed.
198. On this last score, McAdams claims too much. The origins of. and continuing impetus
behind, racial beliefs in the United States have attracted sustained analyses that highlight disputes
over resources and labor, religious conflicts, colonialism, the cultural stress of encountering new
2000] 1767
The Yale Law Journal
To square his theory of discrimination with reality, McAdams
postulates group dynamics of self-deception among discriminators. But
what exactly are those dynamics? How do they function? Under what
conditions do they arise, or dissipate? Unfortunately, these are all questions
that McAdams does not raise, let alone address. In effect, he postulates a
cognitive dynamic, but stops short of explaining its operation. To some
extent, we should not be surprised. To explain self-deception, McAdams
has to push past the boundaries of rational choice theory. Self-deception,
after all, runs afoul of one of the most important tenets of that genre.'99 To
some extent, however, the thinness of his account stems from his decision
to draw his notion of ideology from a relatively minor article by Richard
Posner that does not seriously grapple with that concept.2" Indeed,
McAdams recognizes that Posner's article provides a slim base from which
to address the complicated question of undirected action when he notes,
even in the course of relying on the article, that "[Posner] does not explain
how belief distortion occurs." 20' In the end, "self-interested self-deception"
peoples, and the advent of human physical sciences. See, e.g., THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE
INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1994); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981); REGINALD
HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-
SAXONISM (1981); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrTUDES
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY:
LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971); RONALD T. TAKAKI, IRON
CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1979).
199. James Bohman makes a similar critique of Gary Becker's efforts to fashion a
comprehensive theory of human behavior from rational choice theory:
[T]he generalization of rational choice models of explanation can be had only by
abandoning the intentional assumption: the idea that the theory was supposed to give an
account of how reasons cause actions. Instead the theory searches for non-intentional
maximizing motives and market mechanisms, making the rationality of actors
themselves less and less important as an explanatory condition. The problem is that
without these assumptions, there is no reason to explain ... choices in terms of
expected utility.
James Bohman, The Limits of Rational Choice Explanation, in RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY:
ADVOCACY AND CRITIQUE 207, 216 (James S. Coleman & Thomas J. Fararo eds., 1992).
200. The Material Basis of Jurisprudence is the revised text of a talk Posner gave at Indiana
University School of Law on the topic of a perceived decline in the quality of law practice since
the days of Benjamin Cardozo. See Posner, supra note 181, at I n.*, 30. In the article, Posner
asserts a "fruitful analogy" between the decline of the legal profession and "the decline of
medieval craft production," an analogy grounded in the operation and collapse of an "ideology"
of production that facilitated cartelization by stressing quality and limits to entry. Id. at I, It, 13-
20. Although Posner uses the term "ideology" in the article, he focuses not on ideology per se,
but on what he referred to as "the ideology of guild production," id. at 11. or elsewhere,
"professional ideology," id. at 3. He does not address the nature or operation of ideology in
general; for all that he uses the word "ideology," he might just as well be addressing "guild
ethos" or "professional ideals."
201. McAdams, supra note 35, at 1059. Conceding that Posner does not explain the
operation of belief distortion, McAdams nevertheless asserts that Posner "invoked [belief]
distortion to explain how certain cartels solve collective action problems." Id. (emphasis added).
Yet even this is not clearly so. To support the above claim, McAdams cites to page 10 of Posner's
article. But that page, like so much of Posner's piece, discusses the role of "moral precepts and
values" as well as "social cohesiveness" as mechanisms for establishing informal sanctions.
Posner, supra note 181, at 10. It may be that such mechanisms operate at the level of "belief
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functions as an analogy, not as a theory. -2
McAdams correctly insists on status as a core aspect of racial
discrimination. Yet the behavioral theory he relies on, by leading him to
stress the conscious pursuit of individual esteem, limits his ability to
explain that large class of cases in which persons engage in discrimination
but do not understand themselves to be discriminating, let alone indirectly
pursuing esteem. By undertaking a rational choice approach to status
conflict and discrimination, McAdams runs into a problem common
to rational choice theories generally: an inability to explain undirected
action adequately. This lacuna is particularly significant for theories of
racial discrimination because unmotivated discrimination constitutes a
pervasive phenomenon. Although McAdams recognizes this theoretical gap
and attempts to fill it, the theory of "self-interested self-deception" he
posits remains thin and underdeveloped. 23 Be that as it may, McAdams's
effort to confront undirected discrimination serves as an effective segue to
institutional analysis, for such analysis centers on undirected action.
V. TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
East LA 13 poses the question of how to model conduct by
organizational actors that is not motivated by conscious racial antipathy, but
that nevertheless produces significant discriminatory effects. Institutional
analysis seems able to explain this dynamic, as well as what can be termed
"institutional racism" more generally. In this Part, I explore those ideas in
Harold Garfinkel's Studies in Ethnomnethodology that have most influenced
the development of New Institutionalism's premises.' I also place New
Institutionalism in the context of other social science theories of behavior,
distortion." But at best this must be inferred from Posner's discussion, as he does not explicitly
address this issue.
202. Consider, for instance, the actions of the Los Angeles superior court judges in
nominating their acquaintances. A concern for status may indeed have operated at some level in
motivating this behavior, but how? In what way were the judges a cartel? What was their interest
in excluding large classes of persons from grand jury service? Why wasn't this interest
outweighed by an interest in conforming to legal and professional obligations? By what
mechanism did the judges' interest in status come to be sublimated, and into what? Did the judges
subscribe to an "ideology" of racial superiority? If so, why look beyond this to an interest in
status to explain discrimination? If not, what "ideology" guided their conduct? Did all of the
judges subscribe to it? Were enforcement mechanisms used, or even necessary? Note that because
McAdams fails to elaborate his notion of "self-interested self-deception." his theory cannot even
begin to answer such questions. The simple problem is that McAdams does not tell us how "self-
interested self-deception" works.
203. To repeat, the issue is not McAdams's focus on status itself, but rather the mechanism
through which he postulates that status intersects with discrimination. As noted earlier, many
theorists focus on status in explaining discrimination. Most do not. however, yoke status
competition to a rational choice theory of behavior. See. e.g.. ERVING GOFFIAN, STIGMA: NOTES
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2 (1963) (exploring status differentiation from a
social constructionist approach wherein " [t]he routines of social intercourse in established settings
allow us to deal with anticipated others without special attention or thought").
204. See GARFINKEL, supra note 15.
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in particular rational choice theory. Finally, I develop the ideas of script and
path institutional analysis. This Part lays the groundwork for institutional
racism theory.
A. New Institutionalism and Ethnomethodology
Garfinkel was among the first in sociology to consider the implications
of the cognitive revolution for theories of social action."0 5 Writing in the
1960s, Garfinkel advanced two important and interrelated arguments. First,
he posited a vision of cognition that broke dramatically with the vision
underlying the typical rational actor model. For Garfinkel, cognition
typically involved not the purposeful evaluation of interests and the
strategic calculation of means, but rather what he termed "practical
reasoning," an unremarkable, unconsidered reliance on background rules.
Second, Garfinkel argued that individual identity does not exist outside of
social interaction, but is instead constituted by it. According to Garfinkel,
an actor's familiarity with and reliance on background rules-
what he termed the "[s]ocially-sanctioned-facts-of-life-in-society-that-any-
bona-fide-member-of-the-society-knows" 2 6-is not only cognitively
necessary but also serves to establish the actor's social identity.0 7
New Institutionalism draws on these two arguments in its cognitive and
cultural components. Largely as a result of the work of Garfinkel, New
Institutionalism has adapted a microsociology of practical reasoning, by
which individuals both interact with others according to taken-for-granted
patterns and in turn constitute themselves.20 8
1. Cognition and Rationality
One appreciates Garfinkel's cognitive claims by examining his
approach to rationality. Insofar as he articulated a model of human action
wherein actors often follow routines rather than engage in purposeful
action, Garfinkel may seem uninterested in rationality as a principal engine
of human action. Indeed, one sometimes sees New Institutionalists use such
terms as "antirationalist" and "transrationalist. '' 2° Such a reading of
Garfinkel's work would be misleading, however, for he was supremely
205. Garfinkel's interest in cognition traces back to his involvement in an empincal study of
jury deliberations undertaken at University of Chicago Law School. See Clark D. Cunningham.
The Laiyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal l)iscourse.
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1345 n. I I I(1992).
206. GARFINKEL, supra note 15, at 76.
207. See id. at 273.
208. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 12, at 21.
209. See, e.g., Friedland & Alford, supra note 13, at 235 ("We argue that the opposition is
not between rational and irrational, but between different transrational orders." ).
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interested in the operation of what he termed not "rationality," but
"rationalities." 210
Garfinkel argued against a contemporary wisdom that contrasted the
rationality of science with the nonrationality of daily life. He suggested that
in fact almost all social behavior involves some combination of rational
activities, understood broadly.1 Garfinkel advocated considering the
following activities, among others, as "rational": categorizing and
comparing; concern for timing, temporal order, and causality; analysis of
alternatives and consequences; the pursuit of predictability; the formulation
of strategies; and the establishment of procedural rules.2 2 He termed these
activities aspects of "practical" reasoning. "- 3 Nevertheless, Garfinkel
argued that several specific forms of rationality never form part of
commonsense behavior: concern for establishing the compatibility of
means-ends relationships with the principles of formal logic; emphasis on
clarity and distinctness of all elements of the decision-making process for
its own sake; and, most importantly, an unwillingness to accept-as bases for
action any but such "facts" as conform to scientific findings. '24 According
to Garfinkel, "actions governed by the attitude of daily life are marked by
the specific absence of these ['scientific'] rationalities." 2' 5
Contrasting practical and scientific rationalities, Garfinkel noted
several differences of great importance concerning doubt, trust, and sense-
making. In effect, he argued that practical reasoning involves reliance on
background understandings of the world, as well as on background
procedures of knowledge regulation.
a. Doubt
On the fundamental issue of whether the world is as it appears,
Garfinkel noted that the scientific theorist ideally embraces unlimited
doubt." 6 The scientific theorist follows rules of interpretive procedure that,
210. GARFINKEL, supra note 15, at 262-83 (examining the rational properties of scientific
and commonsense activities). Of course, the study of rationality by Garfinkel and in turn by New
Institutionalists differs from that by rational choice theorists. In this regard, consider Herbert
Simon's summarization of the fundamental difference: -[I]n economics, rationality is viewed in
terms of the choices it produces; in the other social sciences, it is viewed in terms of the processes
it employs." Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics. in RATIONAL CHOICE:
THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25. 26 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin
W. Reder eds., 1986). The former is sometimes referred to as "substantive rationality," and
the latter as "procedural rationality." Id.; see also JAMES G. MARCH. A PRIMER ON DECISION
MAKING: How DECISIONS HAPPEN 2 (1994).
211. See GARFINKEL, supra note 15, at 262-63.
212. See id. at 263-66. In this discussion Garfinkel draws heavily on the phenomenology
of Alfred Schutz. See 2 ALFRED SCHUT7, The Problem of Rationalirv in the Social World, in
COLLECTED PAPERS: STUDIES IN SOCIALTHEORY 64. 74-76 (Arvid Brodersen ed.. 1964).
213. GARFINKEL, supra note 15, at 273.
214. See id. at 267-68, 270.
215. Id. at 270 (emphasis omitted).
216. See id. at 272.
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in principle, insist on empirical testability and confirmation, holding
socially sanctioned beliefs irrelevant. 217 Garfinkel recognized, of course,
that no person functions entirely free of social influences. Nevertheless,
he noted that under some circumstances persons adopt a skeptical and
empirical attitude toward knowledge. In contrast to this scientific attitude,
Garfinkel argued that a "practical" reasoning approach does not and cannot
emphasize doubt, but rather emphasizes the ready acceptance of the world
as it appears. According to Garfinkel, dally life requires, if one is to act
efficiently and normally, the exercise of only limited doubt regarding
whether the world is as it seems. "Doubt for the practical theorist is limited
by his respect for certain valued, more or less routine features of the social
order as 'seen from within,' that he specifically does not and will not call
into question"; it is limited by "practical considerations." 218 In suspending
doubt, the practical theorist must accept large amounts of the social world
in an unquestioning manner: "[R]outine features of the social order ... will
not [be] call[ed] into question." ''"9 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann
express a similar idea:
The reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does
not require additional verification over and beyond its simple
presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and compelling
facticity. I know that it is real. While I am capable of engaging in
doubt about its reality, I am obliged to suspend such doubt as I
routinely exist in everyday life.20
Routine features of the social world operate as a set of understandings that
people at once rely on and are unaware of in the efficient conduct of
everyday life; they are so widely accepted as to be by and large unnoticed
as anything other than reality.
b. Trust and Sense-Making
In addition to drawing on an uncritical acceptance of the social world,
practical reasoning, according to Garfinkel, draws on standard unexamined
procedures for knowledge regulation. To prove the prevalence of such
knowledge rules, he purposefully set out to violate some of them. In one
experiment, he demonstrated the tendency of people to enter into
conversations with an attitude of trust; in another, he showed the
extraordinary lengths individuals go to in order to render meaningful
otherwise meaningless communication.
217. See id. at 272-73.
218. Id. at 273.
219. Id.
220. BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 14, at 23.
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Garfinkel argued that individuals conduct everyday affairs according to
a rule of trust in relations with others, where to act otherwise-that is, with
distrust-requires justification, and if none is forthcoming, results in
hostility and ostracism. To demonstrate this, Garfinkel requested his
students deliberately to display distrust in situations in which "anyone
could see" distrust was not warranted-for example, in asking directions. "-'
He noted that many students who displayed distrust reported "that the other
person was angry with them and hated them."" At the same time, test
subjects experienced the students' distrust of them as a form of anger:
" [M]any victims... complained that the student had no reason to be angry
with them."' 3 Even after the experiment was over, attempts at conciliation
and explanation often failed, leading to "frank displays of anger and
'disgust."" Trusting others, or more specifically, trusting that others will
act in accordance with taken-for-granted social norms, Garfinkel concluded,
constitutes a virtual requirement in the conduct of everyday life.
Garfinkel also postulated that actors rely on a knowledge rule whereby
the great bulk of communication is presumed to be meaningful-that is,
presumed to possess a readily intelligible substantive content. He brought
the operation of this rule to the foreground in an experiment that recruited
undergraduate students to participate in "evaluating" a new student-
counseling method. Garfinkel asked the recruited participants to describe
their concerns to a "counselor" and then to pose questions susceptible of a
"yes" or "no" answer. Unknown to them, the "counselors" were given a
prewritten list of random yeses and noes with which to respond to each
question. In a remarkable display, the student subjects easily carried
through with the exchanges-asking a series of questions, reading into the
"answers" detailed substantive content, actively responding to the
supposed content by formulating new questions, rationalizing seeming
contradictions, and searching for and constructing pattems.2 Moreover,
subsequently asked to evaluate the exchanges, all students directed their
comments to the "advice that they had been given," demonstrating their
perception that the "answers" received had not been random words but
considered responses to their questions. ' 6
221. GARFINKEu, supra note 15, at 51.
222- Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 52.
225. See id. at 79-94. Of course, as one of my colleagues noted, it might be that college
students are especially likely to attempt to render sensible the senseless.
226. Id. at 89. As one student commented,
The answers I received I must say that the majority of them were answered
perhaps in the same way that I would answer them .... One or two of them did come
as a surprise to me and I felt that the reason perhaps he answered these questions the
way he did is for the reason that he is not aware of the personalities involved .... I was
interpreting his answers even though they were yes or no answers as fully meditating
over these situations that I presented to him and they had a lot of meaning to me.
Id. at 84.
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According to Garfinkel, the practical theorist not only accepts that the
world is as it appears, but also assumes that it "makes sense." For the
practical theorist, the world known in common is sensible and to be trusted
as such.
c. Rules and Rationalities
Garfinkel claimed that in their daily lives actors draw upon background
knowledge and rules of knowing. He did not postulate, however, that social
actors act irrationally. On the contrary, rationalities play an integral part in
his model, though these rationalities operate in conjunction with largely
unexamined but indispensable background understandings of the world and
rules of appropriate engagement."2 7 For Garfinkel, unstudied beliefs and
rules and the exercise of rationalities did not represent antithetical or
independent modes of thought, but rather parts of a cognitive whole:
In the conduct of his everyday affairs in order for the person to treat
rationally the one-tenth of this situation that, like an iceberg
appears above the water, he must be able to treat the nine-tenths
that lies below as an unquestioned and, perhaps even more
interestingly, as an unquestionable background of matters that are
demonstrably relevant to his calculation, but which appear without
even being noticed.2 8
The model of social action that Garfinkel posited depicts persons not as
automatons jerked about by forces beyond their conscious control, but as
accomplished actors repeating motions made a thousand times before,
relying on a set of well-honed moves to achieve familiar goals. For the
actor, unlike the automaton, not only routines but also rationalities-
temporal sequencing, consequential reasoning, goal direction, and so on-
are integral to action. At the heart of New Institutionalism's cognitive
claims rest Garfinkel's insights regarding the necessity of background
understandings and rules that serve as unseen antecedents to rational action.
2. Culture
Garfinkel's focus on attitudes toward knowledge directly raises the
issue of socialization. The practical theorist, he suggests, relies on the
"natural facts of life" not simply as a matter of convenience, but in order to
227. In this way, the opposition often postulated in cognitive psychology between
"motivational" and "cognitive" impulses to action posits too stark a dichotomy. See, e.g.. Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1995).
228. GARFINKEL, supra note 15, at 173.
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establish standing as a bona fide member of the social group.-- 9 Herein lies
the basis for New Institutionalism's cultural claims.
a. The World in Common
Garfinkel argued that social membership depends upon the practical
actor participating in a common intersubjective world marked by accepted
rules of conduct.230 He claimed that at the very core of social relationships
exists a body of knowledge-a set of interpretive rules, repertoires of
appropriate actions, and so on-that all social actors must share to be
regarded as "normal" or unquestioned members of the community. On this
level, taken-for-granted aspects of social interaction serve not merely as
cognitive tools, but as cultural codes: They bear not just the normative force
of something one should do, but also the moral force of something that
anyone sane and decent must do. "A society's members encounter and
know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action-familiar
scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with
others and with others taken for granted.""3 One must conform, one does
conform, but rarely as a matter of thoughtful choice. Actors conform
because received rules and understandings define, on a preconscious level,
the way the world is and ought to be. 2 For the practical theorist, the
unthinking acceptance of and reliance on the "natural facts of life" not only
facilitate interaction with others but also serve as strict requirements for
membership in normal, sane society."
229. Id. at 275.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 35. In contrast, under the forms of scientific rauonality noted above, an
investigator is obligated to "know" only what she has decided to give credence to; ideally, such
credence is given independently of the status of others sharing or disclaiming such knowledge.
See iL at 75.
232. Berger and Luckmann emphasize this point:
Since [the sum total of "what everybody knows" I is socially objectivated as
knowledge, that is, as a body of generally valid truths about reality, any radical
deviance from the institutional order appears as a departure from reality. Such deviance
may be designated as moral depravity, mental disease, or just plain ignorance.... In
this way, the particular social world becomes the world tout court.
BERGER & LUcKMANN, supra note 14, at 62.
233. Notice that culture not only transmits but also is partially produced by institutions.
Groups not only engage in but also rework such received understandings, in turn reconstituting
culture. As Berger and Luckmann put it.
[Ilt is important to emphasize that the relationship between man. the producer, and
the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is. man (not, of
course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each
other. The product acts back upon the producer.
Id. at 57. "Knowledge about society is thus a realization in the double sense of the word. in the
sense of apprehending the objectivated social reality, and in the sense of ongoingly producing this
reality." Id. at 62.
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b. Identity
Garfinkel also argued that when individuals draw upon a common
world, doing so constitutes them as individuals. In conforming to socially
required background rules of knowledge and communication, individuals
not only establish membership in a common culture, but also take on an
identity.234 For the practical theorist, the "natural facts of life" constitute
the locus of knowledge, at the same time that subscription to and
participation in the replication of such "facts" constitute the self. Social
actors do not exist outside of or independent of the social context in which
they find themselves. Instead, the identity of social actors, including aspects
of character such as race, class, and gender, but also their interests
and preferences, arises through reliance on unexamined practices and
routines. 235 New Institutionalism insists on the constitution of individuality
through social interaction.
2 36
B. New Institutionalism and Social Science Theories of Behavior
New Institutionalism's cognitive and cultural components not only
define that school, but also can be used to locate it with respect to other
social science theories of behavior. Its component claims translate into axes
along which such theories may be placed, with a cultural axis measuring
postulated degrees of social construction and a cognitive one comparing
posited levels at which action is directed. Employing such axes renders a
rough graph, with New Institutionalism and rational choice theory in
opposite quadrants. Although this graph overstates the differences between
various theories and simultaneously understates the degree of variation
within each approach, it nevertheless constitutes a useful device for
highlighting the relationship between competing conceptions of social
237action.
234. See GARFINKEL, supra note 15, at 281.
235. Aaron Wildavsky addresses the impact of institutions on preference formation in Aaron
Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference
Formation, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 3 (1987).
236. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 12, at 21; see also John W. Meyer et al., Ontology
and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE:
CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 12 (George M. Thomas et al. eds., 1987)
(" [I]nstitutionalized cultural rules define the meaning and identity of the individual and the
patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those
individuals.").
237. Ronald Jepperson uses a similar matrix, though with one axis scaled to the level of
social construction and the other to the level of analysis, individualist or structuralist. See
Jepperson, supra note 16, at 154.
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0Behaviorism
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Cognitive Basis for Action
1. From Low to High Construction
The vertical axis in the graph above measures a continuum along levels
of social construction. Low-construction or realist theories treat actors as
presocial entities, the human equivalent of the biologist's fruit flies or the
behaviorist's pigeons. Skinnerian behaviorism, which models individuals as
"black boxes" responding to external stimuli, most closely approximates
this extreme, 8 although many rational choice theories also come close.
High-construction or phenomenological theories, on the other hand, picture
actors as thoroughly social, completely constituted through their relations
with others. New Institutionalism pushes in this direction, though perhaps
not as far as do many theories of human action associated with
postmodemism.
As the graph indicates, different positions along the social construction
axis exist; this is so not only with regard to the broad theoretical groupings
listed, but also within each of these. Consider in particular rational choice
models. Among rational choice theorists, many suppose actors stand wholly
outside of social influences. But recently (and not so recently if one
includes the work of Robert Ellickson)," legal theorists have developed an
238. See id. at 154-55.
239. A decade ago, Ellickson urged law-and-economics scholars to attend to the lessons
developing in psychology and sociology regarding human behavior. See Robert C. Elfickson.
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 25 (1989). He also anticipated the recent turn to norm
analysis. See ROBERT C. ELLiCKSON, ORDER WiTHouT LAw (1991).
2000] 1777
The Yale Law Journal
approach to rational choice theory that incorporates social norms."' Larry
Lessig identifies this trend as a principal component of what he terms the
"New Chicago School,""24 which counts among its members both Richard
McAdams and Eric Posner.24 2 The increased attention to norms moves from
the actor-as-fruit-fly position to a more nuanced conception of actors as at
least somewhat responsive to the culture in which they find themselves.24
The New Chicago School's increased appreciation for the role of social
norms helps to bridge the gap along the constructivist axis between rational
choice theory and what is labeled "obligatory action" theory.2'4 Obligatory
action theory in many ways constitutes the "old institutionalism,"
particularly in the field of organizational analysis. 245 Obligatory action
posits a model of human behavior in which actors consciously respond to
internalized social norms.246 Under this approach, actors are in part
constituted by the roles within which they function and the attendant values
they internalize.2 7
Despite a move along the social construction axis, both the New
Chicago School and obligatory action theory remain at the "directed" pole
240. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Patti of Deterrence, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence.
83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis o'
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning]:
Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). Richard McAdams
provides an overview of this new approach. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin. Development.
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
241. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998).
242. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 240; Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The
Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996)
(examining the role of social norms in promoting collective action).
243. The move toward constructivism within the New Chicago School remains fairly limited.
however. Most articles, like those by Posner, see supra note 242, and McAdams, see supra note
240, ignore constructivist arguments altogether. Lessig is something of an exception, though he
too retains an exclusive focus on directed action and does not explore in depth the implications of
constructed social identities. See Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 240. at 946,
949-50.
244. I adopt this term from Mark Suchman, who in turn attributes it to James March. See
Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the
Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 475, 479 (citing James G. March, Decision
Making Perspective: Decisions in Organizations and Theories of Choice, in PERSPECTIVES ON
ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR 205, 222 (Andrew H. Van de Ven & William F. Joyce
eds., 1981)).
245. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 12. at 11-15; W. Richard Scott, Institutional
Theory and Organizations, in THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF ORGANIZATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL STUDIES at xi, xviii (W. Richard Scott & Soren Christensen
eds., 1995).
246. Some members of the New Chicago School, while retaining a focus on directed action.
have turned their attention to the internalization of norms, thus further approximating obligatory
action theory. See McAdams, supra note 240, at 376-86; see also Robert Cooter, Law and Unified
Social Theory, 22 J.L. & SOC'Y 50, 60-62 (1995).
247. See Suchman, supra note 244, at 479 (stating that obligatory action theory "emphasizes
how people form their identities, how people define and categorize the situations in which they
find themselves, and how people learn their parts in the social drama").
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on the cognitive axis. In both approaches, action remains wholly managed
by conscious thought-in the case of rational choice theory, the pursuit of
self-interest, and in the case of obligatory action theory, regard for
compliance with learned norms. Although New Institutionalism resembles
obligatory action theory in positing the socialization of organizational
actors, New Institutionalism emphasizes, in contrast, the cognitive rather
than affective basis of socialization; it stresses mental routines instead of
the self-conscious pursuit of internalized values.
-2 4
1
Returning to the continuum along constructivist lines among social
science theories of behavior, something akin to the following ordering
emerges: behaviorism (actor as pigeon); rational choice theory (actor
as fruit fly, presocial and autonomous); New Chicago School (actor
consciously responsive to social norms); obligatory action theory (actor
consciously responsive to internalized social norms); and New
Institutionalism (actor constituted through social action).
2. From Directed to Undirected Behavior
The horizontal axis measures a continuum between action that is
directed by completely conscious processes at one end and undirected
action instigated by completely nonconscious mechanisms at the other. The
variable here is the relative weight assigned to intentional versus
nonintentional spurs to action. The language of directedness highlights the
level of self-awareness involved in action, yet seeks to avoid the baggage
associated with the language of consciousness and, more particularly,
unconsciousness.
Again, placements on the graph indicate the relative position of the
various theories along this axis. Behaviorism, which models human action
as the automatic response to external stimuli, leaving no room for conscious
action, seems to stake out the undirected extreme. - 9 At the opposite pole lie
the rational choice theories that posit that human action results solely from
thoughtfulness. Again, however, distinctions exist among rational choice
theories. Within that school. significant advances have been made in the
analysis of the constraints that organizations, social structures, and iteration
impose on knowledge ("bounded rationality")' and choice ("positive
248. According to DiMaggio and Powell, "Not norms and values but taken-for-granted
scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made. Rather than concrete
organizations eliciting affective commitment, institutions are macrolevel abstractions,
'rationalized and impersonal prescriptions,' shared "typifications.' independent of any particular
entity to which moral allegiance might be owed." DiMaggio & Powell. supra note 12, at 15
(citation omitted). But see Suchman & Edelman, supra note 23. at 911-12 (noting that some New
Institutionalists are "agnostic" regarding the mechanisms-cognitivc. rational, normative, or
otherwise-by which organizational life influences behavior).
249. See Jepperson, supra note 16, at 154.
250. Theories of bounded rationality emphasize the inability of human arrngemens to
deliver complete and accurate information to decision makers. Such theories lie at the heart of
transaction-cost economics. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (3d
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political theory"),."' To a large extent, both bounded rationality and
positive political theory emphasize purposefully directed action. Yet they
also mark something of a departure along the directed/undirected axis from
traditional rational choice theories, insofar as the new approaches replace
the assumption of full awareness of interests and consequences with more
limited claims of partial awareness, especially as to the connection between
means and ends. Moreover, positive theory in particular argues that the
dictates of the situation, rather than exclusively strategic calculations,
sometimes guide human behavior. 2  In these ways, such theories move
away from a position that stresses the fully directed nature of human
behavior. Consider in addition the approach taken recently under the title A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics. 5 3 The authors suggest that
actors occasionally respond rationally to recognized limits on knowledge,
self-discipline, and self-interest. 4 While the theoretical emphasis remains
on directed action-namely, on appropriate responses to recognized
constraints on rationality-the authors correctly emphasize that undirected
spurs to human action pose a distinct challenge to rational choice theory.255
In terms of a continuum, social science theories of behavior fall along
the cognitive axis as follows: rational choice theory (action solely the result
of intent); bounded rationality (action the result of intent limited by
informational constraints); positive political theory (action dictated by
intent as well as by situational constraints); behavioral economics (action
dictated by intent, often informed by anticipated cognitive distortions); New
ed. 1976); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985): R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
251. Positive theory applies game theory to politics, stressing iteration within structured
environments. Common in political science, positive theory has also found expression in legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 43 (1994) ("Positive political theory describes regulatory
policymaking as a part of a world in which political actors function within institutions rationally
and strategically in order to accomplish certain goals."). Among political scientists, such
theorizing sometimes goes by the name of "new institutionalism." For a critique, see Howard
Gillman, The New Institutionalism: More and Less than Strategy: Some Advantages to
Interpretive Institutionalism in the Analysis of Judicial Politics (pt. I), LAW & CTS. (American
Political Science Ass'n, St. Louis, Mo.), Winter 1996-1997, at 6. For a comparison of this
approach with the one generally described here, see Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court
Matters in American Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell
Clayton eds., 1999).
252. For this reason Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek argue that the "positive theory of
institutions" "is not only a new institutionalism that formalizes the strategic behavior of
individuals, it is also a 'new behavioralism' in which self-interested individuals are led by
institutional arrangements toward 'structure-induced equilibria."' Karen Orren & Stephen
Skowronek, Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a "New lnstitutionalism," in THE
DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: APPROACHES AND INTERPRETATIONS 311, 315-16
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds., 1994).
253. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471 (1998).
254. See id. at 1477-79.
255. See id. at 1473, 1476; see also Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to
Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (1998).
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Institutionalism; and behaviorism (spontaneous responses directly triggered
by external stimuli).
C. Script and Path Institutionalism
On the cognitive axis, New Institutionalism lies close to the undirected
end. Yet, on the question of cognition, an important division exists in New
Institutionalist theories. Reflecting this, I differentiate New Institutionalism
in the graph by the terms "script" and "path." Although New
Institutionalist literature does not use these terms, they help distinguish two
different claims regarding the operation of institutions in everyday and
organizational life. 6
"Script institutionalism" refers to institutional models of human
behavior that emphasize stock prescriptions of conventional action, in
which action stems from ingrained habits and responses with virtually no
conscious thought. I use this term because such theories seem to picture
actors following scripts, in the sense that they engage in prescribed routines
appropriate to the situation with no consideration given to the actions
in which they engage. To be sure, such accounts leave room for
thoughtfulness, particularly where it is required to categorize the
situation-though categorization may well be achieved with no conscious
thought at all. Moreover, script institutionalism specifically contemplates
the occasional failure or interruption of routines, positing that when
background practices are drawn into question, thoughtfulness occurs. - 7
Once actors identify a situation, however, and in the absence of a failure or
interruption of routines, script institutionalism posits that unconsidered,
established practices dictate most behavior."'
256. Mark Suchman and Lauren Edelman distinguish divergent orientations toward cognition
in New Institutionalism with the labels "cognitive" and -behavioral" institutionalism. See
Suchinan & Edelman, supra note 23, at 910-13. According to them. "cognitive institutionalists
emphasize schemata, expectations, and accounts," id. at 910. while "work in [the behavioral
institutionalism] mold is less committed to a purely cognitive model of human action and is more
willing to incorporate rational, normative, and structural factors, as well." id. at 912. This division
is not sharp, as few cognitive institutionalists are so wedded to a deterministic approach as to be
unwilling to concede important behavioral roles to rational and normative forces as well, while
behavioral institutionalists concede the significance of cognitive influences. Script and path
institutionalisms advance complementary but distinct models regarding how the cognitive
influences of institutions manifest themselves; thus, they constitute models most salient to those
whom Suchman and Edelman term cognitive institutionalists.
257. Berger and Luckmann emphasize the durability of institutions up to the point that they
fail to meet particular challenges:
The validity of my knowledge of everyday life is taken for granted by myself and
by others until further notice, that is, until a problem arises that cannot be solved in
terms of it. ... Only when my maxims fail "to deliver the goods" in the world to which
they are intended to apply are they likely to become problematic to me -in earnest."
BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 14, at 44.
258. Script institutionalism resembles Alfred Schutz's "cook-book knowledge":
The cook-book has recipes, lists of ingredients, formulae for mixing them, and
directions for finishing off. This is all we need to make an apple pie, and also all we
need to deal with the routine matters of daily life.... Most of our daily activities from
20001 1781
The Yale Law Journal
In contrast, another variant of institutionalism stresses the manner in
which taken-for-granted knowledge prescribes not the specifics of action
but its boundaries, channeling actors along certain courses within which
some significant latitude in decision making is exercised." 9 I characterize
this approach as path institutionalism. Path institutionalism emphasizes
background understandings and grammars that constrain but do not
completely dictate action.2" The path argument focuses on taken-for-
granted knowledge, the nine-tenths of the iceberg beneath the surface,
picturing such knowledge as the nearly indispensable and largely
unconsidered basis on which purposeful decisions are made. Among New
Institutionalists, path institutional explanations seem more common than
script versions. 6 ' Further from the undirected end of the continuum, path
institutionalism posits a weaker claim regarding the role of background
understandings and rules, leaving more room for directed action.262
Notice that script and path institutionalism do not operate as
independent cognitive mechanisms, but instead complement each other.
While script institutionalism describes a first-order phenomenon in the
sense that scripts are spontaneously triggered and involve little or no
conscious thought, path institutionalism implicates a second-order
phenomenon wherein thoughtfulness occurs but nevertheless remains
institutionally channeled. In this way, path institutionalism explains how
institutions continue to wield a cognitive influence even when actors self-
consciously reject the scripts set out for them. Nevertheless, because
different levels of consciousness operate in all decisions, no action is purely
script- or purely path-dependent; actions drawing on institutions always
combine the two. Together, script and path institutionalism suggest
an image of day-to-day activity that is largely unreflective, yet also
rising to going to bed are of this kind. They are performed by following recipes reduced
to automatic habits or unquestioned platitudes.
2 SCHUTZ, supra note 212, at 73-74.
259. See, e.g., Suchman, supra note 244, at 482-84.
260. Jack Balkin offers a theory similar to path institutionalism, though he does so in the
language of memes and cultural software. See J.M. BALKIN. CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY
OF IDEOLOGY (1998).
261. In general, theories of path institutionalism seem more akin to the social constructivism
of Berger and Luckmann than do script theories, which seem more indebted to Garfinkel's
ethnomethodology.
262. Indeed, as the constraining influence of background institutions is relaxed, path
institutionalism loses explanatory power. At a certain point, theoretical parsimony may suggest
proceeding in terms of rational choice or other models while acknowledging institutional
constraints on cognition as well as institutional influence on identity. See Peter Abell, The New
Institutionalism and Rational Choice Theory, in THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 245, at I I [hereinafter Abell, New Institutionalism and Rational
Choice]. This is not to suggest that rational choice theory therefore should be given "paradigmatic
privilege," as Abell elsewhere suggests. See Peter Abell, Is Rational Choice Theory a Rational
Choice of Theory?, in RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: ADVOCACY AND CRITIQUE 183, supra note
199, at 203. But neither is it to argue that institutional explanations deserve preeminence. Model
preference should follow from matching the behavior one seeks to explain against the relative
strengths of the different models.
1782 [Vol. 109: 1717
Institutional Racism
commonly interrupted, prompting varying ratios of thoughtlessness and
thoughtfulness. 3 One should not model human action as directed or
undirected, but rather as shifting combinations of the two.26'
Notice as well that both scripts and paths not only constrain but also
enable social interaction. In sociology, it has long been common to regard
the individual as "shackled by institutions, even threatened by them. '' -'
Yet institutional analysis emphasizes that institutions are necessary to social
interaction. One should not picture institutions as constraints, from which
once released individuals would be free to engage with each other as they
saw fit. Rather, institutions limit but also facilitate what actors can do and
who they can be.' Neither necessarily good nor bad, scripts and paths are
indispensable to social life.
D. New Institutionalism and Rational Choice Theory
The preceding discussion blurs the central distinctions between rational
choice theory and institutionalism. Restoring clarity, even if through
simplification, helps to relocate these schools in opposite quadrants in
the constructivist/cognitive matrix used above. On the question of
social construction, rational choice theory in effect treats social actors
as autochthonous-primordial and presocial beings. 67 Social actors
possessing stable interests function as independent units capable of full
rationality and impervious to changes induced through social interactions:
They act, but are not acted upon.264 With respect to the cognitive basis of
action, rational choice theory pictures actors as directing their actions
263. Cf Ellen Langer et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: 17te Role of
"Placebic" Infonnation in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 635
(1978).
264. Cf. Abell, New Institutionalism and Rational Choice, supra note 262. at 12 ('" Should we
model everyday human actions... as characteristically calculative or as unreflectvely
institutionalized? I am sure the empirical answer is both, and it may be useful to take the degree of
calculation (optimal search) as a fundamental variable.").
265. MARY DOUGLAS & STEVEN NEY, MISSING PERSONS: A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIAL
ScIENCES 154 (1998).
266. See Jepperson, supra note 16, at 146 (" Institutions are not just constraint structures; all
institutions simultaneously empower and control."). Jack Balkin extends this point by noting that,
because background understandings not only limit but also empower, such understandings should
not be assigned an a priori normative valence. "Each ability created carries with it a necessary
disability, each perspective opened up carries with it a necessary blindness. In our cultural
software benefit and [disadvantage] are yoked together, and so our attitude toward our cultural
software can be neither positive nor neutral nor pejorative. It must be ambivalent." BALK. , supra
note 260, at 286.
267. See Jepperson, supra note 16. at 153.
268. Because rational choice theory understands actors as presocial and impervious to
change, actors qua actors receive little theoretical attention. Compare the New Institutionalist
position: "Actors enact as much as they act: What they do is inherent in the social definition of
the actor itself.... Hence the common notion that the actor performs the action is only a half-
truth-at the institutional level, action also creates the actor." Meyer ct al., supra note 236, at 22-
23.
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exclusively through conscious processes. Rationality emerges as a
universal, constant cognitive facility.26 9
In contrast, on the constructivist question institutional analysis argues
that identity results from social interaction.27° With this approach, neither
the social actors who engage one another nor the terms of their engagement
can be understood except in cultural context. Social interaction constitutes
actors: their identities, access to resources, relative social positions-even
the "interests" they pursue and the relationship between means and ends
they perceive-arise out of social exchange.27" ' Simultaneously, on the
cognitive side, the "rationalities" that social actors employ, their strategies,
the repertoires of action to which they have recourse-all of these operate
against a collection of received understandings and rules of knowledge
regulation. Rationalities emerge as but one component among a set of
cognitive spurs to action. Institutionalism, path or script, focuses theoretical
attention not on actions in isolation, but on the organizational contexts in
which interaction occurs, and on the received grammars dictating individual
behavior.
To conclude with an example that sharpens the contrast between the
social science theories of human action considered here, consider the
hackneyed story of a traveler finishing a meal at a roadside caf6 to which
she believes she will never return.272 Does she leave a tip? Rational choice
theory suggests she calculates the expected utility to herself of doing so and
behaves accordingly, probably leaving nothing. The obligatory action
model posits that the traveler instead evaluates the situation against her
internalized norms, and in abiding by those norms probably tips. Script
institutionalism, on the other hand, suggests that our traveler leaves a tip
without giving it much thought. If asked directly why she acted as she did,
the rational choice and obligatory action models predict the traveler is able
to explain her action easily, as she has consciously considered it. For the
same reason, if given a chance to reconsider, those schools anticipate she
would not alter her behavior. Script institutionalism predicts, however, that
the traveler would be challenged by a question as to her reason for tipping,
because she had given the matter no thought. Moreover, institutional
analysis suggests that once having thought about it, she might react in
various ways. In any event, path institutionalism suggests that her decision
will depend on her subscription to rules of appropriate behavior that remain
shrouded and beyond her awareness.
Script and path institutionalisms model types of activity-action
taken in an undirected manner, or if directed, dependent on background
269. Again, as with the nature of social actors, where there is no change, there is nothing to
theorize-rationality is postulated rather than studied. But see supra notes 168-179 and
accompanying text (discussing recent trends).
270. See Meyer et al., supra note 236, at 12; see also Scott, supra note 245, at xi, xviii.
271. See Friedland & Alford, supra note 13, at 238-39; Wildavsky, supra note 235, at 5.
272. The following is adapted from DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 12, at 37 n.24.
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knowledge and rules-not otherwise adequately explained by rational
choice or obligatory action theories that stress constant thoughtfulness. In
the next Part, I argue that script and path institutionalisms compellingly
explain both the judges' actions in nominating grand jurors and their
testimony on the stand in East LA 13.
VI. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
The judges on the Los Angeles superior court discriminated against
Mexican Americans in nominating grand jurors. Institutional analysis
suggests why: The judges uncritically followed a script requiring the
nomination of personal and professional acquaintances. In this Part, I argue
that a nomination script was followed by the Los Angeles superior court
judges. I also argue that an institutional path channeled the judges' efforts
to justify their selection practices once called to the stand in East LA 13. In
effect, Acosta was correct: The judges did not have to arrive at work in the
morning with the intent to discriminate against Mexican Americans for
discrimination to occur. Instead, they had only to show up.
A. Discrimination by Script
1. Believing the Judges
The nominating practices of the Los Angeles superior court judges
excluded most Mexican Americans. Yet virtually every judge testified that
he had "absolutely" no intention to discriminate." To square the judges'
actions with their testimony, one might postulate that they intended the
results of their actions and testified falsely about their intentions. Is it
plausible that thirty-three judges took the witness stand in East LA 13 and
lied? To answer this, one must evaluate the character of the judges, as well
as the likelihood that they had something to lie about. One need not and
probably should not understand the judges as paragons of rectitude."
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that they were no more venal,
and perhaps, because of their office, a little less so, than the rest of us. With
regard to whether they had something to lie about, in the context of the East
Los Angeles cases, conceivably some judges harbored conscious animus
toward Mexican Americans. Little evidence of consciously held racial
animus has surfaced, however.275 Given the relative recency of the cases
and the diversity of backgrounds among the judges, it seems unlikely that a
273. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 399-400: supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text (discussing the testimony of Alameda
County superior court judges).
275. But see infra notes 321-322 and accompanying text (discussing the comments of San
Jose superior court judge Gerald Chargin).
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majority of them intentionally embraced and acted on racial hatred. There
may well have been some element, even some significant element, of a
willingness to dissemble or of racial hostility. But an account that centers
on intentional discrimination and outright lying is simply implausible.
Institutional analysis does not need to postulate that the judges lied in
order to reconcile their testimony and actions. Instead, script
institutionalism stresses the automatic quality of their actions in nominating
their acquaintances, and largely accepts their emphatic denials of
discriminatory intent. Institutional analysis easily accounts for the judges'
testimony, so difficult to square under theories stressing purposefulness,
because it suggests that they operated not mindfully but relatively
automatically in adopting the nomination strategy of picking from among
acquaintances. Thus, most judges were not duplicitous about, but rather
honestly insisted on, a lack of intent to discriminate. They formed no such
intent, script institutionalism contends, because with respect to their
nomination practices they formed little intent at all. This is not to depict the
judges as somnambulists-far from it. They no doubt engaged consciously
in making specific nominations-calling on friends, weighing the qualities
of various acquaintances, perhaps fretting about finding anyone, maybe
soliciting recommendations from fellow judges. But all of this action
occurred within the context of a script that delineated the accepted,
expected manner of grand juror selection. However directed their actions
were within the script's terms, the judges acted with little conscious thought
in conforming to the "pick your friend" script.
2. Scripts in Organized, Office-Holding Environments
Harold Garfinkel recognized that for routine functions in organized
settings, widely accepted, standardized responses develop that are
consistently but mindlessly deployed. 76 New Institutionalists such as
Lynne Zucker have carried this argument further, employing an
ethnomethodological approach to demonstrate that knowledge is more
highly institutionalized-that is, more taken-for-granted-in organizational
contexts, and still more so in organized settings involving office-holding.277
An extended experiment by Zucker renders more plausible the claim that
the judges of the Los Angeles superior court followed a script in selecting
grand jury nominees from among their friends and friends of friends.
To demonstrate the effects of organizational structure and office-
holding on knowledge, Zucker designed an experiment based on the
autokinetic illusion, asking subjects to estimate the distance traveled by a
276. As Garfinkel writes, "In exactly the ways in which a setting is organized, it consists of
methods whereby its members are provided with accounts of the setting as countable. storyable.
proverbial, comparable, picturable, representable-i.e., accountable events." GARFINKEtL. supra
note 15, at 34.
277. See Zucker, supra note 21, at 85-86.
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stationary point of light in a dark room.- Zucker placed subjects in teams
of two-one subject who had judged a previous set of light exposures and
one who was new to the situation. 79 She asked subjects who had already
judged a set of exposures to estimate the distance traveled first, followed by
the new person. In the first set of light exposures, a confederate played the
role of the experienced subject. After a number of exposures, the
confederate left the room, the first subject assumed the role of the
experienced team member, and a new subject came in, and so on through
succeeding "generations.",9 In each instance, the confederate "judged"
the light to have moved a mean of twelve inches. considerably further than
the average judgment of light movement reached by subjects in a control
situation, just over four inches.28 ' Zucker sought to measure first the impact
of the confederates' exaggerated estimates on the estimates made by initial
subjects, and second, the degree to which subjects transmitted high
estimates to successive generations.
The only variation in the structure of the tests came in the instructions
given. Zucker crafted three separate sets of instructions to capture the effect
of differentially organized settings. The first set of instructions measured
"personal influence"-that is, influence in an unorganized context.28 The
second set sought to capture the influence of moderately structured settings,
what Zucker termed "organizational" context. 3 Finally, the last set of
instructions focused on highly organized settings, involving what Zucker
called "office-holding." 2M Other than the instructions given, little varied
278. See id. at 88.
279. See id. at 89.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 92-93.
282. The "personal influence" instructions provided in pertinent part: "This study involves
problem solving in groups. You will be participating with another person." Id. at 91.
283. The "organizational" instructions provided as follows:
This study involves problem solving in model organizations. You will be
participating with another organizational member. Your two-member organization is
meant to be a small-scale model of much larger organizations. and it has many of the
same characteristics they do.
Most large organizations continue even though individual members, or even
whole divisions, may be replaced, due to changing jobs. retirement, reorganization. etc.
The model organization in which you will participate also will have this feature:
members who have been in it for a while will drop out, and new members will join, but
the job will go on. Thus, performance of any single member may not be important to
the organization as long as the job continues to be done.
Id.
284. These "office-holding" instructions incorporated the following directions into those
given to establish "organizational" context:
Large organizations also place members in different positions, often according to
the amount of time spent in the organization. The model organization in which you will
participate also has this feature--the member who has spent the most time in the
organization will be the Light Operator. When she leaves, you will become the Light
Operator....
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between the tests. 85
Unsurprisingly, initial subjects' estimates increased when made
after exposure to the exaggerated numbers given by the confederates,
irrespective of the form of the instructions given. This result is unsurprising
because the availability heuristic-the tendency of recently received
information to skew judgments in predictable directions-suggests such an
effect.286
Zucker's experiment, however, produced two results not explained by
the availability heuristic, results important to the claim that organizational
structure increases the institutionalization of knowledge. First, she found
that the initial subjects' mean estimates varied according to the instructions
given them: While the confederates' estimates consistently averaged twelve
inches, the initial subjects' estimates rose respectively in the personal
influence, organizational context, and office-holding settings, from 6.53 to
9.44, and finally, to 10.51 inches.287 Higher estimates of light movement
correlated positively to more organized settings. Second, the rate of
generational transmission also varied according to the instructions given:
Zucker calculated that subjects' distance estimates would return to the
baseline mean of just over four inches after seven generations in the
personal influence condition, but not until the twenty-ninth generation in
the organizational setting, and not even by the thirty-eighth generation in
the office context.288 As with mean estimates, higher rates of transmission
positively correlated to more organized settings.
Consider, in addition, information gleaned from a postexperimental
questionnaire. The questionnaire asked subjects first to evaluate the
"certainty" they felt in their estimates of light movement, and second to
assess the "difficulty" they experienced in making such estimates. Zucker
found that " [s]ubjects were much less certain of their accuracy in the
personal-influence condition than in either of the more institutionalized
conditions." 89 She also noted that "fewer subjects in the office condition
reported difficulty" compared with those in the organizational condition,
while "[n]early all subjects in the personal influence condition reported
... The Light Operator in each case must depress a button to activate the light.
From then on, the timing and motion of the light is controlled automatically until the
next trial.
Id.
285. There was slight variation insofar as subjects in the "office-holding" set were given a
switch to turn on the light. See id. at 92. In addition, while subjects in the "personal influence"
and "organizational influence" tests were addressed by name, subjects in the "office-holding"
tests were referred to as "Member I" and "Member 2." See id.
286. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNtTIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
287. See Zucker, supra note 21, at 95.
288. See id. at 94.
289. Id. at 97.
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difficulty." 290 Certainty among subjects increased positively with higher
levels of organization, as did the apparent ease of rendering judgments.
The results of Zucker's experiment cannot be explained in terms of
motivational effects alone. Accounts stressing the pursuit of self-interest
seem unable to explain the positive correlation between mean estimates,
transmission rates, and the instructions provided. For instance, no reward
system-material or symbolic--encouraged or penalized particular answers
in one setting more than another. Persons in the personal-influence setting
had neither more nor less incentive to alter their estimates than persons in
the office-holding context. Alternatively, accounts emphasizing conscious
allegiance to role requirements might explain the positive correlation
between instructions and mean estimates, but cannot explain the
corresponding increase in the reported ease of judgment. The questionnaire
demonstrated that subjects felt more certain, not less, the more their
evaluations deviated from the mean estimates reached by members of the
control group. Thus, subjects did not seem to experience a conscious
conflict between the estimates "required" by role demands and their actual
perceptions of light movement. It seems likely that the consistent
differences in estimates demonstrated in Zucker's experiment reflect not
subjects' conscious decisions to alter their judgments, but rather cognitive
distortions differentially induced by different "organizational" settings.
Zucker's experiment shows, importantly, that contextual conditions
produce varying degrees of cognitive distortion that correspond to shifting
levels of apparent organization. She found that actors viewed knowledge in
seemingly organized settings as "more definitely patterned" and "more
formal and less personal." 29 She noted an even more dramatic effect when
actors perceived knowledge to be linked to an office, concluding that
subjects treat such knowledge as "nonpersonal and continuing over time,"
"part of the external world," and "objective." - Zucker concluded that
"social knowledge once institutionalized exists as a fact, as part of
objective reality, and can be transmitted directly on that basis. For highly
institutionalized acts, it is sufficient for one person simply to tell another
that this is how things are done." 3 Zucker's experiment powerfully
290. Id.
291. Id. at 86.
292. Id. at 85-86.
293. Id. at 83. Notice that the "'cognitive" claim made here, when compared to a claim rooted
in the availability heuristic, offers more detail in specifying sources and magnitudes of influence.
While the availability heuristic suggests that recent exposure to information may "prime" an actor
in a manner that skews her judgment, Zucker predicts differing degrees of cognitive effect given
such factors as context and role. More concretely, while the availability heuristic predicts that the
confederates' inflated claims would lead to an upward distortion in subjects' estimates. Zucker's
experiment suggests that the description of the confederate plays a significant role in determining
the degree of cognitive influence. Whether the confederate is presented as a "person." an
"organizational co-member," or an "officeholder" influences whether subjects perceive the
source of information as more or less formal and objective, and so influences the magnitude of the
cognitive distortion generated.
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suggests that some settings more than others-those that are more highly
organized, and more defined by office-holding-more readily produce
taken-for-granted knowledge. 294
What, then, of the Los Angeles superior court judges? Obviously, they
operated within a highly organized framework. The superior court
constituted a formalized, regularized bureaucracy, with clearly delineated
roles and strongly routinized conduct. In addition, the judges held important
offices within that organization. Indeed, the office of "superior court
judge" occupied a central, if not the defining, position within the
organization in which it was embedded. Zucker's experiment, and New
Institutionalism generally, suggest that scripts operated at an unconsidered
level among the Los Angeles superior court judges. 295 The judges' practice
of nominating their friends and acquaintances to serve as grand jurors
seems to constitute one such script.
3. Uniformity of Selection Practices
Perhaps the best evidence that the judges followed a script is the
remarkable uniformity in their selection practices. It was not the case
that some judges relied on their clerks, others on the jury commissioner,
some on advertisements put in the paper to solicit applications, some on
random selection from voter or taxpayer lists, a few on names submitted by
elected officials, and still others on names generated by respected civic
organizations.296 If conscious decision making and personal motives drove
the judges, one would expect to find such a wide range of practices.
However, judge after judge in East LA 13 told nearly the same story in
explaining his selection process: He casually nominated his friends and
acquaintances. Recall that nine out of ten nominees came from within the
judges' circles.297 Remember that among the judges who testified in East
LA 13, only one described a single instance of pursuing a method other than
nominating an acquaintance or someone recommended by an acquaintance
294. See id. at 86. Keep in mind that it was only superficial descriptions of an otherwise
constant set of interactions that generated the dramatic differences in distance estimates and
transmission rates Zucker recorded. The test setting constituted an "organization" only because
subjects were told that it did; office holders held an "office" only to the extent that it involved
turning on a light otherwise connected to a timer. Zucker's experiment reveals that changes in
setting can produce remarkable changes in actors' relationships to knowledge. It also
demonstrates that for such changes to produce cognitive effects, the changes in context
themselves need not be dramatic. Even redescriptions of an otherwise constant setting may
substantially alter the extent to which actors take knowledge for granted.
295. Although I do not engage in a comparative institutional analysis-for example, one that
attempts to measure the institutional dynamics of courts versus legislatures-Ed Rubin
conjectures that courts, more than other forms of government, rely on "practical reason and
consensual judgment." Rubin, supra note 24, at 279.
296. All of these methods, it should be noted, found use as the scandal over grand jury
nomination practices reached critical proportions in the years following East LA 13 and Biltmore
6. See supra notes 133-138, 145-148 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
1790 [Vol. 109: 1717
Institutional Racism
or fellow judge.298 Script institutionalism predicts exactly this uniformity.
Scripts are not idiosyncratic habits rendered routine through long repetition.
Instead, group interaction produces scripts, all the more so within organized
settings and among office holders.
Superior court judge William Levit insisted on the witness stand that
the judges made their nominations individually, without consulting one
another:
Now, our Court Rule says that each Judge will nominate two
people. We don't do it as a group, we do it individually....
We don't do this as a group. I have never discussed my
nominations with any other Judge, and I don't know of any who
have discussed it with me.
299
Perhaps, regarding individual nominees, Judge Levit was correct. But with
respect to the process, he surely erred. Contrary to his sense, the judges
subscribed to a nominating system dictated by group dynamics. Judges
learned from one another, sometimes directly, but also at a nonconscious
level. They learned that the appropriate manner of selecting nominees
involved selecting from among their friends. They learned that those they
personally knew described the world of potential nominees. Script
institutionalism explains why almost every judge picked grand jury
nominees from a narrow circle of friends and neighbors: It was simply "the
way it was done," a taken-for-granted solution to a routine problem. To this
extent, the selection of nominees from among a narrow class and
professional range-and the resultant exclusion of Mexican Americans-
reflected not conscious design but unreflective activity. Judges nominated
acquaintances in a manner unremarkable and unconsidered, easy and sure,
common and legitimate-that is, according to a script.
4. Criteria, Routine, and Legitimacy in Grand Juror Selection
There is a striking facet of the judges' selection practices that merits
introduction here: the judges' almost total disregard of the criteria and
instructions provided them for selecting grand jurors. To be credible, any
account of the judges' behavior must grapple with this fact. Institutional
analysis posits that the routine nature of the grand juror selection system
explains this disregard.
298. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
299. Transcript, supra note 8, at 594.
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a. Criteria and Instructions
Three sources of guidance existed regarding grand juror selection in
Los Angeles County: state statute, federal constitutional law, and superior
court directive. State statute specified minimum grand juror qualifications.
In 1968, the California Code of Civil Procedure listed five prerequisites,
only two of which addressed the personal capacity of the prospective juror:
Jurors were to possess "sufficient knowledge of the English language" and
were required to be "of ordinary intelligence and not decrepit.""
Several Supreme Court decisions also offered direction regarding
nomination practices. The Court on several occasions had held that
selectors must not draw only from their acquaintances if among them no
minorities were to be found, a result that strongly imputed some
responsibility to the grand jury selectors to search beyond their friends and
neighbors.3"' Indeed, a plurality of the Court had stated clearly that jury
selectors had the "duty to familiarize themselves fairly with the
qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and
color." 302
Finally, the superior court judges also received an administrative
directive from the presiding judge. Beginning in 1962, the presiding judge
on several occasions sent to each sitting judge a letter on selecting grand
jurors that included the following instructions: "The Grand Jury should be
representative of a cross section of the community. Each Judge must
therefore be mindful of the need for making nominations from the various
300. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 198 (West 1968). The other three qualifications were that a
grand juror be a U.S. citizen, above the age of 21, and a resident of California and of the pertinent
county for at least one year. See id. In 1971, the following language was added: "A person is
competent to act as a grand juror only if he... is in possession of his natural faculties, of ordinary
intelligence, of sound judgment, and of fair character." CAL. PENAL CODE § 893 (a)(2) (West
1972). Note that in 1966 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it is impermissible racial
discrimination for jury selectors to impose subjective requirements beyond the minimum provided
by statute, specifically warning that "the desire for competency must not be pursued to the extent
that a fair cross-section is prevented." Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 55 (5th Cir.
1966) (en banc).
301. See supra note 156.
302. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The
Cassell plurality wrote as follows:
In explaining the fact that no Negroes appeared on this grand-jury list, the
commissioners said that they knew none available who qualified; at the same time they
said they chose jurymen only from those people with whom they were personally
acquainted. It may be assumed that in ordinary activities in Dallas County.
acquaintanceship between the races is not on a sufficiently familiar basis to
give.., jury commissioners an opportunity to know the qualifications for grand-jury
service of many members of another race.... When the commissioners were appointed
as judicial administrative officials, it was their duty to familiarize themselves fairly
with the qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and
color. They did not do so here, and the result has been racial discrimination.
Id. at 287-89 (footnotes omitted). The Court reached this result despite the fact that Blacks were
represented on the grand jury panel in question in rough proportion to their population in the
county. See id. at 285-86.
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geographical locations within the County, and different racial groups, and
all economic levels .... ,
The criteria and instructions for selecting grand jurors strongly
suggested that the judges had an obligation to cast a wide net in making
nominations. To be sure, both the statutory requirements and the Supreme
Court's holdings may have been somewhat remote sources of guidance,
perhaps falling outside of the judges' usual awareness. Nevertheless, the
letter from the presiding judge addressed the judges directly. Statutory law,
constitutional cases, and court directive told the judges, implicitly and
explicitly, to consider geographic, economic, and, most importantly, racial
diversity in making their nominations.
How can the judges' actions in consistently nominating their
acquaintances be squared with the instructions given them? These
instructions admonished the judges, though in different forms and with
varying levels of immediacy, of their obligation to select grand jurors from
a cross section of the community, including racial minorities. Yet instead
they engaged in a practice that systematically excluded minorities.
Institutional analysis focuses on the cognitive dynamics of routine actions
to explain the judges' disregard of clear instructions.
b. Routine Discrimination
Consider an experiment by Ellen Langer establishing what she termed
"the mindlessness of ostensibly thoughtful action."' Langer asked
experimenters to approach persons about to use a photocopying machine in
a university library with one of three requests: (I) "May I use the Xerox
machine?"; (2) "May I use the Xerox machine, because I have to make
copies?"; and, (3) "May I use the Xerox machine, because I'm in a rush?"
Note that requests one and two are substantively similar, because the
"explanation" that the experimenter seeks to use the Xerox machine "to
make copies" adds no new information. On the other hand, requests two
and three take the same form: "request" plus "reason." If people respond
thoughtfully-that is, to the substance of what is being asked of them-one
would expect a similar compliance rate between requests one and two; if
people respond to form, on the other hand, one would expect a similar
compliance rate for requests two and three.
Langer found that, at least where the interruption was perceived as
relatively minor (five pages of copying), sixty percent of the people
303. Letter from Presiding Judge Lloyd S. Nix (July 26, 1967). quoted in Transcript, supra
note 8, at 289, 299; see also Villalobos, supra note 80, at 108.
304. Langer et al., supra note 263, at 636. Note that Langer writes as a social psychologist.
Her relevance here stems from New Institutionalism's emphasis on scripts. To the extent that
organizational actors are posited to follow established routines. Langer's observations regarding
behavioral responses to the "form" rather than the "substance" of activity fit neatly within
institutional theory.
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complied with request one, while ninety-three percent and ninety-four
percent respectively complied with requests two and three.05 People
responded not to the substance of the request but to its form. Generalizing,
Langer suggests the following:
[W]hen the structure of a communication, be it oral or written,
semantically sound or senseless, is congruent with one's past
experience, it may occasion behavior mindless of relevant details.
Clearly, some information from the situation must be processed in
order for a script to be cued. However, what is being suggested here
is that only a minimal amount of structural information may be
306attended to ....
Institutionalization involves the development of scripted responses,
including sets of cues used to identify types of situations readily. When
events trigger such cues, scripted responses follow, sometimes in
derogation of relevant, readily available information. Applied to the grand
juror selection process, it may well be that, accustomed to letters taking the
form of instructions regarding administrative duties, the judges gave the
substance of such letters no attention, albeit without forming an intent to
ignore them.
The judges' testimony supports this hypothesis. Among the various
questions Acosta posed to virtually every judge, one concerned whether
they recalled the cross-section letter. The judges' responses are tabulated in
Appendix C. Consider Judge Call's response: "Well, I don't specifically
recall it, but I would say I undoubtedly did receive it." 3 Consider also the
response of Judge John Frazer:
Well, I presume that I received it.... This is more than a year ago,
but if it was sent out to all the Judges, I no doubt did receive it....
I don't recall specifically all the letters that I received.
We have a mimeographed process in this Court, and I think I
probably receive on an average of two, if not three, letters a day
from Court, letters on different subjects. I just don't remember each
letter, but I would say that I probably received that one. It seems to
me that generally I remember some statement of that kind in a
letter." 8
The judges received many letters, perhaps too many to allow the careful
consideration of each one. If a particular letter took a recognizable form,
that alone probably conveyed sufficient information for the judges to
305. See id. at 637.
306. Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
307. Transcript, supra note 8, at 369.
308. Id. at 529.
1794 [Vol. 109: 1717
Institutional Racism
conclude that they knew its content. As Langer writes, "[Information ... is
ignored because it is already known. It is known because it has been seen
many times in the past, and aspects of its structure that regularly appear
indicate that this time is just like the last." 3
Some judges disregarded the court's directive to nominate persons from
among all racial groups because cognitively, if not literally, the judges
simply never saw it. The routine nature of the selection process ensured that
they "understood" letters concerning that process without actually
consciously considering them. Judges like Call and Frazer almost certainly
testified honestly that they did not recall the letter that instructed them to
pursue nomination practices starkly at odds with actual processes. It is
unlikely that such judges consciously registered the content of those letters,
decided to disregard them, and lied about their recollection on the stand.
Rather, they routinely ignored the letters, just as they routinely nominated
their acquaintances.
Judges Call and Frazer constitute something of an exception, however,
as most judges did recall receiving the cross-section letter."' Did those who
remembered the letter decide to disregard it? On the contrary, they
remembered the letter because they supposed that it confirmed the very
practices they pursued. Although Langer doesn't explain this phenomenon,
it follows neatly from her argument as well as from Zucker's. To the extent
that certain structural clues trigger a scripted response, the whole script,
with all of its component parts, becomes further entrenched. Each iteration
further institutionalizes the script, so that the triggering of one part
effectively puts into play the whole.3 ' Thus, the judges who "saw" the
cross-section letter registered a reference to grand jury nomination
practices, which in turn confirmed the "pick your friend" script. Without
even reading the letter, they "knew" what it said: Continue in your current
practices. This may seem a surprising claim, inasmuch as the cross-section
letter instructed the judges to "be mindful of the need for making
nominations from the various... racial groups," a directive that the judges
seemed decidedly not to be mindful of at all. Nevertheless, observe the
following exchange between Acosta and Judge William Levit:
Q. Do you recognize the rule of law that says that the Grand Jury
must be representative of a cross-section of the community?
A. I have no quarrel with that.
I would assume that with a hundred and thirty-four Judges,
selected as they are and each one given the right to nominate up
309. Langer et al., supra note 263, at 636.
310. Sixteen judges recalled receiving the letter, while four did not. See Appendix C.
311. Cf. Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept. 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 715, 717 (1981) ("The priming of one script event from a story leads to especially
fast recognition of another script event from that story." ).
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to two people, that this would be what I would consider a cross-
section of the community, broadly defined.31
According to Judge Levit, selecting a cross section of the community, as the
letter required, is exactly what the judges did. Judge Levit, like other
judges, understood the thrust of the letter to commend rather than condemn
the standard practice of picking one's friends." 3
For many judges, nominating cohorts became so natural and
appropriate a practice that they understood the presiding judge's
admonition to do otherwise as an injunction to continue to do the same. For
the judges, nominating one's friends constituted a powerful script. That
they easily construed challenges to the script as support for it demonstrates
in a remarkable manner the unconsidered and yet persistent nature of this
routine.
c. Legitimate Discrimination
The Los Angeles superior court judges treated the "pick your friend"
script as more than merely routine; they also embraced it as legitimate.
Witness in this regard Acosta's questioning of two judges regarding
whether they felt obligated to heed the presiding judge by seeking out
a cross section of the community. Note that the first judge answered
affirmatively and the second negatively, yet in the end, both insisted on
the importance of picking one's acquaintances. Judge Benjamin Landis
testified as follows:
Q. Do you believe that you personally have an obligation to make
some affirmative effort to comply with this policy?
A. I think so.
312. Transcript, supra note 8, at 596.
313. Consider also Acosta's questioning of Judge William B. Keene:
Q. Do you believe that the Grand Jury should be representative of a cross section of
the community?
A. Yes.
Q. How do you define cross section?
A. I think you get a cross section by taking 134 Judges of all backgrounds, and
having them nominate two, and from that group drawing by lot the total number
that will serve.
Id. at 759-60. Judge Richard C. Fildew took a similar approach even when Acosta asked more
pointedly about racial representation:
I just presume that, as the law leaves it to the Superior Court Judges to nominate
two nominees for the Grand Jury, and then they are picked out of a hat, as you know,
and as the Superior Court should and does, I'm sure, represent a cross section of the
community from the ethnic background we have, Japanese, well, we had a Japanese,
we just lost him, on the Superior Court, he has gone to the [District Court of Appeals].
we have people of Mexican background, and then we have a few Mexicans that, when
they got to the Superior Court, became Spanish, and-you know what I'm talking
about-and we have Negroes, and so forth on this Court, that they were all nominating,
we were all nominating, and you would get a cross section.
Id. at 649-50; see also id. at 453 (testimony of Judge Sidney W. Kaufman).
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Q. Have you ever taken such affirmative effort?
A. As to the seeking of people from various geographical areas,
no, sir, I have not, because I don't know any.
Q. How about the different racial groups?
A. Or racial groups....
Q. How about "all economic levels" ?
A. Well, people I recommended come from the upper strata. They
are all well-to-do people, people who can afford to give-make
a contribution to their community by serving on the Grand
Jury.
Q. Did you ever contact any person or any organization for the
purpose of finding nominees of Spanish surname?
A. No, sir. As I indicated heretofore, my personal conviction is
that a Judge can't nominate anyone unless he knows them
intimately, and I have never nominated anyone unless I know
them fairly well. 4
Now the testimony of Judge Leonard A. Diether:
Q. Do you agree... that each Judge must consider the different
racial groups in making their nominations?
A. No, I don't. I think it is the duty of each Judge to pick a
nominee who he feels is qualified for the position, regardless of
what race, nationality, or religion he may be. It doesn't make
any difference.
Q. Were any of your nominees of Spanish surname?
A. No.
Q. Were any of them of Mexican or Latin-American heritage?
A. No.
Q. Did you feel it was incumbent upon you in any way to seek out
Spanish-surnamed persons?
A. No.
Q. Did you make any attempt whatsoever to seek such persons
out?
A. No. No more than I would French, or Chinese, or Japanese,
or Russian, or Catholics, or Protestants, or any other
characteristic.
Q. Were any of your nominees Negroes?
.A. No.
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Q. Would you nominate a person that was not personally known to
you?
A. No, I would not.
31 5
It seems fair to say that on the whole the judges possessed a deep
commitment to the established practice of nominating their friends.
Whether they claimed to agree with the cross-section requirement did not
much matter. In the end, the judges ignored or misconstrued-or sometimes
simply rejected-even relatively direct instructions to alter the standard
practice. Consider a final exchange. Here, Acosta asks Judge Emmett E.
Doherty whether he recalls the cross-section language in the presiding
judge's letter:
Q. Do you recall the words in the letter... relating to
representatives of a cross section of the community?
A. I never received any orders.
Q. Do you recall the letter?
A. I was never bound by anything more than my own discretion. 36
Judge Doherty's responses are nonsensical, except as an expression of his
commitment to business as usual. Asked only if he recalls the cross-section
language, he responds by insisting on his autonomy in nominating grand
jurors.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann assert that "any radical deviance
from the institutional order appears as a departure from reality." 37 For the
judges put on the stand in East LA 13, the suggestion that they do otherwise
than nominate acquaintances seemed to have that quality. Nominating
grand jurors entailed selecting one's friends-and doing so became routine,
legitimate, even rational. 3 8 The presiding judge's challenge to this process
could not be heard, or was heard but misunderstood, or agreed to but
ignored, or simply repudiated. Meanwhile, the harder Acosta pushed, the
more agitated the judges became. Acosta ultimately challenged not just a
particular practice but the very identity of the judges as possessors of the
discretionary power to name their acquaintances as grand jurors: In the end,
he challenged reality, and reality is nothing if not routine and legitimate.
315. Id. at 519-20.
316. Id. at 330.
317. BERGER & LUcKMANN, supra note 14, at 62.
318. "[D]ecision-making may appear rational merely because it follows the socially-
constructed model of rational decision-making, independent of whether it actually involves any
instrumental concern for optimizing substantive outcomes." Suchman, supra note 244, at 499.
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B. The Persistence of the "Pick Your Friends" System and Path
Discrimination
Because the judges followed a script in nominating their friends, they
gave their actions little or no thought, accepting them instead as routine and
legitimate. Questioning by Acosta and the district attorney, however,
compelled the judges called to the stand to consciously examine and defend
the grand juror selection system. Similarly, though on a larger scale, the
events and cases of the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the East Los
Angeles cases, pushed the Los Angeles superior court judges to consider
potential reform in their manner of selecting grand jurors. Even under
relatively intense scrutiny, however, the Los Angeles judges continued to
select their nominees as they had in the past. 9 What explains the failure of
the judges to undertake serious reform? Though inertia no doubt played a
role, three predominant factors probably convinced the judges to continue
with business as usual: racial animus, patronage of both the social and the
political kind, and concern for the selection of "qualified" jurors.
This Section examines all three motives, though with special attention
to the last. Most likely, racial animus and the interest in patronage were
influenced by institutionalized understandings of appropriate conduct of the
sort that path analysis depicts. The concern for qualifications, however,
strikes a particular resonance with the judges' East LA 13 testimony.
Whatever the judges' other rationalizations and motivations, the emphasis
on finding qualified grand jurors reflects the operation of path
institutionalism, both among the judges on the stand, and anong the judges
more generally in their decision not to reform their practices.
1. Racial Animus
Purposeful racism may have factored into the decision of some judges
to retain personal control over juror selection. Although conscious racial
antipathy has not been stressed here, it sometimes reared its head among the
judges. For those judges who consciously held racially derogatory views,
such views may have convinced them of the importance of close judicial
control over the nomination of grand jurors, or, in any event, of the dangers
of random selection.
To appreciate the degree of racism sometimes expressed among the
judges, consider a transcript from a penalty hearing held before Santa Clara
superior court judge Gerald Chargin in September 1969. The defendant, a
seventeen-year-old Mexican-American boy, had pled guilty to the charge of
incest with his fifteen-year-old sister, although he subsequently insisted that
319. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
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he was innocent and had pled only on advice of counsel in order to avoid
trial:
320
The Court. Don't you know that things like this are terribly
wrong? This is one of the worst crimes that a person can commit. I
just get so disgusted that I just figure what is the use? You are just
an animal. You are lower than an animal. Even animals don't do
that. You are pretty low.
I don't know why your parents haven't been able to teach you
anything or train you. Mexican people, after 13 years of age, it's
perfectly all right to go out and act like an animal. It's not even
right to do that to a stranger, let alone a member of your own
family. I don't have much hope for you. You will probably end up
in State's Prison before you are 25, and that's where you belong,
any how. There is nothing much you can do.
I think you haven't got any moral principles. You won't
acquire anything. Your parents won't teach you what is right or
wrong and won't watch out.
Apparently, your sister is pregnant; is that right?
The Minor's Father, Mr. Casillas. Yes.
The Court. It's a fine situation. How old is she?
The Minor's Mother, Mrs. Casillas. Fifteen.
The Court. Well, probably she will have half a dozen children
and three or four marriages before she is 18.
The County will have to take care of you. You are no particular
good to anybody. We ought to send you out of the country-send
you back to Mexico. You belong in prison for the rest of your life
for doing things of this kind. You ought to commit suicide. That's
what I think of people of this kind. You are lower than animals and
haven't the right to live in organized society-just miserable, lousy,
rotten people.
There is nothing we can do with you. You expect the County to
take care of you. Maybe Hitler was right. The animals in our
society probably ought to be destroyed because they have no right
to live among human beings. If you refuse to act like a human
being, then, you don't belong among the society of human beings.
Mr. Lucero [Defense Counsel]. Your Honor, I don't think I can
sit here and listen to that sort of thing.
The Court. You are going to have to listen to it because I
consider this a very vulgar, rotten human being.
Mr. Lucero. The Court is indicting the whole Mexican group.
The Court. When they are 10 or 12 years of age, going out and
having intercourse with anybody without any moral training-they
don't even understand the Ten Commandments. That's all.
Apparently, they don't want to.
320. See Ruben Salazar, Judge's Latin Slurs Bring Call for Removal, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2.
1969, § 1, at 1; see also RUBEN SALAZAR, BORDER CORRESPONDENT: SELECTED WRITINGS,
1955-1970, at 225-27 (Mario T. Garcfa ed., 1995) (providing further background on the incident).
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So if you want to act like that, the County has a system of
taking care of them. They don't care about that. They have no
personal self-respect.
Mr. Lucero. The Court ought to look at this youngster and deal
with this youngster's case.
The Court. All right. That's what I am going to do. The family
should be able to control this boy and the young girl.
Mr. Lucero. What appalls me is that the Court is saying that
Hitler was right in genocide.
The Court. What are we going to do with the mad dogs of our
society? Either we have to kill them or send them to an institution
or place them out of the hands of good people because that's the
theory-one of the theories of punishment is if they get to the
position that they want to act like mad dogs, then, we have to
separate them from our society.
Well, I will go along with the recommendation. You will learn
in time or else you will have to pay for the penalty with the law
because the law grinds slowly but exceedingly well. If you are
going to be a law violator-you have to make up your mind
whether you are going to observe the law or not. If you can't
observe the law, then, you have to be put away.21
Judge Chargin's tirade from the bench, over the objections of defense
counsel, stamped him as a racist. His commendation of Hitler, the easy
manner with which he slipped back and forth between attacks on the
accused and slurs on his family and the Mexican-American group as a
whole, his dehumanizing language of animals and mad dogs, his calls for
violence, including long incarceration, banishment, and extermination, all
bespeak a mind poisoned by racial hatred.
To be sure, in the ferocity of his outburst, Judge Chargin was
exceptional. Nevertheless, his views may not have been unique to him.
Indirect evidence exists that his opinions did not deeply repel the bench:
Despite the evident nature of his racism, and wide public airing of his rant,
Judge Chargin was not removed from service as a superior court judge.3" If
other judges shared even some of his views of Mexican Americans, such
views may have contributed to their decision to retain discretion over the
nomination of grand jurors."
321. In re Paul Pete Casillas, Jr.. No. 40331 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1969), reprinted in
INTRODUCTION TO CHICANO STUDIES: A READER 482, 483-84 (Livie Isauro Duran & H. Russell
Bernard eds., 1973).
322. In 1970, however, the California Supreme Court censured Judge Chargin. following the
recommendation of the State Commission on Judicial Qualifications. See Judge Censured for
Anti-Latin Remarks, L.A. TIMES, June 11. 1970, § 1. at 3.
323. See infra note 380.
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2. Patronage
Another possible factor contributing to the judges' decision to retain
control over the selection of grand jurors may have been an interest in
patronage, both social and political. Grand jury service carried with it a
certain amount of prestige. As a 1966 Los Angeles grand juror marveled,
"[Y]ou feel that you have some power and authority. You walk in the
elevator and you get a certain kind of treatment. You walk down the hall
and those that know you have a certain type of respect for you." " Or as a
1962 Los Angeles grand juror enthused, "I enjoyed serving. I think it is the
kind of sacrifice that virtually anybody can make. I am listed in every blue
book and social directory although I am not a social type and it is always
kind of a surprise to me when I am included."31 5 Along with picnics,
barbecues, luncheons, and the flattering attention of county officials, grand
jurors also received a lifetime parking pass at the downtown Los Angeles
County courthouse and a fancy grand jury badge, possibly helpful in
wiggling out of speeding tickets.326 And also, at least in Los Angeles, there
beckoned membership in the Past Grand Juror's Association, a social club
of approximately 200 people who had served at least one term on the grand
jury.327 Given that grand jury service brought social prestige and a certain
cachet, it should be no surprise that some judges viewed "grand jury
service.., as an honor to be bestowed on citizens for outstanding public
service or civic activity," while others used their nominating powers to
"maintain their standing with the county's political influentials." 38 This
last factor may have carried particular significance, since California
superior court judges were subject to reelection.329
3. The Need for Qualified Grand Jurors
The civil investigative function of the grand jury in California also
served to justify the established procedures for the nomination of grand
jurors. Recall that the San Francisco superior court advanced such an
argument in federal court, claiming that "the civil investigative grand jury
can and should be a so-called 'blue ribbon' panel."33 Or consider Judge
Alarcon's explanation, given when he himself testified as a witness in the
Sirhan Sirhan trial:
33'
324. EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY, supra note 62, at 37 (testimony of Skipper Rostker).
325. Id. at 99 (testimony of Juanita Sayer Erickson).
326. See id. at 112-14.
327. See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 104, at 44 (testimony of Hloward Brace, foreman
of the 1953 Los Angeles County grand jury).
328. Prahl, supra note 40, at 639.
329. See ARNOLD, supra note 49, at 100.
330. Quadra H, 403 F. Supp. 486, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1975); see supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
331. See People v. Sirhan, No. A-233421 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1969).
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Since the grand jury is required by law to perform an audit of the
manner in which County moneys are expended, it seems to me to
be necessary to nominate a Grand Juror of sufficient intelligence
that he can read the audit report given to him by the contract
auditor for the Grand Jury, can determine if the auditor has done a
proper job, can require that the auditor make other investigations
which were not covered by the audit, and this takes a great deal of
sophistication and intelligence and I had that in mind when I tried
to select someone for the Grand Jury.332
The contention that the demands of the civil investigative system required
the careful selection of the most qualified grand jurors seems to have
carried great weight with the judges.333 The strongest reason for retaining a
subjective selection system may have been a conscious concern that grand
jurors responsible for civil functions possess specific qualifications.
4. The Nomination of Qualified Grand Jurors
The judges' concern for qualified grand jurors reverberates throughout
their testimony in East LA 13. No judge stated, for instance, that he
intended to nominate his acquaintances. Instead, almost every one insisted
that he had sought to nominate only the most qualified persons. In this
context, recall the prosecutor's questioning of Judge Call, quoted almost
in its entirety earlier in this Article." t The district attorney asked not
only whether there had been any purpose to discriminate, but also, "Did
you nominate those persons whom you did in fact nominate because
you felt they were the best qualified to serve?" 335 Judge Call answered,
"Absolutely." 336 Here again, Judge Call's testimony anticipates that of
the other judges. In response to similar questions, virtually every judge
responded that he had nominated only those he considered "the best
qualified to serve." Note that the judges' insistence on selecting the best
qualified jurors did not come only in response to the prosecutor's direct
prompting. Judge Call, for example, summarized his selection criteria by
332. Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Quash Indictment at 2031, Sirhan (No.
A-233421), quoted in Mar, supra note 48, at 44.
333. As one commentator observed,
California judges admittedly add their own qualifications to the state's statutory
requirements-qualifications which have no relationship to the competency of a grand
juror to listen to evidence and determine whether to indict, but rather are related to
notions of competency needed for far more difficult duties in examining the operations
of county government
Mar, supra note 48, at 54. Grand jurors apparently also shared the sense that "high standards- had
to be maintained. See PrahI, supra note 40, at 642 (reporting that 70% of surveyed grand jurors
"indicated that high selection standards should be maintained for the grand jury as opposed to the
idea that any citizen is qualified to serve as a grand juror').
334. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
335. Transcript, supra note 8, at 400.
336. Id.
2000] 1803
The Yale Law Journal
explaining, "It's a question if they have got the brains or capacity to be on
the Grand Jury, is the whole thing in a nutshell. Very neatly stated." 33 7 In
justifying their nominations, the judges consistently claimed an intention to
nominate "the best qualified." Qualifications emerged as a constant refrain
in the testimony of the judges.338
5. Path Discrimination
In part, a desire to legitimate their activities in a context in which their
motivations were under intense scrutiny may have compelled the judges to
describe their practices as directed toward securing the best qualified grand
jurors. No script told the judges how to respond to aggressive questioning
on the stand, and no doubt the setting induced considerable conscious,
purposeful, strategic thinking on the part of the judges. But the likelihood
that they considered their answers carefully and tailored them to the setting
does not mean that they lied outright. Rather, they probably believed that
securing the best qualified in fact constituted their actual motivation. The
legitimacy accorded their claim no doubt stems from our culture's
celebration of merit.339 Its plausibility, however, especially to the judges
themselves, must lie in their conviction that those they nominated actually
constituted the best qualified. 4 But how could they have thought this of
their friends, their tennis buddies, their neighbors, and Camellia Club co-
members? Path institutionalism offers an account of why the judges
337. Id. at 399-400.
338. Consider the following remarks. "[Ilt wouldn't make any difference who came before
me if they are qualified as a nominee, but I don't want to nominate people I don't know." Id. at
393 (testimony of Judge Call) (emphasis added). "I think it is the duty of each Judge to pick a
nominee who he feels is qualified for the position, regardless of what race, nationality, or religion
he may be." Id. at 519 (testimony of Judge Leonard Diether) (emphasis added). "My primary
motivation was to get the most qualified people, regardless of race, color, creed, or religion, or
national origin." Id. at 556 (testimony of Judge Robert Feinerman) (emphasis added). "I think
that if they are qualified Mexican-Americans, they should be selected .... " Id. at 652 (testimony
of Judge Richard C. Fildew) (emphasis added). "I would say that getting qualified people of
various races is good." Id. at 493 (testimony of Judge Aubrey N. Irwin) (emphasis added). "[Hlad
I known ... of anyone of a minority group who might have been qualified ... I would have gone
out of my way to have appointed him .... " Id. at 457 (testimony of Judge Sidney W. Kaufman)
(emphasis added). "It wouldn't make any difference what their ethnic background would be if I
felt they were qualified to serve as Grand Jurors." Id. at 508 (testimony of Judge Ben Koenig)
(emphasis added). "The only attempt I made, as I have indicated, was to select people whom I felt
were qualified to serve, not on any basis of race, or religion, or nationality, anything like that." id.
at 597 (testimony of Judge William H. Levit) (emphasis added). "I went out to get the available
people who I thought were the best qualified to serve as Grand Jurors .... Id. at 289 (testimony
of Judge James G. Whyte) (emphasis added). See generally Appendix C.
339. See generally PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA (Stephanie M. Wildman ed., 1996).
340. "[W]hen people are asked to attribute the causes of actions or choices, they do not
actually examine their cognitive processes, but select from memory a causal theory which seems
to them to be a plausible explanation for what they have done." Krieger, supra note 227, at 1215
(emphasis added) (citing Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More than We
Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 247 (1977)).
1804 [Vol. 109: 1717
Institutional Racism
uniformly claimed to be interested in nominating the best qualified, even as
they nominated their friends.
The pressures for reform and the demands of the East Los Angeles
cases forced the judges to abandon the security of a routine script and to
consciously consider their nomination practices. However, the Los Angeles
superior court judges were not thereby free from institutional influences.
Rather, even as they carefully weighed their responses, they continued to
draw on institutionalized understandings. That is, they exercised conscious
thought along the paths laid out for them by institutions. "[macit cultural
assumptions... fram[e] behavior at a preconscious level.... [Tihe most
important determinants of decision-making may be neither costs and
benefits nor moral principles, but rather, the taken-for-granted cultural
categories, definitions and accounts that help us to make sense of our
lives."" Tacit cultural assumptions about racial animus and political and
social patronage most likely informed the judges' reliance on those
motivations. Certainly, invoking the need for "qualified grand jurors"
seemed to operate in this fashion for the judges.
Reciting a concern for qualification sufficed in the judges' (and
prosecutors') minds to clothe the judges' actions with a mantle of
legitimacy, and to dispel doubts about the appropriateness of their
conduct. 2 Notice that no judge made more than a modest effort to give that
term any content in his testimony. Notice also that no judge described a
selection system rationally geared to identifying and selecting the most
qualified persons. Yet, notwithstanding these failures, almost all judges
repeatedly cited the importance of qualifications. Path institutionalism
suggests that the very thinness of the term as used by the judges facilitated
rather than detracted from the ability of qualification to serve as a
multifaceted justificatory tool. "Classifications, logical operations, and
guiding metaphors are given to the individual by society. Above all, the
sense of a priori rightness of some ideas and the nonsensicality of others are
handed out as part of the social environment." 3 For the judges, to invoke
the pursuit of "qualified" grand jurors spoke volumes in the judges' world
exactly because the term put into play widely shared but unarticulated-
and, indeed, largely nonconscious-understandings of who should sit on
grand juries. The need for "qualified" grand jurors was imbued with a
priori rightness that ensured that this rationale would appear weighty and
legitimate, even as it served only to justify the judges' actions by reference
to their shared but unrecognized consensus on appropriate selection
practices.
341. Suchman, supra note 244, at 482.
342. Cf. BERGER & LUcKMANN, supra note 14, at 23 (describing "[c]ommonsense
knowledge" as "the knowledge I share with others in the normal. self-evident routines of
everyday life").
343. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 10.
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In East LA 13, the judges relied on the rhetoric of "qualified grand
jurors" to defend their past nomination practices. Qualifications also
figured prominently as a justification for continuing the "pick your friends"
selection system. Script institutionalism underlies the judges' unthinking
exclusion of Mexican Americans in the years before the East Los Angeles
cases. Path institutionalism rationalized those practices in the minds of the
judges, and perpetuated such practices in the decades that followed.
VII. INSTITUTIONAL RACISM
In East LA 13 and Biltmore 6, Judges Kathleen Parker and Arthur
Alarcon rejected the defendants' discrimination claims and granted legal
legitimacy to the superior court judges' established nomination practices. In
retrospect, for them to have held to the contrary would have been virtually
inconceivable, for most likely both Judges Parker and Alarcon engaged in
the decried practices. 3" Nevertheless, their rulings declared under law's
imprimatur that the judges' selection of their friends did not constitute
"racial discrimination."
But were Judges Parker and Alarcon wrong? Even if we assume script
and path institutional influences on the judges' actions, what converted
such actions into racial discrimination? One can answer this question in
terms of effects. 45 To appreciate fully the claim that nothing less than
institutional racism occurred, however, one must reexamine the judges'
practices in light of what I term racial institutions. In this Part, I develop the
notion of racial institutions, and then provide a typology that distinguishes
between purposeful and institutional racism. Considering afresh the judges'
actions, I utilize the concept of racial institutions to illustrate how the
judges' script and path behavior amounted ultimately to script and path
institutional racism.
A. Racial Institutions and Unconscious Racism
Racial beliefs suffuse our society, and many if not most of these beliefs
operate as racial institutions. That is, they constitute unconsidered
understandings of race-taken-for-granted, consistently relied on, and
disrupted, if at all, with great difficulty. Social actors both inherit and
remake racial institutions, which ultimately depend upon group dynamics
for their perpetuation. Of course, institutionalization does not result in
monolithic or static understandings of race. Racial institutions take many
344. Cf. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affinnative Action, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1251, 1328 (1998) (noting that "[there is no reason to
believe that the incidence of stereotype-induced judgment error in discrimination adjudications
will differ in any significant way from its incidence in employment or educational decision
making").
345. See supra Section II.F.
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forms and function differentially across various domains. Some racial
institutions, such as those regarding the virtues of Whites, operate in
diverse forms across geography, time, and social groups; others, such as
beliefs regarding Mexican Americans, remain more restricted in structure
and more specific to certain places and eras. For all this heterogeneity,
however, race constitutes a paradigmatic set of institutions. Mary Douglas
speculates that socially ordering ideas undergo institutionalization when
they refer back to or claim a mandate in nature:
[T]he incipient institution needs some stabilizing principle to stop
its premature demise. That stabilizing principle is the naturalization
of social classifications. There needs to be an analogy by which the
formal structure of a crucial set of social relations is found in
the physical world, or in the supernatural world, or in eternity,
anywhere, so long as it is not seen as a socially contrived
arrangement. When the analogy is applied back and forth from one
set [of] social relations to another and from these back to nature, its
recurring formal structure becomes easily recognized and endowed
with self-validating truth.3
Surely ideas of race epitomize this process, for in the Southwest and in the
United States generally, the history of race amounts to the history of
ascribing social relations to nature.
The claim that racial institutions permeate society bears an important
resemblance, and a great debt, to Charles Lawrence's writings on
unconscious racism.4 7 Published more than a decade ago and widely
regarded as one of the foundational Critical Race Theory articles,
Lawrence's The Id, the Ego, and Unconscious Racism argued that racial
stereotypes suffuse American society and psyches. "Americans," Lawrence
wrote, "inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach
significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and
opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has
influenced all of us," he continued, "we are all racists."" 8 Lawrence's
claim that "we are all racists" caused a considerable stir. Yet, if one
346. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 48.
347. See Lawrence, supra note 30.
348. Id. at 322. Lawrence spells out his argument in the following oft-quoted paragraph:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also
inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an
individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the
extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the
same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in
which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on
which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior that
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Other critical race theorists also urge a focus on the dynamics of
unconscious racism. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL L. REv. 733 (1995); Davis, supra note 30.
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understands him to claim that racial beliefs widely pervade society, shaping
behavior at a nonconscious level, I advance the same argument in this
Article.
Nevertheless, important theoretical differences distinguish Lawrence's
approach from my own. Most importantly, Lawrence rested a substantial
portion of his argument on Freudian grounds. 49 This reliance produced an
ambiguous methodological focus, wherein the careful examination of social
practices rubbed uneasily against strong claims about individual
psychological dynamics. In contrast, I do not attribute racial institutions to
the idiosyncratic psychology of individuals. Instead, I posit that group
interaction generates racial institutions, and that such institutions influence
individual behavior through widely shared cognitive processes. The cultural
practices occurring in specific social and organizational settings are
precursors to institutionalization; institutions form as the habits of groups,
not individuals. In turn, racial institutions do not inform action through the
relatively hot, relatively stochastic processes of egotistical turmoil
and repression, but through the cooler dynamics of standard cognitive
distortions. It is not that individuals struggle to reconcile conflicting values
and thoughts, but that congeries accede to accepted manners of thinking and
acting. To be sure, institutional and Freudian processes do not exclude one
another-one might engage in both unconscious racism of the sort
Lawrence described and institutional racism of the type I postulate. These
processes, however, remain theoretically distinct.
With this clarification in mind, it bears repeating what the notions
of racial institutions and unconscious racism share: an assertion that
nonconscious racial beliefs permeate society. When people absorb and rely
on racial ideas cognitively, treating race as an accepted, expected part of the
natural order, race functions institutionally. A racial institution is any
understanding of race that has come to be so widely shared within a
community that it operates as an unexamined cognitive resource for
understanding one's self, others, and the-way-the-world-is. To restate in
institutional language Charles Lawrence's observation that "we are all
349. Although Lawrence gives substantial attention to cognitive psychology, see Lawrence.
supra note 30, at 323, 336-39, he emphasizes a Freudian approach in his article, arguing that the
desire to avoid feelings of guilt associated with racial animus leads the conscious mind to suppress
such animus where it cannot defeat it, see id. at 323 ("When an individual experiences conflict
between racist ideas and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his
racism from consciousness."). Others, such as Joel Kovel, have also pursued a Freudian approach
at some length. See JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970). Psychoanalytic
theories of racism continue to have contemporary resonance. See, e.g., PAUL L. WACHTEL, RACE
IN THE MIND OF AMERICA: BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES
(1999). Indeed, this approach undergirds the renascent "aversive racism" thesis, which posits that
Whites experience anxiety and discomfort (rather than overt hostility) in the presence of
minorities because of a conflict between consciously held egalitarian norms and unacknowledged
racial biases. See KOVEL, supra, at 191-211; see also Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The
Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio &
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
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racists": In this country we are all constituted by and cognitively rely on
racial institutions.
B. Racism
An explicit discussion of racism, one that both defines and
disaggregates that term, is now in order.
1. A Definition
I define racism as follows: Racism is racial status-enforcement
undertaken in reliance on racial institutions.3" Notice that this definition
effectively has three components. The third, "racial institutions," I have
just defined as "any understanding of race that has come to be so widely
shared within a community that it operates as an unexamined cognitive
resource for understanding one's self, others, and the-way-the-world-is."
The second, "undertaken in reliance," involves the relationship between
cognitive processes and racial institutions, and is the primary focus of this
Part, as it highlights the distinction between institutional and purposeful
racism. Before proceeding to that discussion, however, the notion of racial
status-enforcement merits review, both as an essential component of the
proffered definition of racism, and as an important factor in the decision to
label as "racism" the discriminatory practices described in this Article.
Under the definition of racism advanced above, neither racial status-
enforcement nor a reliance on racial institutions alone amounts to racism.
Some actions may enforce status hierarchies and yet not be impelled
directly or indirectly by reliance on racial institutions?5' And some actions
may be driven by reliance on racial institutions and yet not enforce racial
status.
352
350. This definition is slightly overinclusive with respect to purposeful racism. See infra note
377. While this definition seeks to describe accurately a set of common social practices that harm
racial minorities, it nevertheless also attempts to highlight elements of the discrimination theory
advanced here. Some distance separates these goals, as one aims at descriptive accuracy regarding
a widespread phenomenon, while the other attempts to clarify a theory concerned with just one
part of that phenomenon. In addition, with regard to descriptive accuracy, this definition of racism
applies only in the contemporary socio-historical setting, describing the contours of racism in the
post-civil rights era just beginning in the late 1960s and now deeply entrenched in the 2000s. See
MICHAEL OM & HOwARD WINANT, RACIAL FO RATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
1960s TO THE 1990s, at71 (2d ed. 1994) (" [There can be no timeless and absolute standard for
what constitutes racism ..." ).
351. For example, distinctions made on wealth in this country, if independent of all
motivations related to race, might be of this sort. However, the likelihood is that virtually all
discriminatory action in this country is tied in at least an attenuated manner to racial institutions.
See infra notes 398-399 and accompanying text.
352. Public initiatives to counteract racial hierarchy-for instance, antidiscrimination laws
and affirmative action programs-do not constitute racism under this definition, despite outright
reliance on racial institutions.
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"Racial status-enforcement" refers to action that has the effect of
enforcing a racial status hierarchy.353 Action here is an important element,
directing attention to individual behavior-albeit individual behavior in
group contexts-and not to abstract social processes divorced from social
actors. Such action forms a predicate to racism insofar as it consists of
cultural practices of racial status-based differentiation. I emphasize here the
symbolic "status conflicts [that] occur when groups clash ... over the
approval, respect, admiration, or deference that they are able to command
by virtue of their way of life, including their culture, customs, and
values." 354 But I also emphasize the material and structural components of
social domination-the market marginalization and public-sector alienation
attendant upon racial oppression. 5 Status-enforcement may enhance or
degrade a racial group's social position and may take material or symbolic
forms.
356
Concern for racial status-enforcement motivates the decision to
describe as racism the discriminatory practices examined in this Article.
Racial status-enforcement directs attention to the harms suffered by
minority communities. To the extent that harm constitutes a central measure
of racism, institutional practices more than qualify. Institutional practices
impose substantial injuries on minorities, even if they do so quietly, in a
matter-of-fact, taken-for-granted manner. Moreover, as this Part details,
institutional processes inflict such harms on minorities because of, not
despite, their minority status. In this way, harmful institutional action
corresponds closely to the common understanding of racism-deleterious
353. Cf supra note 186 (citing works by Jack Balkin, Reva Siegel, Kenneth Karst, and
Rachel Moran that also root conceptions of social domination in a status model). George
Fredrickson similarly focuses on status in defining racism:
Racism... can be defined as an ethnic group's assertion or maintenance of a
privileged or protected status vis-A-vis members of another group or groups who are
thought, because of defective ancestry, to possess a set of socially-relevant
characteristics that disqualify them from full membership in a community or citizenship
in a nation-state.
George M. Fredrickson, Reflections on the Comparative History and Sociology of Racism, in
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY 51, 55 (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997).
354. Moran, supra note 186, at 341.
355. Cf. Lucius Outlaw, Toward a Critical Theory of "Race," in ANATOMY OF RACISM 58.
69-70, 74-75 (David Theo Goldberg ed., 1990) (discussing the importance of analytically linking
the "cultural, political, and economic structural and dynamic features of the social world in
assessing racism"). Consider also john a. powell's vision of a post-civil-rights agenda:
The post-civil rights agenda must focus on subordination and exclusion. The key
to this focus is understanding that racial discrimination and economic deprivation are
not only oppressive, but they are also structural and institutional. Without
characterizing oppression as structural, and without developing an agenda that is
oriented toward destabilizing and disturbing this structure, any formal or individual
progress will be largely rendered impotent ....
john a. powell, An Agenda for the Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 889, 910 (1995).
356. A status model complements an institutional approach to racism, as both direct attention
to group dynamics. Some tension exists, however, between a status approach and an institutional
one, as status theory implies a level of rational or strategic action. The status-enforcement
requirement in my definition should not be read as an effort to reinsert an interest in motives, but
rather seen as a desire to inject a concern for outcomes.
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treatment imposed on the basis of racial group identity. All social action to
some degree or another draws on institutions, and frequently on racial
institutions. Under my definition, action influenced by racial institutions
becomes "institutional racism" when those actions produce racial status
harms. Notice, however, that the theory of institutional discriminatory
behavior advanced here does not depend on its definition as " racism."
Whether one accepts or rejects the "racism" label, the validity of the racial
discrimination model advanced in this Article must be evaluated on its own
terms.
2. A Typology
The definition of racism proffered above takes a specific form: racial
status-enforcement, plus some cognitive process tied to racial institutions.
The following typology builds on this form to distinguish purposeful from
institutional racism, and further, to divide institutional racism into script
and path varieties.
Purposeful racism is directed racial status-enforcement motivated
by an intent to discriminate harmfully.
Institutional racism is directed or undirected racial status-
enforcement influenced in an unrecognized manner by racial
institutions.
Institutional racism divides into path and script racism:
Path racism is directed racial status-enforcement influenced in an
unrecognized manner by racial institutions.
Script racism is undirected racial status-enforcement influenced in
an unrecognized manner by racial institutions.
The remainder of this Part explores these distinctions. However, for
purposes of clarity, consider the following quick sketch. Given racial status-
enforcement, three labels are possible: purposeful racism, institutional
racism, and no racism. Purposeful racism obtains when the status-enforcing
action stems from a consciously embraced desire to discriminate. No racism
occurs if racial institutions play no role in generating racial status-
enforcement. Institutional racism exists if such action results from an
unrecognized reliance on racial institutions. Within the category of
institutional racism, a further division may be made: Undirected action
constitutes script racism, whereas directed action may be described as path
racism.
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C. Racial Institutions in Los Angeles
Let us now apply the notions of racial institutions and racism to the Los
Angeles superior court. Los Angeles at the close of the 1960s swirled with
stereotypes of the various social groups making up the county. Many of
these stereotypes, in turn, operated as institutions-cognitive shortcuts,
encompassing shared yet unrecognized renditions of reality. As social
actors operating within Los Angeles, the superior court judges drew on
those institutions. They may have done so purposefully, or they may have
struggled consciously against racism. Either way, racial institutions
informed their social judgments at a nonconscious level.
Consider the judges' actions in nominating their friends. The
institutional scripts and paths the judges followed-for example,
the automatic recourse to selecting acquaintances or the casual but
consistent invocation of qualifications-did not draw on race explicitly.
Nevertheless, these scripts and paths incorporated at unexamined levels
significant racial components. Taken-for-granted understandings of both
White and Mexican-American identity, operating in the form of racial
institutions, penetrated the Los Angeles superior court judges' ostensibly
race-neutral institutionalized behavior. Racial institutions did not, however,
influence the judges' behavior in an ad hoc or idiosyncratic fashion.
Instead, racial institutions operated on the judges through standard mental
dynamics and heuristics. The judges followed institutionalized patterns of
behavior generated at an organizational level, and racial institutions in turn
informed those patterns through standard cognitive distortions that almost
uniformly affected all judges.357
357. Social and cognitive psychology figure prominently and helpfully in assessing how
racism infused the judges' actions, though the analytic emphasis remains on institutionalized
group dynamics. Psychology in general, and cognitive theory in particular, nicely dovetail with
New Institutionalism. New Institutionalism has incorporated cognitive psychology's emphasis on
schemata, unacknowledged, privately held, substantive mental shortcuts akin to, or in some
circumstances synonymous with, "institutions." See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 23. at 910.
On schemata, see, for example, David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in I
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 161 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984).
Some New Institutionalists have also adopted cognitive psychology's insights into heuristics:
standard cognitive operating procedures or processes not subject to motivational effects. See, e.g.,
Theresa K. Lant & Joel A.C. Baum, Cognitive Sources of Socially Constructed Competitive
Groups, in THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 245. at 15. On
heuristics, see, for example, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 18
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Despite this synergy, important differences exist between
New Institutionalism and cognitive psychology. Of perhaps greatest importance, whereas
cognitive psychology addresses the operation of cognitive distortions in individuals, New
Institutionalism takes as its focus organizational structures and, to a lesser degree, the influence of
organizational contexts on individual behavior. Of less importance, but still of significance, while
cognitive psychology emphasizes widespread, not to say universal, cognitive phenomena, New
Institutionalists highlight culture and context. Nevertheless, cognitive psychology informs an
institutional analysis of racism. In this regard, the scholarship of my colleague Linda Krieger
stands out, for she more than anyone has focused on the hard lessons that cognitive psychology





The judges followed a simple script in nominating grand jurors: They
turned to their acquaintances. Yet racial group identity strongly influenced
whom the judges knew. Social psychology's analysis of intergroup biases
explains the root of this dynamic. Substantial evidence demonstrates that
people treat others whom they perceive as like themselves far more
favorably than they treat persons whom they consider socially distinct."5
These intergroup effects function substantially automatically, at a level of
cognitive processing that actors do not consciously control or even
perceive. Though the biases operate in a standard fashion, however, they
remain rooted in contingent notions of group identity and difference. Racial
institutions often provide the basis for group distinctions.
a. Favoring Whites
The judges' penchant for nominating acquaintances amounted to
tapping persons they likened to themselves. Consider a composite offered
by Acosta of the typical Los Angeles grand juror:
From the testimony of the thirty-three judges subpoenaed to testify
[in East LA 13], at times vague if not downright hostile, a
reasonable composite of the 1959-1969 "grand juror" was
constructed: (1) He is comparatively advanced in years. (2) He is
wealthy, of independent financial means. (3) He is, or was, a
business owner, executive, or professional-or married to one.
(4) He is a close personal friend, occasionally once removed, of
a Superior Court Judge. (5) He is White .... In a word, as
characterized by an appellate Judge: WASP.3 59
Although Acosta set out to describe grand jury nominees, he effectively
described the judges themselves. Every superior court judge shared most of
the listed characteristics, and many possessed them all: mature in age,
358. See generally RUPERT BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 8 (1995)
(defining prejudice as "the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the
expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behavior towards
members of a group on account of their membership in that group"); JAMES M. JONES.
PREJUDICE AND RACISM (1972) (discussing the role of psychological distinctions based on race as
perpetuating prejudice). According to Krieger, "A substantial body of work on intergroup
behavior, representing over thirty years of empirical research, demonstrates that once divided into
groups, even on a trivial or random basis, people exhibit powerful intergroup biases." Krieger,
supra note 344, at 1274. Strikingly, Richard McAdams's status-production article relies on some
of this same research, though he makes little of its provenance. See McAdams, supra note 35, at
1013-16.
359. Oscar Zeta Acosta, The East LA. 13 vs. The LA. Superior Court. EL GRrTO, Winter
1970, at 12, 15.
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wealthy, professional, male, and White. Charged with the duty to pick
grand jurors, the judges picked persons similar to themselves.
Racial institutions operated through in-group favoritism to inform the
Los Angeles superior court judges' nominating practices. Such institutions
incorporated not only negative beliefs about minority groups but also
favorable presumptions about Whites. 36' A large literature now centers on
the cultural significance of White identity.361' This cultural significance
extends to the cognitive level, where a positive conception of Whiteness
functions as a default position. Thus, in striking up friendships and in
nominating grand jurors, the judges drew on assumptions of White social
worth and respectability. Some may have done so consciously. Regardless
of their decision to rely on or to reject racial considerations, however, every
judge on the superior court drew on notions of White superiority at the
nonconscious level.
The judges followed a script of nominating acquaintances. Yet racial
institutions concerning the superiority of Whites helped to draw lines
around the judges' social worlds. How they thought of themselves and who
they thought to be in-group members turned substantially on notions of
White identity. The infusion of race into the grand jury nomination practice
did not exclusively take the form of negative racial ideas. Primarily,
perhaps, it took the form of in-group prejudice in favor of Whites.362
b. Disfavoring Mexican Americans
But of course, notions of Mexican-American identity also played a role.
Irrespective of their level of consciously held prejudice, the superior court
judges harbored notions of Mexican-American inferiority.363 Moreover,
such notions came into play easily, possibly simply through exposure to
360. A recent study used response time in word-recognition tasks as a measure of the degree
of association between racial categories and various positive and negative trait constructs. This
study found that even "low prejudiced" individuals "readily associate[d] positive traits with
whites." Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin, Racial Stereotypes: Associations and
Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 23, 24 (1983).
Krieger summarizes other studies demonstrating White in-group biases. See Krieger, supra note
344, at 1322-24.
361. See generally ALLEN, supra note 198; DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL CRITICISM (Ruth Frankenberg ed., 1997); RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE
WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); HANEY LOPEZ.
supra note 7; TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK (1992); OFF WHITE: READINGS ON RACE,
POWER AND SOCIETY (Michelle Fine et al. eds., 1997); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE
ABOLITION OF WHITENESS (1994); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE
REPUBLIC (1990).
362. Cf. Krieger, supra note 344, at 1319 ("[In-group favoritism] largely underlies the kind
of discrimination that results in the systematic advantaging of white males.").
363. According to Lawrence's theory, no judge conversant with the culture of California at
the time could have failed to be influenced by ideas of Mexican-American inferiority. Stereotypes
of degeneracy concerning the Mexican-American community continued to thrive in the late
1960s. See, e.g., supra notes 320-323 and accompanying text (remarks of Judge Gerald Chargin).
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Spanish surnames.3" Through the processes of in-group favoritism, not
only nonconscious presumptions of White worth but also unconsidered
conceptions of Mexican-American worthlessness influenced the judges'
nomination patterns.
Some judges, of course, claimed to know a few Mexican Americans.
Did their familiarity with members of that community shield them from the
prejudices that plagued their colleagues? Probably not. Consider in this
context the fundamental attribution error, the tendency of persons to
overattribute the behavior of others to dispositional traits rather than to
situational factors.365 Those judges who claimed Mexican-American
acquaintances most often named gardeners and servants.? If the
attribution-error heuristic held true, however, those judges most likely
attributed the menial or servile position of their acquaintances not to social
status but to Mexican-American "nature." 367 The judges' considerable
distance from the Mexican-American community in East Los Angeles-
geographically as well as socially-facilitated reliance on racial institutions
regarding Mexican Americans. Most judges did not "know" Mexican
Americans at all, except in terms of the racial institutions concerning that
group. Some judges did, however, possess a few Mexican-American
acquaintances. Paradoxically, though, because those judges knew Mexican
Americans only as gardeners and servants, they most likely "knew"
Mexican Americans not less but even more deeply in terms of the racial
institutions surrounding that group.
364. A recent study demonstrates that exposure to names such as Jane and John significantly
alters the judgments subjects make about otherwise unknown persons. See Mahzarin R. Banaji et
al., Environments and Unconscious Processes, in 10 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNMON 63, 69-71
(Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1997). Reflecting on their findings, the study's authors commented:
"What is remarkable is the smallness of the familiarizing experience an environment must offer
(in this case, passing exposure with a name. .. ) to show an effect on judgment." Id. at 70. They
concluded, "People are universally influenced by sociocultural norms that engender stereotyping
of and prejudice toward members of social groups.... ITIriggers may be socially microscopic,
shaping social cognition without awareness and acknowledgment." Id. at 69.
365. See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1977); see also Krieger, supra note 344, at 1329 ("lTlhe fundamental attribution
error ... leads people to over-attribute social behavior to stable, dispositional traits and to
underestimate the causal efficacy of situational determinants of judgment, behavior, and
choice.").
366. See, e.g., supra note 74 and accompanying text.
367. Consider the following argument:
It is precisely the confounding of person and situation that allows people to be
well served by their naive dispositionism. When we predict that the behavior of
professors will be professorial, that the behavior of dictators will be dictatorial, or that
the behavior of servants will be servile ... the performances we observe more often
than not will confirm our predictions and justify the relevant trait ascription-
professorial, dictatorial, or servile-provided, of course, that we continue to observe
the actors in circumstances where the privileges and constraints of their roles remain in
effect ....
LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 150 (1991).
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The judges' nomination of their friends amounted to racial
discrimination not only because of its racial effect, but also because racial
institutions infused that selection system. The nomination script's
discriminatory effect followed from that script's substantial incorporation
of racial institutions. Reliance on racial institutions transformed the judges'
otherwise race-neutral practice of picking their friends into a racially
discriminatory system of nominating White persons and excluding Mexican
Americans.
2. Path Discrimination
The attention focused by the East Los Angeles cases on the judicial
practice of nominating friends made it difficult for the judges to continue
that practice thoughtlessly. Put differently, those cases and other
contemporaneous events interrupted the judges' easy subscription to a
nomination script. Nevertheless, by asserting the importance of selecting
"qualified" grand jurors, the judges both defended their past conduct and
justified its continuation. Recourse to the language of qualifications in this
context constituted path discrimination, and ultimately, path racism.
The judges consistently returned to a discourse of "qualifications."
This language, however, carried with it a strong racial subtext: Qualified
persons were White, and nonwhites were unqualified. Consider Acosta's
questioning of a judge regarding whether minorities should sit on grand
jury panels:
Q. Do you believe that the Grand Jury should be represented by
the different racial and ethnic groups?
A. If the people are qualified, definitely; if they are not qualified,
no.
Q. I'm talking about the ultimate result, the end result.
A. I answered you; I said if they are qualified.
If the end result is you are getting unqualified people on
there, my answer would be definitely no.368
Acosta attempted to set the "qualified" issue aside:
Q. I am assuming that the Grand Jury is eventually composed of
qualified people.
Now, my question is: Do you believe that the ultimate
result of any Grand Jury should be that it be composed
generally of a cross section of the community?
A. It would be fine if it could, and I will agree with that, that it
would be very nice if it could, but if you are going to impair the
368. Transcript, supra note 8, at 653 (testimony of Judge Richard C. Fildew).
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quality and get on people just because they are of certain races,
then I am not in favor of that.3"
Here, Acosta apparently grew frustrated with the judge:
Q. What do you mean by "impair the quality" by certain people? I
don't-
A. Well, if you are going to get somebody who isn't qualified just
because he is an American-Indian or an Eskimo, because you
have to have an Eskimo on the Grand Jury, but this fellow isn't
qualified, I am against that. I don't think the Grand Jury should
be composed of people like that.370
Notice that for this judge, whether to include a cross section of the
community relentlessly reduced to an issue of qualifications. Many judges
inextricably but nonconsciously linked qualifications with racial identity.
The representativeness heuristic helps to explain this unrecognized but
virtually unseverable link between race and qualifications. This heuristic
describes how persons assign others to categories-for instance, the
category of "grand jurors." Persons do not carefully scrutinize the other
and compare her characteristics against exactly assembled criteria for
category membership. Instead, they contrast those aspects of the other
perceived as salient against facets of the category that stand out. 7' Put
differently, under this heuristic, social actors rely on institutions twice when
they match persons and groups: Institutions factor in how they assess the
salient characteristics of others, and again in how they assess categories.
The impact of racial institutions on evaluations of persons has been
discussed in terms of script discrimination.37" Note here that the
representativeness heuristic describes how racial institutions also informed
conceptions of the "grand juror" category. In seeking nominees, the judges
developed a stock conception of a "grand juror." This accepted account
reflected the most socially salient aspects of the identity of those nominated
in the past, thereby building past racism into ongoing evaluations of
typicality. But it also drew freshly on racial institutions concerning social
respectability and competence.373 On both of these levels, racial institutions
concerning Whites and Mexican Americans figured prominently in the
judges' conception of the prototypical "grand juror."
The representativeness heuristic helps explain the judges' persistence in
nominating friends and neighbors even after they were challenged about
369. Id.
370. Id. at 653-54.
371. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 357. at 49-57.
372- See supra notes 360-367 and accompanying text.
373. For a more detailed examination of the cognitive influence of race on evaluations of
merit, see Krieger, supra note 344, at 1291-302.
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their practices. Unable to rely on a script, the judges nevertheless relied on
an institutionalized understanding of "grand juror" to conceptualize their
actions. Racial institutions functioned through the representativeness
heuristic to create an unexamined certainty that the best qualified grand
jurors consisted of the judges' (White) friends. Only in this way could the
"best qualified" serve as a legitimate explanation for the judges' practice of
nominating almost exclusively White grand juries. Racial institutions and
the representativeness heuristic assured the judges that the best qualified
grand jurors were White.
According to the same equation, however, racial minorities existed
outside the "qualified" pool. Minorities simply did not fit the "grand
juror" profile. Forced inclusion of minorities, moreover, remained just
that-forced and implicitly illegitimate. The push for minorities ran afoul
of the judges' unexamined conception of who was qualified to serve as a
grand juror. Just as the judges presumed the qualifications of those like
themselves, they presumed the unsuitability of those unlike themselves.
One could surmount this presumption, but only by affirmatively
demonstrating the qualifications of the "atypical" nominee, a hurdle that
the judges' friends decidedly did not face. Recall the conversation between
Acosta and the judge who balked at answering whether minorities should
sit on grand juries, instead stridently insisting on the dangers of
empanelling unqualified persons.17' This judge simply could not conceive
of minority representation on the grand jury except as a threat to quality;
"qualified" for the Los Angeles superior court judges described them and
their friends, not minorities.375
A bitter irony exists in the way racial institutions informed the selection
and justificatory practices of the judges. Through racial institutions and
institutionalized conduct, the judges' nominations of their White friends
374. See supra notes 368-370 and accompanying text.
375. Consider in this regard Acosta's questioning of Judge John Frazer:
Q. Do you feel personally obligated as a Judge to seek out, affirmatively seek out
persons from different racial groups as your nominees?
A . ... Actually, to me, what a person's race is is a minimal requirement. It doesn't
make any difference to me whether they are Jewish, or black, or Spanish. or
Mexican, or Oriental, or Caucasian, as far as I am concerned. If they are qualified,
I would as soon appoint one as the other.
Q. Do you feel personally obligated to seek out, to affirmatively seek out persons
from different racial groups as your nominees?
A. Well, if anyone is qualified, I will appoint-if I knew anyone who could serve in
any of those categories that you named, I certainly wouldn't hesitate to nominate
them.
Q. What I'm trying to get at, Your Honor, is this: It appears that you don't know, or
you know very few Spanish-surnamed persons, and so my question is, do you feel
obligated to go out and look for other qualified Spanish-surnamed persons?
A. Not unless I-if I knew someone who was qualified, or it was indicated to me was
well qualified, as I say, I wouldn't hesitate to contact them and ask them if they
would serve.
Transcript, supra note 8, at 539-41.
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emerged as the race-neutral and legitimate seating of qualified grand jurors,
while the cross-section requirement appeared to be an illegitimate demand
for the inclusion of unqualified minorities. Put differently, for many judges
it seems racial discrimination lay not in the almost exclusive nomination of
White grand jurors, but in the demand for minority representation.
E. Judicial Racism
Racism involves complex combinations of intentions and actions.
The typology of racism advanced earlier is not meant to suggest that
individual acts of racism neatly disaggregate along exact lines. Rather, as
the dynamics of discrimination in grand juror selection indicate, various
forms of racism often combine. Nevertheless, typologizing racism clarifies
institutionalism's lessons regarding that phenomenon.
Institutional analysis offers insight into the role of racial institutions not
only in causing nonintentional discriminatory action, but also in supporting
the plausibility of allegedly race-neutral rationalizations for such action.
How did racism factor into the nomination practices on trial in East LA 13?
Racism played out in the nomination practices themselves, as well as in the
explanations offered to account for them-in short, racial institutions
scripted racial status-enforcing discrimination, and paved the path of its
justification and continuation.
1. Script Racism
Script racism parallels the notion of script institutionalism. It describes
undirected racial status-enforcement undertaken in reliance on racial
institutions. Script racism is influenced by racial institutions but impelled
without any conscious thought. Reliance on scripts is a feature of
organizational life. When racial institutions inform these accepted patterns,
and when these patterns entrench racial hierarchy, following such scripts
amounts to script racism.
Script racism describes the conduct of superior court judges across
California in nominating friends and friends of friends as grand jurors. In
general, prior to the East Los Angeles cases and the CRLA study, judges
reflected little on how they selected grand jurors. Rather, virtually every
California superior court judge selected nominees from among his or her
social circle. Subscribing to this taken-for-granted procedure equaled script
racism. First, the judges relied on the script without conscious thought.
Second, the "pick your friends" script enforced racial hierarchy by
favoring Whites and excluding Mexican Americans. Third, racial
institutions suffused that script. It seems, then, that the judges largely
testified honestly when they claimed they had no intent to discriminate in
selecting grand jurors. Institutional analysis shows they had little conscious
18192000]
The Yale Law Journal
intent whatsoever, at least with respect to grand jury nomination systems.
Nominating their friends-script racism-simply constituted part of the
judges' daily routine.
2. Path Racism
Path racism parallels the notion of path institutionalism. Path racism
encompasses directed racial status-enforcement that draws on racial
institutions in an unrecognized manner. The crux of path as opposed
to script racism lies in the former's motivated element, a significant
difference that I soon address. For now, however, recognize that path
racism occurs when racial institutions set the unrecognized boundaries for
decision making-when racial institutions form the taken-for-granted path
along which conscious choices occur. When racial institutions delimit
decision making, and when action pursuant to such decision making
enforces racial hierarchy, such action constitutes path racism.
Forced to confront the consequences of their practices, most judges
consciously persisted in the "pick your friends" approach to grand jury
nominations in the years after the East Los Angeles cases, the CRLA study,
and so on. Path racism describes the action of those judges who opted to
perpetuate the status quo for reasons informed by racial institutions,
including the concern for securing "qualified" grand jurors. First, these
judges acted in a directed manner. Second, their actions in nominating their
acquaintances reinforced racial hierarchy. Third, racial institutions shaped
their motivations in unrecognized ways.
Had one accused the judges who perpetuated the status quo of racism,
they would have strenuously objected, insisting with the judges in East LA
13 that they sought only to nominate qualified grand jurors. Yet their failure
to develop effective criteria and screening protocols suggests a particular
understanding of "best qualified." The contours of this understanding
become evident when one considers that selecting qualified grand jurors
translated into the continued selection of friends and neighbors. The judges
accused of racism would genuinely protest that they did not intend to
discriminate racially, for indeed most did not. Nevertheless, through path
racism, racial institutions informed the motivations of most judges in an
unrecognized manner that ensured the almost exclusive nomination of
Whites.
3. Purposeful Racism
Some judges, of course, possessed a conscious intent to discriminate in
favor of Whites or against Mexican Americans. To the extent that they
entrenched racial hierarchy pursuant to such motivations, they engaged in
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purposeful racism. Purposeful racism involves directed racial status-
enforcement motivated by an intention to discriminate harmfully." 6
Like path racism, purposeful racism describes directed action that
draws on racial institutions. Thus, the difference between purposeful and
path racism does not lie in the motivated nature of the action, nor in
whether such motivation draws on racial institutions. Rather, it lies in
whether persons consciously adopt racial institutions for harmful purposes.
Under path racism, actors fail to recognize the influence of racial
institutions on their motivations, and have no intent to discriminate. With
purposeful racism, actors consciously embrace racial institutions as a basis
for intended racial status-enforcement.3"
A distinction exists between those who enforce racial hierarchy for its
own sake and those who engage in status-enforcement in the service of
some secondary motive. In this latter category, one might place those who
utilize race as a proxy for information, or who racially discriminate as a
signaling device.378 For purposes of normative evaluation, this distinction
seems important.379 Here, however, the central point remains that actors
often purposefully embrace racial institutions when undertaking intentional
racial status-enforcement. Under the definition proposed here, such actors
engage in purposeful racism.
Direct evidence of purposeful racism among California's superior
court judges is sparse-Judge Chargin's outburst excepted, of course.
Nevertheless, we should suspect that some judges, sharing some or all of
376. Some members of the Supreme Court doubt the possibility of distinguishing, either
practically or morally, between those who consciously rely on race and intend harmful
discrimination and those who use race but do not intend to discriminate harmfully. According to
members of the Court, the inevitability of harm whenever race is considered renders any
distinction untenable. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,241 (1995) (Thomas.
J., concurring) ("[G]ovemment-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just
as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial
discrimination, plain and simple." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 241 n.* ("[Whether a law
relying upon racial taxonomy is 'benign' or 'malign.' ... either turns on 'whose ox is gored,' or
on distinctions found only in the eye of the beholder." (internal citations omitted)). I disagree
strongly with the claim that reliance on race necessarily results in social harms. To the contrary,
institutional analysis teaches that combating racism requires explicit invocations of racial ideas
and language. See infra notes 400-406 and accompanying text.
377. Recall the earlier general definition of racism as "racial status-enforcement undertaken
in reliance on racial institutions." See supra note 350 and accompanying text. The general
definition is overinclusive on the purposeful-racism side to the extent that it labels as racism
status-enforcing action by those who actively rely on racial institutions without harmful intent. I
take this to be a small class of cases. But see the concerns of Justice Thomas, supra note 376.
378. See supra notes 164-179 and accompanying text.
379. One might distinguish morally between what can be termed "malicious racism"-racial
hierarchy enforcement for its own sake---and "indifferent racism" -harmful discrimination
employed as a means to an end, where the resultant harm constitutes a matter of indifference or
even mild regret to the actor. While an important distinction, both "malicious" and "indifferent"
racism involve the conscious embrace of race as a basis for status-enforcement. In this sense, they
are both "purposeful" racism and stand in contrast to the sorts of institutional, nonconscious
racism on which this Article focuses.
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Judge Chargin's beliefs regarding Mexican Americans, intended to and did
discriminate against that group.38°
F. Reconsidering Institutional Racism Theory
1. Script and Path Racism
On one level, script and path racism blur together. Script racism, like
scripted behavior generally, turns on the absence of conscious thought
when certain routines are triggered-allowing someone to use a
photocopier, or conforming to a certain means of nominating grand jurors.
Within the dictates of such routines, however, actors may engage in
substantial conscious action. Thus, one could describe much that I label
here script discrimination as instead path racism. Likewise, because path
racism countenances the unthinking reliance on racial institutions, one
might be tempted to use the term script racism instead. For instance, one
could plausibly characterize the judges' virtually uniform recourse to the
language of qualifications as reliance on a script.
On another level, however, the script/path distinction contributes a
critical insight: Path racism postulates that even when actors consciously
evaluate their motivations, they often continue to rely on racial institutions
in unrecognized ways. Building on this point, we can conceptualize script
racism as occurring when persons enforce racial status hierarchy through an
unrecognized reliance on racial institutions and without giving any thought
to race, while path racism occurs when persons enforce racial hierarchy
after carefully considering, and rejecting, the idea that race informs their
actions. On this level, the distinction between script and path racism
acquires great importance: While script analysis shows that the judges
thoughtlessly discriminated in nominating grand jurors, path analysis
demonstrates the remarkable continuation of such discrimination even after
the majority of judges assured themselves that race did not figure in their
intentions. In observing the daily effects of institutional racism, the
distinction between script and path racism adds little. But in assessing
the ability of institutional racism to continue even in the face of
direct challenges to discriminators, the script/path distinction generates
380. Consider comments that Judge Chargin offered to the Los Angeles Times in the wake of
the furor raised by his tirade from the bench: "I am pleased to say that my entire adult life, both in
the law and on the superior court bench, has been an effort and a striving for justice for all....
The most recent example of this is my nomination of the only Mexican-American individual
presently serving on the County Grand Jury." SALAZAR, supra note 320, at 226. The East LA 13
transcript records many similar utterances by Los Angeles superior court judges, though usually
absent the claim to have actually nominated any Mexican Americans. This does not suggest that
the judges all lied. This Article argues just the opposite, that most genuinely believed themselves
innocent of racism. Nevertheless, Los Angeles superior court judges' uniform insistence that they
did not intend to discriminate does not preclude the possibility that some of them purposefully
discriminated in selecting grand jurors.
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institutional racism theory's most important implication: Self-reflection and
innocent intent do not forestall participation in path racism. Path racism
may occur even with exacting self-examination and the purest of intentions.
2. Institutional and Purposeful Racism
The distinction between institutional and purposeful racism resides in
the extent to which actors recognize race as influencing their motivations.
Institutional analysis, which models human behavior in terms of the
influence of unrecognized practices and understandings, seems well-suited
to explain discriminatory action in the absence of such recognition. In
particular, it affords a means of explaining how persons engage in actions
with clear and even recognized discriminatory effects, and yet stridently
insist and genuinely believe that they possess no discriminatory intent.
Institutional racism analysis urges attention to scripts and paths indebted to
institutionalized understandings of race.
Institutionalism's explanatory power is particularly pronounced
in organizational settings, which frequently produce scripts and
unexamined understandings.38' Organized life, however, does not provide
an environmental boundary to institutional racism. All of social life
depends on background routines and understandings, making institutional
racism theory widely applicable. The racism evident in the actions and
testimony of the judges in East LA 13 operated not just among the Los
Angeles judges, or the superior courts, or the California criminal justice
system, but also across law and society. Institutional analysis provides an
essential tool for examining pervasive forms of racism.
The relative inability of other social science theories of behavior to
model nonintentional racism enhances the importance of institutional
analysis. Rational choice theory, in particular, fails here, not because it
emphasizes rationality, but because it stresses conscious intent. Absent
some theory of nonintentional action, rational choice theory cannot explain
the discriminatory behavior of persons who genuinely do not intend to
discriminate. Richard McAdams correctly perceived the need for the latter
sort of theory, though his attempt to develop it foundered. Obligatory action
theory similarly falters, for, while it places actors in a social context by
stressing internalized values, it too looks to intent to explain action.
Cognitive psychology helps far more than these other theories to explain
nonintentional racism, and, indeed, it contributes valuably to an institutional
analysis of racism. 82 But psychology falls short of, and could benefit from,
analysis that focuses on the group origins of taken-for-granted scripts and
paths. Institutional theory best details the dynamics of path and script
381. See supra notes 276-294 and accompanying text.
382. See supra note 357.
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racism, forms of racism both pervasive and otherwise difficult to model
under alternative social science theories of behavior.
Nevertheless, despite its early rejection as the principal explanation for
the actions of the superior court judges, intentional racism shadows the
entire analysis. Institutional theory contributes to the modeling of script and
path racism. Does institutional analysis add to accounts of purposeful
racism? To a limited extent, yes.
First, institutionalism leaves room for purposeful racism's operation.
Institutional racism theory incorporates the Judge Chargins of the world-
or those who seek status, information proxies, or signaling mechanisms-
because such analysis does not rule out but rather specifically contemplates
the possibility of directed action.
Second, institutionalism highlights the extent to which purposeful
racism requires the acceptance of background notions of race. To engage
in purposeful racism is usually not to shed but to embrace racial
institutions. Those judges who believed in Mexican-American inferiority
did not pierce but rather energetically adopted the institutionalized
understandings surrounding that group; they discriminated against Mexican
Americans not in spite of but because of racial institutions. This insight
suggests that studies of intentional racism should attend to racism's cultural
context. The historical setting, the evolution of cultural practices, a
culture's memory of group origins, or its imagination of group futures-all
of these belong in studies of purposeful racism." 3
Third, an institutional approach suggests that institutional racism
abets purposeful racism. To begin with, in settings where racism
is institutionalized, certain forms of discriminatory action by definition
appear legitimate and routine. Such contexts may encourage and even
organizationally validate persons engaged in directed racial status-
enforcement. In addition, purposeful racism becomes less obvious, and so
less subject to social sanction, in settings of institutional racism. When
institutional discrimination occurs, purposeful discrimination may not stand
out.384 Finally, the superficially race-neutral rationales accepted under path
racism may afford the intentional racist the ability to hide his or her
pernicious motives behind the invocation of motivations widely accepted as
383. Cf. GOLDBERG, supra note 185, at 90 (noting that racism is always historically
contingent).
384. Consider the recommendation of censure against Judge Chargin by the California State
Commission on Judicial Qualifications. Although the Commission described the judge's remarks
as "improper and inexcusable," it opined that "there is no evidence of bias or prejudice by (the
judge) except for the incident of Sept. 2, 1969." SALAZAR, supra note 320, at 251 (quoting the
Commission). Assuming that racism motivated Judge Chargin to discriminate against Mexican
Americans at other times, the Commission's inability to find evidence of such prejudiced action
may reflect the difficulty of distinguishing Judge Chargin's purposefully racist conduct from the
institutionally racist conduct of his colleagues. Of course, Judge Chargin may also have engaged
in institutional racism.
1824 [Vol. 109: 1717
Institutional Racism
legitimate. In these various ways, institutional racism facilitates intentional
racism.
All of that said, however, it remains the case that institutional analysis
does not powerfully model intentional racism. Institutionalism's strength
does not lie in explaining intentional action per se, nor does it have much to
offer regarding the formation of intentions." Indeed, to the extent that
purposeful racism is functional-geared toward the achievement of larger
social interests-institutionalism's inability to contribute much regarding
intentional racism emerges as its most potent failing. New Institutionalism
is most sophisticated concerning, and most interested in, the operation of
already established institutions. Questions that necessarily broaden the
historical sweep of the inquiry-how institutions arise, persist, and
collapse-have received less attention.386 "Power and interests have been
slighted topics in institutional analysis." " This relatively focused quality
contributes to institutionalism's efficacy when applied to narrowly
circumscribed case studies, such as here. But it also limits the ability of
institutionalism to account for the functional role of social phenomena,
even in terms of the origins and disintegration of institutions.' In the
elaboration of the racial institutions it otherwise analyzes with acuity, an
institutional model runs the risk of excluding, at the level of theoretical
focus, attention to purposeful racism and the functional role of racial
hierarchy. In this regard, institutionalism's strength and weakness reside in
its narrow temporal focus and proclivity for divorcing institutions from the
forces impelling their rise and collapse.
VIII. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM'S DOCTRINAL AND
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Oscar Acosta and the defendants in the East Los Angeles cases accused
the Los Angeles superior court judges of discriminating against Mexican
Americans in nominating grand jurors. To make their case, the East LA 13
and Biltmore 6 activists relied on numbers-the judges' actual nominations
385. To be clear, it is no surprise that New Institutionalism says little on this score, since
explaining intentional action is not one of its objectives.
386. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 12, at 27-28. There are, however, numerous and
increasing exceptions. See, e.g., Soren Christensen & Jan Molin, Origin and Transformation of
Organizations: Institutional Analysis of the Danish Red Cross, in THE INSTmYrIUONAL
CONSTRUCTION OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 245, at 67; Friedland & Alford, supra note 13.
Political scientists lead the way in combining historical and institutional analysis. See, e.g.,
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORIcAL INSTrrJIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Sven
Steinmo et al. eds., 1992); Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism, -
and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL Sc. REv. 89 (1988).
387. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 12, at 30.
388. Mary Douglas provides a helpful discussion of what a functional theory of unintentional
action might look like. See DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 31-43; see also Friedland & Alford, supra
note 13; Ronald L. Jepperson & John W. Meyer, The Public Order and the Construction of
Formal Organizations, in THE NEw INSTTrUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 12, at 204.
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reduced to small data points that in composite produced a vivid portrait of
that community's almost total exclusion. In the decade leading up to those
cases, Mexican Americans accounted for no more than 1.7% of Los
Angeles's grand jurors, despite the fact that the Mexican-American
community constituted roughly fourteen percent of the County's
population.389 But the activists did not rely on numbers alone. In addition,
they sought to make their case by calling superior court judges to testify.
Once on the stand, however, the judges did more than describe their
nominees; they also denied, in the strongest terms, that they ever intended
to discriminate against Mexican Americans. The trial courts accepted their
fellow judges' denials and rejected the activists' equal protection challenge
for lack of evidence of purposeful racism.3 Acosta and the defendants, the
courts concluded, wrongly alleged judicial discrimination against Mexican
Americans.
Thirty years later, little has changed in the selection of grand jurors in
Los Angeles County. In the decade leading up to 1969, Mexican Americans
suffered exclusion from Los Angeles County grand juries at a ratio of eight
to one; in the 1990s, a six-to-one segregation rate governed all Latino/as.39'
In the 1960s, the Los Angeles superior court judges nominated all grand
jurors; in the 1990s, they did the same.392 At the close of the sixties, each
and every superior court judge who testified in East LA 13 insisted that he
had no intention to discriminate.393 Contemporary superior court judges,
each and every one, almost certainly would reaffirm that denial.
Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton introduced the phrase
"institutional racism" in 1967 to explain harms inflicted on minorities other
than through individual racist actions.394 Acosta may have learned this term
before or while representing the activists in East LA 13 and Biltmore 6.'9'
Regardless of whether he knew the phrase itself, he subscribed to the idea
behind it. Acosta claimed neither that the judges excluded Mexican
Americans intentionally nor that the underrepresentation of Mexican
Americans alone created a constitutional violation. Rather, Acosta urged
the court to recognize that a "system" within which Mexican Americans
"don't exist" produced their exclusion. 396 How this "system" operated,
however, neither Acosta, nor Carmichael and Hamilton, nor the many
others who since have used the phrase "institutional racism," ever fully
explained. Reconciling the discrimination in the Los Angeles cases and in
389. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 46 and 147 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
394. See CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 28, at 4-5.
395. Certainly, the Black Power movement influenced the growing militancy in East Los
Angeles by the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, months before the high-school walkouts.
See MUfiOz, supra note 2, at 59.
396. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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the contemporary exclusion of Latino/as with the elaborate denials of
discriminatory intent registered thirty years ago and likely today requires a
fuller account of institutional racism.
Relying on the cognitive and cultural insights of institutional analysis,
this Article advances a new conception of the racism evident both in the
Los Angeles cases and much more widely. Appropriating the term
"institutional racism," this Article describes how individual actors often
unintentionally engage in racial discrimination by relying on unexamined
background understandings. These background understandings, or
institutions, develop through group interactions, and thus accrete at various
rates depending on the social context. The more organized and formal the
setting, the more likely that such grammars develop and dictate behavior.
Within organized contexts, reliance on institutions often proceeds almost
automatically in the sense that persons do not reflect on their actions but
instead seem to follow a script. At other times, actors consciously reflect
even as they remain channeled into thinking along certain lines, as if
pursuing a path that requires rational thought but that nevertheless largely
delimits imaginable options. Institutional racism theory stresses how racial
institutions, whether followed in a script or path form, operate as taken-for-
granted understandings of the social context that actors must adopt to make
sense of the world, as well as to be accepted as bona fide members of that
milieu. Under the sway of institutional racism, persons fail to recognize
their reliance on racial notions, and indeed may stridently insist that no such
reliance exists, even while acting in a manner that furthers racial status
hierarchy.
The institutional racism theory advanced here helps us to understand
the "system" to which Acosta drew attention in the East Los Angeles
cases. But it also has lessons for contemporary social practices, judicial and
otherwise. This Article concludes by turning to some of the doctrinal and
normative implications of institutional racism. Before that, however,
consider what institutional racism theory suggests about racism's ubiquity
and intractability.
A. The Ubiquity and Intractability of Institutional Racism
Institutional racism theory implies racism's ubiquity. The definition of
racism offered above perhaps suggests a relatively sharp boundary between
what is and is not racism. This boundary is at best indistinct, however,
because institutional racism pervades our society. This Article defines
racism as racial status-enforcement coupled with a reliance on racial
institutions. But recall that racial institutions form part of the world-known-
in-common by members of our society, and that we are all constituted by
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and cognitively rely on racial institutions.397 To this extent, reliance on
racial institutions becomes normal, and escape from such reliance, the rare
exception. In such circumstances, the touchstone for differentiating racism
from nonracism largely reduces to racial status-enforcement itself. In all
cases of racial status-enforcement, institutional analysis suggests that
reliance on racial institutions likely exists, whether direct or attenuated.
Consider government decisions that affect poor persons generally.
These decisions may seem racially neutral, despite their more pronounced
harm to minorities engendered through the disproportionate presence of
nonwhites among our society's poor. Such decisions, if truly independent of
racial institutions, might not be considered racism at all.398 Nevertheless,
recent scholarship demonstrates that few such governmental actions are
race-neutral; rather, reliance on racial institutions often taints them. The
long history of racism in the shaping of welfare policies, for instance,
evidences not only purposeful but also institutional racism.3 Racial status-
enforcement in the absence of influence from racial institutions surely
exists, but institutional racism produces much that we usually consider an
accident of inequality. Instances of harmful discriminatory action taken
without reliance on racial institutions ultimately may be quite few. Thus,
racism is nearly as ubiquitous as racial status-enforcement.
Institutional analysis also suggests racism's intractability. Individual
reliance on racial scripts or paths pervades our society. Yet background
patterns and understandings are difficult to deinstitutionalize, particularly in
organized settings.400 Linda Krieger details the conditions that must obtain
before well-intentioned individuals can control cognitive biases in their
397. See supra notes 346-349 and accompanying text.
398. Nevertheless, some scholars define discriminatory action produced in the absence of any
particular motivation or behavior as "institutional racism." See FEAGIN & FEAGIN, supra note 18.
at 31-33. If one thought it appropriate to label such action racism, one could apply the term
"structural racism." Cf. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 40
(1990) (describing "structural oppressions").
399. See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND TIlE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 84-88, 114-23 (1994); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF
WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); Dorothy E. Roberts.
Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1569-72 (1996) (reviewing
GORDON, supra; QUADAGNO, supra).
400. Here again Zucker's work is instructive. In a companion experiment to the one
discussed above, see supra notes 277-295 and accompanying text, Zucker also measured what she
termed "resistance-to-change." Zucker, supra note 21, at 99-101. She found that in the
"personal" condition subjects willingly changed their estimations under the influence of a
confederate playing the role of the second viewer, while subjects in the "organization" and
"office" condition were progressively less likely to change their estimates. See id. at 100. Zucker
concluded,
The results of my... experiment were surprising in the ease with which
institutional effects were created: an instructional manipulation of a seemingly trivial
action embued the system with meaning. As the results of my [subsequent] experiment
indicated, such effects were much more difficult to destroy. Institutionalization
often occurs accidentally, as a by-product of the creation of other structures;
deinstitutionalization is seldom accidental. Once institutionalized, structure or activity
may be maintained without further action ....
Id. at 105.
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own actions. According to Krieger, they must (1) become aware of the
effects of such biases; (2) be motivated to overcome such effects;
(3) correctly discern the direction and magnitude of error, to avoid
overcorrection; and (4) possess sufficient control over mental processes to
allow correction.m Where cognitive biases arise through reliance on
institutions shared by groups, rather than through the operation of standard
heuristics that individuals may learn to be wary of, the likelihood that
individuals can tame such biases may be further reduced.
Altering institutions, rather than individual actions, introduces yet
further challenges. As Larry Lessig points out, reworking institutions (in his
language, "social meanings") involves collective-action problems.'
Because institutions gain meaning among social groups, remaking
institutions requires altering collective understandings. However,
individuals often face incentive structures that make it less costly to abide
by norms they disagree with than to act to change them."n Finally, to the
extent that social action turns on individual assessments of incentive
structures, such assessments will themselves vary as a function of received
grammars.' People are embedded in, and therefore not strategically
dispassionate about, the institutions they seek to change. To be sure,
individuals and communities can purposefully alter racial institutions-but
not in any neat, easy, or predictable way." Unlike many social science
theories of discrimination, an institutional approach suggests that racial
discrimination is highly intractable.'
Institutional racism analysis strongly implies that racism in our society
is both endemic and relatively ineradicable. It follows that in the face of
discrimination, to ask only whether racism is present betrays an incomplete
understanding of that phenomenon. Where racial status-enforcement looms,
401. See Krieger, supra note 344, at 1286. Krieger is skeptical about the ability of individual
actors to counteract cognitive biases successfully. See id. at 1286-91.
402. Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 240. at 993. Lessig writes, "Social
meanings are constituted by contexts of understanding; they are reconstructed when contexts of
understanding change; but contexts change when collections of individuals change, and hence the
problem of social meaning making is how to get these groups to change." Id.
403. See id. at 1001.
404. On this level, speculation about "meaning manager[s]," id. at 1008-or for that matter
"norm entrepreneurs," Sunstein, supra note 240, at 909-who strategically manipulate
institutions, seems to ignore the extent to which such managers or entrepreneurs are themselves
constituted by the institutions they purportedly wield. See Doug McAdam et al., To Map
Contentious Politics, 1 MOBILIZATION 17, 25-26 (1996) ("The image one emerges with is of an
isolated outsider deciding whether or not to affiliate with a given instance of collective action
'offered' by an entrepreneur of some sort. What this view misses is the degree to which
individuals are already embedded and ontologically invested in various kinds of social structures
and practices."); see also David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization.
and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REv. 464, 470 (1986).
405. Indeed, it is possible to understand the activism in the Mexican-American community
that eventually led to East LA 13 and Biltmore 6, as well as the Black Power and other racial
minority movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, as efforts to alter the institutionalized
understandings and practices regarding those groups.
406. Many social science theories of racism treat the phenomenon as largely irrational and
therefore relatively easily remedied. See FEAGIN & FEAGIN. supra note 18. at 5.
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the most important question is not whether racism exists, but in what form,
to what degree, and with what impact. What are the nature and extent of the
cognitive reliance on racial institutions? If purposeful, what sorts of racial
institutions are embraced? If nonconscious, how strictly do racial
institutions channel action? Alternatively, what of the discriminatory
impact: Is it severe and direct, or attenuated and ambiguous? Does it
impinge on a few, or harm an entire group? These are the questions one
must ask about racial status-enforcement and racism.
B. Institutional Racism and Equal Protection
When the East LA 13 and Biltmore 6 defendants raised their equal
protection challenges, the U.S. Supreme Court had long been oscillating
between two tests to establish such a violation. One test looked to
exclusionary patterns. For instance, observing the complete absence of
Mexican Americans from grand or petit juries in a Texas county over at
least a quarter-century, the Court ruled that "[t]he result bespeaks
discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any
individual jury commissioner."4 7 The other test, however, focused on
purposeful racism. Thus, in other cases the Court wrote that "[t]he
statements of the jury commissioners that they chose only whom they
knew ... prove the intentional exclusion that is discrimination in violation
of ... constitutional rights,"4 8 and also that "an imperfect system is not
equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race."4 Castafieda v.
Partida ended this oscillation in 1977, declaring that the Court's prior cases
effectively "established the principle that substantial underrepresentation of
the group constitutes a constitutional violation ... if it results from
purposeful discrimination.""41 Citing Washington v. Davis,411 Castafieda
added that "[r]ecent cases have established the fact that an official act is not
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." 412
Recall that in both East LA 13 and Biltmore 6, the presiding judges rejected
407. Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954). Hernandez echoed the Court's ruling in
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), that "[ilf there has been discrimination, whether
accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand." Id. at 132; see also Reece
v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 88 (1955) (finding "discrimination 'ingenious or ingenuous,"' and citing
Smith).
408. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion).
409. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965). This holding tracked the Court's earlier
decision in Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945), that "[a] purpose to discriminate must be present
which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by
unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination." Id. at 403-
04.
410. 430 U.S. 482. 493 (1977).
411. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
412. Castalieda, 430 U.S. at 493. Of course, to some extent the Court only displaced this
oscillation to the question of how parties prove intentional animus. See infra note 415.
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the activists' equal protection challenges because they failed to prove
intentional discrimination.'
13
The East Los Angeles cases demonstrate that discrimination against
Mexican Americans did not result solely from purposeful conduct, but
rather from some combination of purposeful and institutional racism. It
seems likely that varying blends of purposeful and institutional racism also
underlie virtually every jury discrimination case-and, quite probably,
every equal protection claim-to have come before the courts. This
observation alone does not establish that the Supreme Court erred in
installing purposeful racism as the sole constitutional concern regarding
racial discrimination. The question of what racism the law should address,
and what it should permit and by implication sanction, requires not just
an understanding of racism, but also a vision of law's role in the
achievement of social justice." 4 Nevertheless, institutional racism analysis
carries doctrinal implications, not least with regard to equal protection
413. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text. The requirement that one prove "a
racially discriminatory purpose" has been extended to cases involving discrimination in the
selection of trial juries. See Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79. 93 (1986). Batson marked an
advance in the battle against racial discrimination insofar as it allowed defendants to question the
use of preemptory challenges to exclude minorities from particular jury panels. See id. at 96.
Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, nevertheless criticized the majority's decision to allow
preemptory challenges at all, reasoning that requiring defendants to show purposeful racism, and
allowing prosecutors to rebut such claims through the assertion of race-neutral reasons, effectively
rendered Batson's reforms "illusory." Id. at 106 (Marshall. J., concurring). Justice Marshall wrote
that" [a]ny prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts
are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons." Id. In reasoning akin to that advanced by Charles
Lafrence, he also suggested the following:
A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the
conclusion that a prospective black juror is "sullen." or "distant." a characterization
that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically. A judge's
own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as
well supported .... Even if all parties approach the Court's mandate with the best of
conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own
racism on all levels-a challenge I doubt all of them can meet.
Id. Justice Marshall's concern regarding the inability of court officers to "overcome their own
racism on all levels" applies to institutional racism as well.
414. Institutional theory demonstrates that actors rely on institutionalized understandings of
all social identities, thereby suggesting that one must look to a general theory of social justice, not
specifically to a theory of racial justice. Nevertheless. with respect to race and the Fourteenth
Amendment, there are a number of contending visions, most related to one of three main choices
developed over the last quarter-century: a process-defect approach, closely associated with John
Ely; the antidiscrimination principle advocated by. among others. Paul Brest; and the
antisubordination approach worked out, in part, by Owen Fiss and Kenneth Karst. See. e.g., JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST 14-21 (1980); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court. 1975
Term-Foreword. In Defense of the Antidiscrinination Principle, 90 HARV L REV. 1. 5 (1976);
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause. 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107. 157-70
(1976); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1. 4-5 (1977). Recent contenders include
colorblindness as well as antistatus and anticaste approaches. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 239-41 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring, and Thomas, ., concurring)
(advocating colorblindness); Balkin, supra note 186, at 2315 (presenting a status-based approach);
Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparisons, 97 MICH. L REV. 1311,
1311 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Affirmative Action] (supporting the anticaste principle); Cass
R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Anticaste] (setting forth the anticaste principle).
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jurisprudence. Institutional racism theory offers a critique of the reasoning
behind the purposeful racism limit to equal protection, especially as it has
recently evolved, and also highlights the social costs of this constricted
approach.
1. Limiting Equal Protection
Washington v. Davis established the rule that, regarding facially race-
neutral government action, equal protection applies almost exclusively
to cases of purposeful racism." 5 To that extent, it probably ranks as the
most important equal protection case of the last quarter-century. While
justifications abound for limiting equal protection to cases of intentional
discrimination, the reasoning in Davis provides perhaps the most widely
accepted rationale. The Court there offered the following principal
objection to extending equal protection to situations of disproportionate
harm:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to
the average black than to the more affluent white.41 6
Many commentators have focused on Davis's "parade of horribles,"
the supposed dire consequences for the efficient administration of the state
415. The Court has not been blind to the limits of a rigid search for "purposeful racism."
Indeed, the Court has long accepted evidence of egregiously disproportionate impact as itself
indicative of intentional discrimination. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
Davis recognized this exception. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42. This approach is evident in the
equal protection jurisprudence surrounding jury discrimination. In this area, the Court presumes
intentional discrimination to exist once a showing of sufficiently disproportionate impact has been
made, placing the burden on state officials to disprove intentional animus rather than on the
challengers to prove its existence. See Castafieda, 430 U.S. at 494-95. Importantly, the Court has
refused to accept the testimony of state officials, even judges, merely denying discriminatory
intent, as sufficient to overcome the presumption of purposeful exclusion. See Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958). Rejecting the adequacy of such testimony, the Court wrote,
True, the judges now serving on the local court testified generally that they had
not discriminated against Negroes in choosing grand juries, and had only tried to pick
the best available jurors.... [However, we] are reluctantly forced to the conclusion that
the uniform and long-continued exclusion of Negroes from grand juries shown by the
record cannot be attributed to chance [or] accident .... It seems clear to us that
Negroes have been consistently barred from jury service because of their race.
Id. at 587-88. Despite an insistence on proof of intentional discrimination, the Court has
occasionally shown itself willing to strike down certain practices in the absence of direct
evidence, in the belief that some disparities are so great as to alone prove discriminatory intent.
The development of this doctrinal exception demonstrates both the Court's lingering
dissatisfaction with the implications of a strict purposeful-racism approach and the incoherence of
that approach as applied.
416. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
1832 [Vol. 109: 1717
Institutional Racism
that a disproportionate-impact approach might produce." 7 Before returning
to that issue, however, note first and foremost Davis's invocation of statutes
"designed to serve neutral ends."4 ' The Court means "neutral" in the
sense that no discriminatory animus underlies such statutes. However,
institutional analysis cautions against too readily presuming the neutrality
of statutes that "may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white." 4 9 In practice, it seems likely to turn
out that few such statutes in fact have been untainted by the influence of
racial institutions. In that sense, institutional racism theory suggests that
few government actions that impose disproportionate harms on minority
communities are in fact race neutral.
Consider Davis itself. There, the Washington, D.C., police force sought
to raise its "standards" and "achieve excellence," to quote the district
court, by introducing the requirement that prospective police officers
exceed a certain score on a standardized test.' 2 Yet, the established cutoff
excluded four times as many African Americans as Whites. 2' Instigated in
the immediate context of pressures to desegregate a previously White force,
an intention to discriminate-perhaps animated both by the desire to
maintain a privileged position and by animus towards Blacks-most likely
informed the decision to impose the new screening device. Whether
purposeful racism played a role, however, institutional racism almost
certainly did.
The hiring practices introduced by the police seem to reflect the same
racialized concern for qualifications one sees in the California grand juror
selection practices of the same era. Institutionalized notions of racial
competence most likely informed both the adoption of the test and the
decision to retain it despite the grossly disproportionate racial impact.
Consider that, like the superior court judges, the police force adopted a
procedure without calibrating its actual ability to measure appropriate
qualifications.4 Just as the superior court judges in California insisted on
"qualifications" as their principal concern but did not formulate practices
to rationally assess them, the Washington, D.C., police force asserted an
interest in raising its standards but did not validate the selected means
against the actual duties of police officers.4" As in the grand jury context,
417. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 414, at 50 (observing that "[t]he specter of the stopping
place problem, it would seem, is no more 'easily cabined' than the idea of Equality" (footnote
omitted)).
418. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added).
419. Id.
420. lId at 236.
421. See id. at 237.
422. Indeed, one issue in Davis was whether the Equal Protection Clause required the police
to validate the efficacy of their hiring standard, as Title VII would have-for example, "by
ascertaining the minimum skill, ability, or potential necessary for the position at issue and
determining whether the qualifying tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified applicants
for the job in question." Id. at 247. The Court held it did not. See id. at 247-48.
423. See id. at 235-36.
20001 1833
The Yale Law Journal
one must hesitate to credit as untainted by racial institutions an invocation
of qualifications when the means selected were not in fact formulated to
that end, but seemed instead simply to promote the overrepresentation of
Whites.
Note further that the institutional racism evident in the police force's
unexamined refrain of standards extends to the Davis opinion itself. The
Court asserts that "it is untenable that the Constitution prevents the
Government from seeking modestly to upgrade the.., abilities of its
employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of
competence."4 4 However, the Court could come to this position only by
accepting at face value the very claim at issue: that the sole impetus behind
this test was the claimed intention to "modestly upgrade" employees. In
accepting this claim, the Court's majority failed to recognize that
"qualifications" -for the Washington, D.C., police force, the California
superior court judges, and apparently even for itself-served in substantial
part as a taken-for-granted understanding of the desirability of Whites over
nonwhites.
Institutional racism analysis demonstrates that Davis misunderstands
the nature of racism, at least insofar as the decision implies that statutes or
other government actions that do not evidence purposeful racism are
consequently race-neutral. Davis directs the courts to guard against
conscious animus, but in doing so it turns equal protection away from the
institutional practices that also produce racially discriminatory harms. Such
institutional racism may well permeate society; certainly, the East Los
Angeles cases and even Davis suggest that it substantially afflicts the courts
themselves.
2. Racism in Recent Supreme Court Equal Protection Cases
Despite its limited conception of racism, in comparison to recent
evolutions in equal protection, the holding in Davis seems defensible and
restrained--defensible, because Davis's equation of racism with purposeful
racism insured that the Equal Protection Clause would at least address a
major source of racial harm,4" and restrained, because Davis did not
arrogate to the Court the sole authority to identify racism, but instead
specifically left room for other branches of government to define the sorts
of invidious practices that required state intervention.42 6 Recent Supreme
Court equal protection decisions have not been so enlightened.
424. Id. at 245-46.
425. Of course, by the time the Court handed down Washington v. Davis in 1976, purposeful
racism of the sort the Court focused on was already waning as a source of social harm, not only
relative to its influence in earlier decades, but relative also to other forms of racism.
426. Compare Davis to other cases of that era in which the Court upheld the ability of
Congress and administrative agencies to address disparate impact discrimination. In Griggs v.




In confronting disproportionate harms imposed on minority
communities, Davis reasoned as if the absence of purposeful racial animus
demonstrates that race plays no role in producing such disproportionate
outcomes, at least for constitutional purposes. This sort of reasoning
continues to hold sway. For example, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court
upheld Georgia's imposition of the death penalty because the Court found
no purposeful racism, despite accepting the findings of a massive
sentencing study showing that race---of the defendant and of the victim-
figured prominently in who lived and who died at the hands of the Georgia
criminal justice system.42 However, if such reasoning predominated into
the 1980s, in the last decade the Court seems to have subtly but crucially
altered its understanding of racism. In recent equal protection cases, the
Court has moved from a search for purposeful racism to an inquiry
into whether decision makers consciously considered race. The Court
increasingly articulates an equal protection jurisprudence in which any
explicit consideration of race, but only such consideration, amounts to
purposeful racial discrimination.
Facially race-based statutes evidence the first part of this new
development. In affirmative action cases involving government set-asides,
such as City of Richmond v. Croson4' s and Adarand Constructors v. Peiia,4 -9
Civil Rights Act "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 431-32. Similarly, in Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974), the Court ruled that under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting
discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal funding, the Department of Health.
Education, and Welfare has the power to provide that " [dliscrimination is barred [on the basis of]
effect even though no purposeful design is present." Id. at 568. Davis embraced a "purposeful
racism" understanding only concerning the Constitution, and left to other branches of government
the power to adopt broader understandings of racism. Note in this respect that Davis includes the
following statement: " [Iln our view, extension of the [disparate impact] rule beyond those areas
where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment.
should await legislative prescription." Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
427. 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "At most." Justice Powell wrote for
the majority, the study "indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race ... [but] we
decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious." Id. at 312-13. Justice Brennan. in
dissent, summarized the findings of the sentencing study as follows:
[B]lacks who kill whites are sentenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate of
blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of whites who kill blacks. In
addition, prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70% of black defendants with white
victims, but for only 15% of black defendants with black victims, and only 19% of
white defendants with black victims. Since our [1976] decision upholding the Georgia
capital sentencing system... the State has executed seven persons. All of the seven
were convicted of killing whites, and six of the seven executed were black. Such
execution figures are especially striking in light of the fact that, during the period
encompassed by the Baldus study, only 9.2% of Georgia homicides involved black
defendants and white victims, while 60.7% involved black victims.
Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
428. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
429. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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the Court has concluded that any mention of race requires strict scrutiny.
But the Court's new fascination with explicit considerations of race also
extends to laws "neutral" on their face.430 Consider Shaw v. Reno.43' In
Shaw, the Court used the Equal Protection Clause to strike down North
Carolina's enactment of a majority-Black electoral district, a district
fashioned pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that produced the
first African-American member of Congress from that state since
Reconstruction.4 32 The Court previously had ruled that challenges to
electoral districting required a showing of purposeful discrimination and
discriminatory effect.433 In Shaw, however, the Court accepted a challenge
that alleged instead a "right" to "participate in a 'color-blind' electoral
process." 434 Recognizing this right, the Court struck down North Carolina's
plan because, in its shape, the district "rationally can be viewed only as an
effort to segregate the races."4 35 In effect, the Court rescinded North
Carolina's new district because race served as a predominant factor in the
redrawing of district boundaries-yet, redistricting under the Voting Rights
Act necessarily involved addressing racial voting imbalances.436 Shaw and
other cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court increasingly views the open
consideration of race as doctrinally akin to purposeful racism (irrespective
of whether such consideration is necessary to remedy discrimination),
thereby requiring heightened-and effectively fatal-scrutiny.437
The Court now largely finds racism wherever decision makers
explicitly take account of race. But it is also increasingly true that the Court
spies racism only where state actors consciously consider race. Consider
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in a recent jury discrimination case,
Hernandez v. New York.4 38 Hernandez rejected an equal protection
challenge to the actions of a prosecutor who struck every Latino/a member
of a petit jury on the ground that as Spanish speakers, they could not fully
accept an interpreter's English translation when witnesses testified in
430. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995).
431. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
432. See id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
433. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
434. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641-42.
435. Id. at 642.
436. Miller v. Johnson construes Shaw as holding that race may factor in redistricting, but it
may not predominate. See 515 U.S. 900,913 (1995).
437. Shaw attempts a Bakke-like balancing. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 318 (Powell, J.) (holding that race may be considered as one among a number of factors
in higher-education admissions decisions). It seems likely, however, that the Court-as it does in
Miller-will strike this balance in a manner that increasingly limits the extent to which race may
be considered in redistricting decisions. In this context, Justice O'Connor's insistence that strict
scrutiny is not "strict in theory but fatal in fact" rings hollow. See Adarand Constructors v. Pefia,
515 U.S. 200, 202, 237 (1995); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451-52
(2d ed. 1988).
438. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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Spanish.439 Concurring in the rejection of this claim, Justice O'Connor
commented,
[The strikes] may have acted like strikes based on race, but they
were not based on race. No matter how closely tied or significantly
correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be,
the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is
based on race."0
Under Justice O'Connor's reasoning, "no matter how closely tied or
significantly correlated to race' an action otherwise might be, purposeful
racism does not exist unless a government agent explicitly invokes race."'
In emphasizing the conscious consideration of race, the Court deviates
from Davis by rendering purposeful racism increasingly irrelevant to
constitutional analysis. Under O'Connor's reasoning in Hernandez,
purposeful racism cannot be shown unless the state actor openly considers
race. The consideration of race, however, already triggers heightened
review under cases like Shaw, Croson, and Adarand; thus, a showing of
purposeful racism becomes redundant. Absent the open consideration of
race, neither racism nor cause for heightened review exists; yet, where race
is facially considered, strict scrutiny applies irrespective of any showing
of purposeful racism. The Supreme Court seems to be transmuting the
search for racism into a 'simplistic inquiry into the existence of explicit
considerations of race. Reference to race emerges, under current doctrine,
as the measure of racism.
One does not need institutional analysis to see error in such a doctrinal
approach. Indeed, Justice Stevens in his dissent in Adarand powerfully
objects to this development in plain and direct language, decrying the
resultant equation of race-conscious remedies with the worst excesses of
racism."3 Institutional racism theory, however, advances our understanding
439. See id. at 372. The Hernandez Court seemed untroubled by the fact that the prosecutor
questioned only the Latino/a venire members and no others about their Spanish ability. The
opinions, whether majority or concurrence, failed to address this issue, though it figured
prominently in the record below. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not To Say
Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM, & MARY L. REv. 21. 53 (1993).
440. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375. Justice O'Connor in nearly the same breath referenced
Davis and warned of "the dangers of a rule that would allow an equal protection violation on a
finding of mere disproportionate effecL" Id. at 374.
441. Id. at 375.
442. Perhaps Justice O'Connor meant to make the doctrinal rather than evidentiary point that
disproportionate effect alone is insufficient to establish the purposeful discrimination required
under Batson. See supra note 413. Given her language, however, it seems unlikely that Justice
O'Connor would accept as evidence of purposeful racism anything short of an admission to that
effect-or open references to race. In effect, then, Justice O'Connor's doctrinal concerns become
evidentiary ones.
443. Justice Stevens wrote:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed
to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.
Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to
enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect
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of why "purposeful racism" and now the explicit consideration of race fail
as proxies for racism. Institutional analysis reveals that racism occurs
through the purposeful embrace of racial institutions, but also through the
nonconscious subscription to racial background understandings and
practices. In the latter instances, explicit references to race occur
infrequently; to the contrary, emphatic, heartfelt denials of racist motives
often accompany institutional racism. Moreover, institutional analysis
shows that remedying nonintentional racism requires openly addressing the
role of racial institutions in human cognition. To end nonconscious reliance
on racial institutions requires frank references to race; without such
attention, racial institutions will persist, unrecognized but prevalent.
The Court seems to be developing an equal protection jurisprudence
that defines racism both too narrowly (race must be openly considered) and
too broadly (any consideration of race constitutes racism). The Supreme
Court errs when it suggests that racism-always and exclusively-involves
the open consideration of race. Indeed, by disregarding institutional racism,
the Court errs fundamentally: It understands racism exactly backwards.
Institutional racism easily occurs without conscious thought of race, and
consciously considering race may stem from a desire to ameliorate rather
than to perpetuate institutional racism. In short, the Court's current
understanding of racism is indefensible relative to institutional racism.
b. Reserving the Power To Define Racism
Current equal protection decisions not only rework Davis's
understanding of racism, but also depart from Davis's refusal to define
racism for all government purposes. Davis explicitly countenanced
government remedies to racial discrimination that conceptualized racism
more robustly than the Court thought appropriate for constitutional
analysis." In contrast, many recent equal protection decisions demonstrate
the current Court's willingness to impose its restrictive understanding of
racism on other branches of government. Current equal protection
jurisprudence not only depends upon an erroneous understanding of racism;
it increasingly imposes that defective understanding on all state actors.
Shaw demonstrates this trend with respect to antidiscrimination statutes,
insofar as the Court there reversed reforms undertaken pursuant to the
Voting Rights Act because such redistricting ran afoul of the Court's
evolving equation of a reliance on race with racism.4" Cases concerning
the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.... The consistency that the
Court espouses would disregard the difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a
welcome mat.
Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 220, 243,245 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
444. See supra note 426.
445. The Court's tendency to impose its own definition of racism on antidiscrimination law
extends beyond the Voting Rights Act. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
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race-conscious remedies, however, such as Croson and Adarand, more
powerfully evidence this new dynamic. In Croson, for instance, the City of
Richmond established a set-aside program for city contracts aimed at
increasing the number of minority contractors in the construction industry.
Richmond justified its program on the grounds that African Americans
constituted about half the city's population, while just two-thirds of one
percent of Richmond's construction dollars dispensed in the five years prior
to the set-aside had gone to minority-owned prime contractors. ' The Court
rejected Richmond's plan, ruling squarely for the first time that strict
scrutiny applies to remedial action. More to the point here, however, the
Court also explicitly limited the sort of racism that government may attempt
to remedy.
The Court castigated Richmond for resting its program on "an
amorphous claim" of past discrimination,"' on "sheer speculation"
regarding the effects of longstanding racism s and on "unsupported
assumption[s]" about the overwhelmingly White Richmond construction
industry. 9 The Court held that government actors may implement race-
conscious remedies only when they address specifically identified practices
of discrimination, practices "approaching a prima facie case of a
constitutional or statutory violation."" In so holding, the Court specifically
(1989), the Court reaffirmed the ability of Tite VII to reach disparate impact cases, but imposed a
new hurdle on plaintiffs by requiring that they identify "a specific or particular employment
practice that has created the disparate impact under attack." Id. at 657. The Court explained that
to allow plaintiffs to prevail without "specifically showing that each challenged practice has a
significantly disparate impact ... would result in employers being potentially liable for 'the
myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work
forces."' Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977. 992 (1988)) (emphasis
added). The reference to "innocent causes," when used to justify a heightened evidentiary burden
requiring the identification of specific discriminatory practices, seems to import into disparate
impact doctrine a concern for motives and ill-intent, even as it implies that racially
disproportionate results are not themselves generally indicative of racial discrimination. See infra
note 450.
446. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469. 534 (1989) (Marshall, J..
dissenting).
447. Id at 499 (" [An amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular
industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.").
448. Id. ("It is sheer speculation how many minority firms there would be in Richmond
absent past societal discrimination.").
449. Id. at 502 ("To a large extent, the set-aside of subcontracting dollars seems to rest on the
unsupported assumption that white prime contractors simply will not hire minority firms.").
Criticizing Croson, Patricia Williams chastised the Court for what she termed a hypnotic
campaign of "adjectival dismissiveness." Patricia Williams, Legal Storytelling: The Obliging
Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128, 2129 (1989).
450. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The requirement that government
actors identify specific discriminatory practices as a predicate for establishing a remedial program
seems similar to the requirement of evidentiary specificity recently imposed by the Court on
plaintiffs seeking to establish disparate impact claims under Title VII. See supra note 445. In both
instances, the Court conjures a model of racism in which disproportionate harms to minority
communities are presumed to be the product of natural or "innocent" causes, with the burden on
the harmed parties to demonstrate otherwise. Put differently, under this model. "racism" is
presumed not to operate, even in the context of gross racial disparities, unless identified and
proved with particularity. As john powell remarks, "the Court has adopted the perspective that
racial inequality is the result of natural or legitimate causes." powell. supra note 355, at 904.
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rejected as "rather stark" the proposition that "the city of Richmond enjoys
sweeping legislative power to define and attack the effects of prior
discrimination." '451 The specific exclusion of definitional power is telling,
for in its various decisions the Court in fact curtails the power of Congress
and the states to comprehend racism as they think appropriate for the
purposes of achieving social justice. The Supreme Court increasingly
arrogates the power to label some social practices "racism," and hence
remediable, not only constitutionally, but by statute or affirmative action."
Washington v. Davis limited the reach of the Constitution to instances
of purposeful discrimination. Nevertheless, Davis left room for Congress
and others to define racism in alternative ways, and to fashion
corresponding remedies. Institutional racism theory spotlights the
importance of fashioning remedies for policies and practices that impose
disproportionate harms on minorities, irrespective of whether accompanied
by conscious racial animus. Path analysis, in particular, emphasizes the
potential for persons to engage in racism even when they are convinced that
racial concerns play no part in motivating their actions. Racial status-
enforcement reflects not only the latent effects of past purposeful racism,
but the contemporary prevalence of institutional racism. Institutional
analysis makes evident that effects-based approaches are necessary to
address not simply the present results of past discrimination, amorphous
and attenuated, but also the current manifestations of ongoing institutional
racism, robust and real.
The Supreme Court errs not only by fundamentally misapprehending
racism, but also by imposing this flawed conception on others. The Court
need not, of course, constitutionalize an effects approach; yet, at a
minimum, the Court must leave room for government to address
discriminatory racial impact. Institutional racism necessitates disparate
impact approaches; antidiscrimination laws or racial remediation strategies
45 1. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486 (O'Connor, J.) (emphasis added).
452. With respect to Congress in particular, it is troubling that the Supreme Court now treats
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting states from denying to any person within
their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, as vesting in the Court the sole authority to
define racism, in derogation of Section 5's grant to Congress of the power to enforce the
provisions of the Amendment by appropriate legislation. One wonders whether cases such as
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), remain within the constitutional memory of the
Court. That case specifically rejected the argument that Congress may do no more under the
powers accorded to it by Section 5 than legislate against state action that would otherwise be
found unconstitutional under Section 1:
A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that [state
actions] precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining
the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and
congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would confine the
legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional ....
By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed
in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Id. at 648-50 (footnote omitted).
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founded on models of intentional discrimination cannot and will not curtail
institutional racism's harmful workings. The Supreme Court undermines
efforts to bring about racial equality when it imposes a model of racism




An institutional analysis of racism raises doubts about the wisdom of
limiting the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to cases of purposeful
racism, and of similarly limiting all government responses to racial
inequality. In addition, however, it paints a disturbing picture of the social
costs imposed by the purposeful racism limit. Here, the East Los Angeles
cases speak volumes. In the face of evidence showing that over a twelve-
year period Mexican Americans counted for one of every seven persons in
Los Angeles but only one of every fifty-eight grand jurors,' the trial
courts' findings of no constitutional violation imposed substantial harms.
These decisions deprived the defendants of the right to a grand jury selected
without bias, confirmed in the minds of the defendants and community
members their social marginalization, continued the exclusion of Mexican
Americans from an important organ of democratic government, and blessed
the discriminatory practices of the Los Angeles superior court with the
imprimatur of legal legitimacy. These deleterious costs, although visited
narrowly on the Mexican-American community in East Los Angeles,
nevertheless herald similar harms imposed across this country through
equal protection law's exclusive preoccupation with "purposeful racism."
Recall McCleskey, the Georgia death penalty case.4" Or consider
welfare cases such as Dandridge v. Williams456 and Jefferson v. Hackney,r1
funding families with children at significantly lower levels than persons in
other welfare categories (for instance, the aged). The Court found no
453. Cass Sunstein argues that for reasons of institutional and democratic competence, courts
should not engage in the sorts of sweeping judgments that a disproportionate-impact approach to
equal protection would seem to require. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 472 (1989) ("If courts held that a disproportionate
effect sufficed to raise constitutional doubts, a wide variety of governmental policies would be
seriously questioned--an extremely intrusive outcome that might be inappropriate in light of the
properly limited role of the judiciary in American government."). By the same token, however, he
also argues that courts should not preclude legislative branches of government from engaging in
exactly those sorts of judgments. See Sunstein. Affirmative Action, supra note 414, at 1315 ("No
clear constitutional commitment forbids affirmative action programs .... It is imperative that
constitutional law not be used to strike down political judgments about which reasonable people
differ and to which the Constitution does not clearly speak"); see also Sunstein, Anticaste, supra
note 414, at 2440 (" [Liegislative and administrative bodies, with their superior democratic
pedigree and fact-finding capacities, can better implement the [anticastel principle.").
454. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
455. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also supra note 427 and accompanying
text.
456. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
457. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
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constitutional violation in these cases, despite the fact that the challenged
state action disproportionately harmed nonwhite families, because the Court
saw no discriminatory purpose. Again, one does not need institutional
analysis to measure such harms to minority communities. Institutional
racism theory suggests the strong probability, however, that government
inflicts such harms on minorities-matters of life and death, health and
welfare-not fortuitously, but partially because of their minority status. In
the East Los Angeles cases, in McCleskey, in Dandridge and Jefferson, and
in myriad other cases that find governmental practices constitutional despite
disproportionate harm to minorities, institutional analysis most likely would
demonstrate that the disproportionate injuries followed at least partially and
probably substantially from institutional racism.458
Return now to the "parade of horribles" argument-Davis's contention
that to extend the Equal Protection Clause beyond purposeful racism would
push the Court into the untenable position of having to address "serious
questions about... a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor
and to the average black than to the more affluent white. ' 459 The Court
continues to repeat such concerns, perhaps most notably in McCleskey,
where Justice Powell warned that "if we accepted McCleskey's claim that
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. ' '4"
Leading constitutional commentators have long accepted this argument as a
sufficient justification for the purposeful racism limit.
46'
The institutional analysis of racism does more than suggest that
government must be free to address racism broadly conceived; it also
renders the parade-of-horribles rationale troublesome. Institutional analysis
458. I specifically chose the above poverty cases because Charles Lawrence cited these as
beyond the appropriate reach of the Equal Protection Clause. Attempting to place pragmatic limits
on equal protection, Lawrence proposed a "cultural meaning test," wherein heightened legal
protection would apply if government action involved either (1) purposeful racism or
(2) discriminatory impact plus "cultural meaning." See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 355-56. The
latter was to serve as "the best available analogue for and evidence of the collective unconscious
that we cannot observe directly." Id. Lawrence concluded, however, that "[plroving racial
meaning under the cultural meaning test will be most difficult in cases ... challeng[ing] a
governmental decision to limit subsidies to the poor for such basic human needs as food, clothing,
shelter, and medical services." Id. at 376. Institutional analysis demonstrates that even in
Lawrence's excluded cases, institutional racism likely infects the decision-making process. See
supra notes 396-399 and accompanying text.
459. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976); see also supra notes 416-417 and
accompanying text.
460. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 374 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (" In Washington v. Davis, we outlined the dangers of a rule that would
allow an equal protection violation on a finding of mere disproportionate effect. Such a rule would
give rise to an unending stream of constitutional challenges." (citation omitted)). Regarding
McCleskey, Justice Brennan, in dissent, described the majority's concern as suggesting "a fear of
too much justice." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
461. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 414, at 29 ("[F]or the reasons suggested by Mr. Justice
White's parade of horribles in Washington v. Davis, [the disproportionate-impact doctrine! cannot
reasonably be applied across the board." (citation omitted)).
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suggests that the Court has responded to the problem of the Fourteenth
Amendment's stopping-place in the protection of racism's victims with a
rationale predicated on a fundamentally flawed understanding of racism.
And it shows that the "neutral" government actions the Court hopes not to
evaluate do in fact impose severe injuries on minority communities-and
do so not in spite of, but because of, their minority status. Courts and
commentators must answer why the Equal Protection Clause curtails some
racism-for example, that resulting from the conscious desire to harm
minorities-while other forms remain lawful-for instance, institutional
racism in taxation, welfare, public services, and so on. They should not
presume to resolve this issue, however, by supposing the racial neutrality of
government actions that disproportionately harm minorities but do not
evince a racial purpose. Institutional analysis cautions that racial status-
enforcing government action is likely to reflect institutional racism.
Institutional racism theory tells us that we must forthrightly engage the
debate the Court fears in Davis and McCleskey. We must address the
"serious questions" raised by government action that burdens nonwhites
more than Whites. To be sure, the judiciary already weighs harms to
minority communities against other social concerns-but it does so
haphazardly, by labeling some action "neutral" and other programs "race-
based." Courts cannot avoid balancing racial harm against competing social
interests; at best, they can only hide from themselves their constant
participation in this process. Such balancing will persist, but it should not
continue in a manner that ignores new understandings of racism's various
forms.
C. Some Normative Implications of an Institutional Account of Racism
An institutional analysis of race may engender despair. It is
disheartening to understand racism as endemic, difficult to eradicate, and,
above all, effectively misunderstood and misaddressed by current equal
protection law. In addition, institutional racism theory may provoke
frustration. On one level, the relatively bloodless language of institutions
fails to capture the terrible power of racism. On another, the use of such
language exculpates social actors and society in general by locating harm to
minorities in hidden cognitive dynamics.
Nevertheless, the pallid language of institutionalism is normatively
appropriate. Script and path racism remain shrouded from observation
precisely because they draw on institutions, the received social grammars
on which all persons rely. Racial institutions and institutionalized racial
practices form part of the world-known-in-common; they constitute the
reality that we have socially constructed. It is necessary, or at least
appropriate, to model some racism in the relatively dry language of
institutionalism because the racism of institutions elicits barely any
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attention, and still less emotion and uproar. It exhibits no fiery hatred,
reveals no easily singled out and easily condemned culprit or decision,
stimulates no fury or moment of truth. There is only the steady,
unremarkable progression of reality, the day-to-day doldrums of racial
discrimination. The language that explains the tedious creep of institutional
racism cannot be suffused with incendiary imagery, for such language
would not accurately reflect the social processes described. The heat of
moral condemnation warranted by the inequitable results of institutional
racism misdescribes its monotonous, unquestioned, sedimentary progress.4 6
All of that said, this Article has sought to demonstrate that the social
processes described herein are racism. Though they exhibit no purposeful
embrace of racial discrimination, they nevertheless involve action,
prompted by cognitive reliance on racial institutions, that enforces racial
status. Perhaps similar levels of moral culpability and remedial obligation
do not attach to the person who engages in-or to the society that
tolerates-script or path, rather than purposeful, racism. And perhaps
institutional racism will prove far more difficult to disestablish than the
intentional sort. Nevertheless, nature did not institutionalize racial practices:
We did, and that imposes on us the responsibility for their persistence and
remediation. We must respond, however, in institutional terms, for such
terms measure the differences in our understandings of the world, and
indeed of the very requirements of justice.463
With the ability to counteract racism comes the responsibility to do so,
to realize our national ideals, to achieve an increased measure of social
equality. To talk of institutional racism may be to engage in dry analysis,
but to posit institutional racism places at center stage our responsibility to
address largely unrecognized processes of organizational and social life that
harm our society.
462. Cf HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (1963). While I hesitate to invoke the Holocaust, Arendt's depiction of human evil as
sometimes incremental and utterly ordinary resonates with the depiction of institutional racism
that I advance here.
463. Thus the epigraph that began this Article:
When individuals disagree on elementary justice, their most insoluble conflict is
between institutions .... The more severe the conflict, the more useful to understand
the institutions that are doing most of the thinking.... Only changing institutions can
help. We should address then, not individuals, and address them continuously, not only
in crises.
DOUGLAS, supra note I, at 125-26.
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APPENDICES
All excerpts in the following appendices are taken from the transcript of the
Motion to Quash Indictment, People v. Castro, No. A-232902 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1968)
[indicated in the tables as "T"]. The full transcript is available in the Oscar Zeta Acosta
Papers, California Ethnic and Multicultural Archives, Department of Special
Collections, University of California, Santa Barbara.
APPENDIX A: EXCERPTS FROM THE EAST LA 13 TRANSCRIPT REGARDING
GRAND JURY NOMINEES
This Appendix compiles in table format each judge's grand jury nominees, based
on the judges' testimony in East LA 13. The tables include the judges' names, the
names of the nominees, the years of their nominations where available, and the judges'
relationships to the nominees, drawn wherever possible from the judges' own words.
The tables characterize the relationship between judges and nominees in the
following terms: Friend; acquaintance through a church, civic organization, or club
(abbreviated as Church, Civic Org., or Club); Business Acquaintance; Spouse of
Acquaintance; Neighbor, Family Member;, Recommended; No Recollection; and
Uncharacterized. Often the judges described a single nominee such that more than one
characterization applies.
JUDGE EUGENE H. BRErrENBACH
T426
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Carol W. Parcher "He is the editor, and I Friend
1959 believe the publisher, of the
Glendale News Press." Knew
him for "several years" and
considered him "a personal
friend." T428
Helen Erickson "She is a neighbor.... [I Neighbor
1959 have known her] since we
moved to our residence about
a block from where she lives
in 1940." T429
Harland J. Nissen "I first became acquainted Church, Civic Org., or
with Mr. Nissen when we Club
were both on the recreation
facilities committee of the
Los Angeles Junior Chamber
of Commerce in the early
1930s." T429
Victor Montgomery "I know-knew him very Friend
1960 well," since 1948. T429-30
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Nominee Relationship Chanacterization
Lindley M. Bryant "Mr. Bryant was a member Church, Civic Org., or
of the board of trustees of the Club
Emanuel Presbyterian
Church, 3300 Wilshire
Boulevard, at the same time I
was, approximately 20 years
ago, and I have known him
very well ever since as a
member of that same
church." T430
Eleanor Hiller "I first met Mrs. Hiller when Church, Civic Org., or
we were both on the Los Club
Angeles Community
Council .... This was
approximately 1933, and I
have known her of course
ever since." T430
Herman J. Garretson "I knew him first as president Church, Civic Org., or
of the Iowa Association of Club
Southern California. This was
approximately 1932, and I
have known him in the Iowa
Association and in other
social contacts ever since."
T431
Mary Jane Kidd "I first met Mrs. Kidd as a Church, Civic Org., or
co-member of the Mental Club
Clinic Organization in
Glendale for children. This
was approximately 20 years
ago." T431
Louise Sellman "I first met her husband when Spouse of Acquaintance
we were neighbors in West
Lost Angeles ... [in]
approximately 1932, and I
have known him ever since as
an accountant and a personal
friend." T431-32
Ruth Darsie "She was a widow of Darsie Neighbor
L. Darsie, the sports writer
for the Herald-Examiner, and
I knew her as a neighbor
living approximately three
blocks from where I have
lived... since 1940 in
Glendale." T432
Ross G. Van Gundy "I met him as a fellow Church, Civic Org., or
member of the board of Club
trustees of Emanuel
Presbyterian Church, and as a
member of that church, and
on the sessions of that
church." T432
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Nominee- Relationship Characterization
Donald C. Hieht "I have known him as an Recommended
1965 acquaintance for about
three-approximately three
years, and by reputation."
Recommended by "a fellow
member of the Los Angeles
Lions Club." T432, 434
Anthony Fogo "I first met him as a fellow Church, Civic Org., or
member and later fellow Club
board member of the Los
Angeles Junior Chamber of
Commerce in the 1930s, and
I have known him of course
very well ever since." T433
Eleanor Austin "She and my wife were both Friend:
members of the same parent- Church, Civic Org., or
teacher association in Club
Glendale approximately 15
years ago, and I have known
her and her husband all
during this time, socially and
in various other civic and
other organizations in
Glendale and Los Angeles."
T433
JUDGE JosEPH L. CALL
T366
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Frank Fensch "He was outstanding in the Uncharacterizcd
1959, 1960 Alcoholics Anonymous
movement and was for years,
and in my dealings with
unfortunate alcoholics in the
Municipal Court, in that
capacity I ran into him."
T371
Mrs. Marius Biencourt "I knew her-I became Uncharacterized
1959 acquainted with her as a
forthright member of the
community, a housewife, if I
remember correctly." T376-
77
Cornwall Jackson "Well, he's a-he has been a Friend;
friend for 25, 30 years. He is Church, Civic Org., or
not an intimate friend, but he Club
is a friend of long-standing
acquaintance." A member of
the Los Angeles Tennis Club
"since the middle '30s."
T377, 396
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Nominee . , Relationship Characterization
Grace Van der Hof "I would approximate that I Friend;
have known Mrs. Van der Church, Civic Org., or
Hof since 1953 .... [She is] Club
a very good friend." A
member of the Los Angeles
Tennis Club. T378, 395
Patricia Yeomans "I've known her since the Church, Civic Org., or
middle '30s as a child, almost Club
as a very young adolescent
girl at the time. She's an
outstanding housewife now."
Daughter and spouse of Los
Angeles Tennis Club
members. T378, 396
Dora Rombeau "She is the wife of Dr. Church, Civic Org., or
Rombeau, an outstanding Club;
physician, I believe, in Spouse of Acquaintance
Burbank. I know Dr.
Rombeau and Mrs. Rombeau
because they have been
members of the Los Angeles
Tennis Club since the early
'50s .... I see them twice a
week on the courts at the Los
Angeles Tennis Club, and
have since 1950." T379
Maureen Campbell "I place the time through her Church, Civic Org., or
husband, Mr. Alex Campbell Club;
of the Los Angeles Herald, Spouse of Acquaintance
and that would go back to the
time he joined the Los
Angeles Tennis Club .... I
joined there in 1932, '33, and
Campbell came in in about
1955, and that is when I met
his wife, so I'd say from
1955." T379
George Goman Knows him "very well" as a Church, Civic Org., or
member of the Los Angeles Club
Tennis Club "roughly since
1950." T380
Leona McNeill "I knew her through her Church, Civic Org., or
husband, Dr. Robert McNeill, Club;
who is an outstanding Spouse of Acquaintance
surgeon in the city .... [Sihe
plays [at the Los Angeles
Tennis Club] on weekends.
She may have what is known
as an associate membership
through her husband, who is
a member." T380-81
Elizabeth Hunter Acquainted with her through Church, Civic Org., or
the Los Angeles Tennis Club. Club
T398
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JUDGE KENNETH N. CHANTRY
T559
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Elmer Niemoeller "Oh, I think I met him Church, Civic Org., or
playing golf, and probably at Club
the Wilshire Country Club.
I'm not sure." T561
Dalton Adams "I know Mr. Adams quite Church, Civic Org., or
well.... [He is] somebody Club
that I knew at Wilshire
Country Club, and also a
businessman, and I would say
I have known him since at
least 10, 12, 15 years." T562
William Middleton "I know Mr. Middleton. He Church, Civic Org., or
is also a retired businessman. Club
I have known him for about
[10 to 15 years]. I also know
his son.... [I know him
from] Wilshire Country
Club." T562
Byron Reynolds "I know Mr. Reynolds very Church, Civic Org., or
well. I have known Mr. Club
Reynolds I believe since-I
hate to admit it, about
1922.... [He is also a
member of Wilshire Country
Club], but I knew him...
before I was ever a member
of the country club." T562-
63
E.W. Beck "Well, I met him at the club Church, Civic Org., or
also. I have known Mr. Beck Club
for probably five, six, seven,
eight years. He is a retired oil
man, if I am not mistaken."
T563
Mrs. Davis Pye "Yes, I know her, but I don't Recommended
know her very well. I think I
got her name from someone
else, a friend.... [s]omeone
at the club." T563
Harry Moore "Yes, I know Mr. Moore. Mr. Church, Civic Org., or
Moore is a Certified Public Club
Accountant, and I think he is
with the Ross Montgomery
firm. I believe I met him
when he was on the Harbor
Commission of the City of
Los Angeles .... He also is a
member of the Wilshire
Country Club." T564
Ralph E. Davis "I think I have met him at the Church, Civic Org., or
club, if I'm not mistaken, but Club
I again wouldn't want to be
tied down to that." T564
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JUDGE LEONARD A. DIETHER
T512
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Denman Gamble "Oh, I've known him from Friend
10 to 15 years socially."
T515
Ruth Shepard "I have known her for 20 Friend;
years, as a friend and as an Business Acquaintance
associate." T515
Leon L. Horchitz "[I have known him s]ocially Friend
for 15, 20 years." T516
Bruce V. Reagon "I have known him for about Friend;
approximately 35 years in a Business Acquaintance
business capacity.... Oh,
yes; [he is] a friend also."
T516
lone Sharp Gibboney "I have known her two or Friend
three years, a friend." T516
Frances R. Wilcox "[I have known him o]h, Friend
probably 15, 20 years; [he is
a) friend." T516
JUDGE GEORGE A. DOCKWEILER
T402
Nomiinee Relationship Characterization
Thomas Barrington "Yes, he was a neighbor of Neighbor
mine when I lived at 2040
Cummings Drive, right off
Los Feliz. Thomas
Barrington lived just around
the corner, and I knew him
for some-well, we lived in
Los Feliz for about 20 years,
and he was a neighbor, and I
think he lived there
practically all that time."
T404
Joseph Raeburn "He was also a neighbor of Neighbor
1959, 1960 mine. He was connected with
the Security First National
Bank, in the real estate
department, and he was
around the corner when I
lived on Cummings Drive,
and he was a neighbor of Mr.
Barrington." T404
Roy T. Mote "I think that name was Recommended
1960 suggested to me by Joseph
Raeburn in whom I had a lot
of confidence." T405
Constance H. Jones "I think that name came from Recommended
Mrs. Raebum, my neighbor."
T406
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Monica Gorman "She is a friend. I knew her Friend;
husband very well, and met Spouse of Acquaintance
Monica through her
husband." T406
Abraham Abell "[I've known him flive or six Business Acquaintance
1964 years.... He is an auctioneer.
I became acquainted with
him-I have gone down to
his auction house." T406-07
Albert Robbins "I don't know Robbins Recommended
1964 personally. I met him, I think,
socially, but Robbins, his
name was presented to me as
being a competent and well-
qualified juror through Mr.
Lindell Young, an attorney."
T407
Donald McGrath "Oh, yes, he is my neighbor. Neighbor
He lives on the comer of
Irving and First Street." T408
Mary Stella Raeburn "That is Joseph Raebum's Neighbor
wife, my neighbor when I
lived on Cummings Drive.
She is still-Of course, I
knew her well." T409
Helen McMillen "Helen McMillen is my Family Member
wife's father's brother's wife.
Her husband was formerly
president of the McMillen
Petroleum Corporation,
which is still in existence, but
no longer controlled by the
family." T409
William Rasch "William Rasch is a Church, Civic Org., or
contractor, a builder, and I Club
met Mr. Rasch, at first blush,
at the Newman Club." T409
Pauline Helm "Yes. Pauline Helm I have Friend
seen out socially. I am not too
well personally acquainted. I
have seen her, but I know her
background and her family,
and so forth.... I have
known her for years." T409-
10
Mary Ellen Day "That's another neighbor of Neighbor
mine .... I first became
acquainted with her when I
moved into the area about
nine or ten years ago." T410
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Nominee Relationship Characterization




him for] approximately 20
years." T323
Mrs. Earl B. Gilmore "I was associated with her Spouse of Acquaintance
husband in business, Earl
Gilmore," and knew her for
"[p]robably 25 years, maybe
longer." T323-24
Marjorie Mount "I knew her socially.... Friend
1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, [a]bout 20 years, probably
1965 longer." T324
Lombard Smith Knew him "socially" for Friend
1966 "[albout 15 years." T324-25
Marguerite Lyons Did not recall nominee. No Recollection
1966
Joseph Buchler "He was the father of the Uncharacterized
1967 bailiff in my court, and a
retired businessman who
was-I knew of, and knew
him available to serve." T325
Henry Fritzen "I knew him for 10 years." Friend
1967 T325
Mr. Porter "I have known him socially Friend
1968 probably for 20 years." T326
JUDGE GosCOE 0. FARLEY
T867
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Doris Kingsley "She is the wife of Justice Friend;
Kingsley. I first knew her Spouse of Acquaintance
when he was dean of U.S.C.
Law School." A friend. T869
James Markey "Mr. Markey is my father-in- Family Member
law, and at the time I
nominated him I must have
known him about 10 or 12
years." T869
Reverend A.J. Soldan "I hadn't actually known Recommended
him. He was recommended
by my father-in-law Mr.
Markey." T869
Arthur Werner "He was recommended by a Recommended
friend of mine... an attorney
in town." T870
Leo Hubbard "He was recommended by a Recommended
Judge of the Municipal
Court .... " T871
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Bessie Kramsky "She was also recommended Recommended





Rita Barschak "I have known Mrs. Friend,
Barschak for approximately Spouse of Acquaintance
10 years.... Mrs. Barschak
is the wife of a veterinarian
who has been a friend of
mine for many years. Dr.
Barschak served, and is
serving as a director of the
savings and loan which I
represented when I practiced
law. In addition, they are both
social friends of mine and my
wife's." T547-48
Saul Cooper "I have known Mr. Cooper Friend;
for approximately 10 years. I Business Acquaintance
have known him in a business
capacity, and I have known
him socially." T548
Estelle Massarik "I have known Mrs. Massarik Spouse of Acquaintance
since her marriage to Dr.
Massarik, which was
approximately 1952 or
'53.... I have known them
socially and-Dr. Massarik is
one of my closest friends."
T548
Jules Bisno "I have known Mr. Bisno for Church, Civic Org., or
approximately 20 years. I Club
have known him because of
community service. He is an
active leader of the USO,
United Jewish Welfare Fund,
the Federation of-Jewish
Federation Council of Greater
Los Angeles. We both served
as officers of that
institution." T549
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L.B. Manhoff "Well, Mr. Manhoff was one Friend;
of my first clients. We were Business Acquaintance
also business partners, and I
knew Mr. Manhoff since I
first started practicing law in
1936.... [He is] a very close
personal friend. We were
business associates and are
very close personal friends."
T636
Tom Wyper "I knew Tom when he first Friend;
came over from Scotland and Business Acquaintance
established a sign business
known as Wyper Sign
Company in Pasadena....
[He is a] very good friend."
T637
Frank Tang "Well, Mr. Tang and I were Friend
friends for many years. I
frequented his restaurant
when I practiced law, and got
to know both he and his wife,
and his brother Ken, whom I
saw in the 'Flower Drum
Song' Sunday night on
television." T637
A.H. Melcher "Well, I knew him as a Friend;
client, close personal friend, Business Acquaintance;
and my secretary, who has Spouse of Acquaintance
been my secretary for 13
years, he happened to be her
husband .... T638
Ann Merrill "Yes, she went to school, Friend
UCLA, with my wife before
my wife was my wife. I have
known her-I knew her
husband before she married
him-a very bright,
intelligent woman, now a
resident of New Mexico."
T638
Clarence Follett "He has been a personal Friend
friend of mine for a number
of years." T638
Willard Wiener "He is also a personal friend Friend
of mine dating back to 1938,
a very close personal friend."
T638
Dominick Turinetto "We call him 'Chi Chi.' He Friend
is also a very good friend of
mine." T639
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Milton Walker "Oh, I've known Milt since Friend
1938 at least, and he is a very
close personal friend." T639
Earl Brown "Earl Brown I have known Friend
very well." T639





William Blanchard "Well, I have known him Church, Civic Org., or
since about 1927. He is a Club
resident of Santa Monica, and
he belongs to the same lodge
that I belong to. As a matter
of fact, he was Master I think
of the Masonic Lodge that I
belonged to at one time."
T530
Mildred Stevens "Well, I knew Mrs. Stevens' Friend
mother, her-I don't believe I
ever knew her father, but I
knew her brothers and sisters.
I would say it goes back into
the 1920s sometime." T530
Collis Holladay "Yes, I have known Collis Friend
Holladay, I'd say, for
approximately 10
years.... He is not an
intimate acquaintance, but he
is a friend." T530-31
Samuel Perry "[I have known him] I would Friend
say about seven or eight
years .... He is [a friend of
mine]." T531
Warren Watkins "[I have known him] I would Friend
say probably about 10 years.
I have known his wife about
the same period." T531
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James Cantlen "[I have known him for Recommended
a]pproximately three or four
years, I would say.... He
was president of the Los
Angeles Chamber of
Commerce, and he was also
executive vice-president of
the telephone company here
at one time.... [H]is name
was suggested to me by one
of the other Judges ... and
we both had a very dear
mutual friend in San
Francisco, and I knew of him
by reputation .. " T532
Jack Denbo "Well, Jack Denbo is on the Church, Civic Org., or
Executive Board of the Boy Club
Scouts of America, which I
have served on for about 10
years, and I have known him




Gus Diamond "I have known him since Friend:
1952. I met him then. He was Business Acquaintance
one of a group that retained
my services when I was then
in the practice of law.... We
have known each other as
friends and as social
acquaintances for the past 15
years or more." T721
Evelyn Grold "She served on the jury panel Uncharacterized
in the Municipal Court of the
Beverly Hills Judicial District
when I presided in that court.
That was from 1963 to 1966.
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Marjorie Dunsmoor "She was my neighbor. She Neighbor
1959 lived directly across the street
from me. I had a social
relationship with her and saw
her frequently, and conversed
with her frequently; in fact,
sometimes it was almost a
daily occurrence when we
were out walking. I knew her
quite well." T303-04
Arthur Kenner "I knew him intimately. He Family Member





Milton J. Seidel "Oh, I think I have known Church. Civic Org., or
him 20 or 25 years.... Well, Club
I have known him as a very
fine citizen. He was also a
member of my lodge, and
Masonic organizations, and
we have worked together in
that work, and I have known
him and his wife both quite
well." T622
Russell F. Thompson "I think he was Recommended
1959 recommended to me by
someone, and I had talked
with him before I-as I
always did with each
nominee that I made
nomination for." T624
Carl Fennema "I first knew him when I was Friend;
on the California Public Business Acquaintance
Utilities Commission many
years ago, and we had an
outing at Catalina, and we got
to be friends on the boat, and
after, thereafter visited back
and forth. He came to my
office occasionally, and he
appeared to be a man of rare
intelligence and a truthful,
fine gentleman, and that is
the reason I nominated him."
T624
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Louis Morris "I haven't seen him for years. Friend
He used to be with Pacific
Telephone Company in
Pasadena. He was the branch
manager there .... [He has
been a friend for] more than
10 years, I'd say." T624-25
Roger Bone A friend. T625 Friend
Arnold Eddy A friend. T626 Friend
Roy Anderson A friend. "I knew him very Friend
well." T626
Joe Beranek A friend. T626 Friend
William Welch "He was an insurance broker Friend
[in Pasadena], and a friend of
mine, a long-term friend of
mine." T626
JUDGE AUBREY N. IRWIN
T486
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Carol W. Parcher "I have known him Friend
approximately 40 years, more
or less. I went to Glendale in
1927, and he was rather
prominent in that area about
that time, and I have known
him almost since that time."
T488
William J. Goss "I have known him since Friend;
about 1928, and I have Business Acquaintance
known him as a businessman,
former client, and former
mayor of the City of
Glendale; a close, personal
friend, very fine man." T489
Pauline Bunch "I have known her as a Friend;
neighbor, and a community Neighbor
worker in the area in which I
live, a friend." T489
Roland F. Bush "[I have known him for Friend;
a]pproximately 32 years, and Business Acquaintance;
I first became acquainted Neighbor
with him when he was a vice-
president and general
manager of the Security First
National Bank in Glendale,
and I knew him as a banker,
and since then I know him as
a neighbor. He is now retired.
A friend." T489
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Eugene F. French "I have known Mr. French Friend;
about 10 years, more or less. Business Acquaintance
I know him as an executive
of an insurance company,
Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company, and a citizen of the
area in which I reside. I know
him as a retired
genteman... a casual friend,
not too close." T489-90
Bernard Anawalt "I have known him as a Friend;
former client, as a Business Acquaintance
businessman in our
community, semiretired at the
present time; a close personal
friend.... [I have known him
for] 23 years." T490
JUDGE BERNARD S. JEFFERSON
T464
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Gano Culwell "My recollection is that he Church, Civic Org., or
1961 served on the board of Club
directors of the Los Angeles
Urban League, I believe....
[I knew him] probably five or
six years [before nominating
him]." T466
Lola L. Beavers "[I have known her for] Church, Civic Org., or
many, many years. Mrs. Club
Beavers is the wife of George
Beavers, who is an officer of
the Golden State Mutual Life
Insurance Company.... My
acquaintance with the
Beavers has been both in
civic work and to a lesser
extent social." T466-67
Ophelia W. Bolger "My recollection is... Church, Civic Org., or
1962 that... she also was a lay Club
person, as we call it, working
in various capacities with the
Los Angeles Urban League."
T467
George Sevelle "I knew him through the Church, Civic Org., or
1962 Urban League, and also as a Club;
businessman." T468 Business Acquaintance
Arthur J. Clement, Jr. "My recollection of him is Business Acquaintance
that he was a manager of...
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Helen G. Smith "[I have known her for] a Spouse of Acquaintance
number a years. She is the
wife of now Judge Sherman
Smith, who is a Judge of the
Superior Court." T468-69
Ella K. Mays "[I have known her a]s a Friend
friend, since approximately
1948 or '49." T469
Benjamin Labiner "He, I think, was a friend, or Recommended
1968 at least a neighbor of my
brother Justice Edwin L.
Jefferson, and he
recommended Mr. Labiner to
me." T469-70
JUDGE SIDNEY W. KAUFMAN
T447
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Daniel S. Levine "[I have known him for] over Friend
20 years as a close friend,
primarily." T449
Rosemary Halloman "I met her I think only once. Recommended
1964 I nominated her at the request
of another Judge who had
filled his nomination, and
who had assured me of her
qualifications." T449
Albert L. Leveton "Well, he's been a warm and Friend
1967 intimate friend for many,
many years." T450
Boris Frankel "[I have known him for] Friend
several years, as a friend; and
I play a lot of bridge with
him, or did." T451
JUDGE WILLIAM B. KEENE
T755
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Oral Dryden "Well, Dryden was a former Business Acquaintance
partner of mine, and Oral
Dryden-my wife and I have
known Oral Dryden for 10
years." T756
Eileen Brown "Eileen Brown is a neighbor Friend;
and personal friend, and I Neighbor
have known her for
approximately 10 years."
T756
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Mebs McKay Peterson "I have known her for Recommended
1967 approximately one year, and
she is a friend of a friend....
She was recommended to





Theodore R. Ellsworth "I have known Mr. Ellsworth Friend
at least since-I think it was
the late 1930s, and he was the
business manager for the
Wardrobe Union of the
motion picture industry, and
now is a professor at
UCLA." A friend. T498-99
Albert Levinson "I have known Mr. Levinson Friend
for about 15 years. He is the
president of the General Pipe
& Supply Company at
Compton. He is a very
personal friend of mine."
T499
Willard Isaacs "I have known him about 25 Friend;
or 30 years.... He was a Business Acquaintance
client of mine. He was
associated with the Westmore
Cosmetics and Salon." A
friend. T499
Abner Parker "I have known Mr. Parker Friend
almost 40 years.... I met
him when I lived in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He
was then a resident of
Chicago." A friend. T500
Jack J. Bayer "I have known Mr. Bayer for Friend;
approximately 10 or 12 years. Church, Civic Org., or
My association with Mr. Club
Bayer was in charity work for
the Jewish Home for the
Aged. He was the vice-
president." A friend. T500
Alvin A. Lavine "Mr. Lavine was-at the Friend
present time is a member of
the Grand Jury, and my
nominee. I have known him
for, oh, more than 10 years."
A friend. T500-01
20001 1861




Rosalie Hutton "Well, I'm only guessing Friend
1961 now. I wouldn't consider her
an intimate friend of mine,
but I have known her several
years, about several years,
yes." T602
Maurice R. Schez "I have known him over 20 Friend
1966 years socially, and he is a
very good friend of mine. He
was former vice-president of
Max Factor Company." T603
Gretchen Stanbury "I have known her about 15 Friend
years. She is a widow now,
but Raymond Stanbury was a
very prominent trial lawyer."
T603
Carl Titelman "[I have known him for] Friend
perhaps a decade
[socially].... He was-had a
chain of markets, and then he
sold them and retired." T603
Samuel Bischoff "Very well. He is a very Friend
prominent motion picture
producer. I have known him
for 25 years." T603
Milton Berancik "Well, I've known him Friend;
socially for 20 years or more. Church, Civic Org., or
He is a member of my Club
country club, and we have
been good friends for many
years." T604
JUDGE WILLIAM H. LEVIT
T580
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Desmond Moody "I'd say [I have known him] Business Acquaintance
in excess of 20 years....
Well, I knew him in business
when I practiced law. I think
he has been at my house and I
have been at his house. I
wouldn't say that we are
intimate social friends,
anything like that, but I know
him." T583
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Helen Rice "Well, I've known Mrs. Rice, Friend-
I would say, 40 years, Business Acquaintance
approximately.... I knew
her when she was quite
young, when I grew up in San
Francisco, when I first met
her. I know her husband. My
wife knows her, knows her
husband. We see each other
from time to time over the
years. I would say that
although there has been some
business relationship,
basically our relationship was
a social relation." T584
Jane Sinn "We were neighbors for a Business Acquaintance;
period of time. I have had a- Spouse of Acquaintance;
also when I practiced law, I Neighbor
had a business relationship
with her husband, and to
some extent with her." T585
Ruth Meyer "Basically she and her Friend
husband are social friends. I
have also had some slight
business connection, I would
say, with her family, when I
practiced law.... [I have
known her] in excess of 20
years." T585
Jane Ilfeld "I'd say basically a social Friend
relationship. However, she
has been active in community
affairs, and I'm sure that I
have had some dealings with
her in that capacity, and her
husband is a doctor. I have
had-I've been a patient of
her husband on occasion."
T585
Lawrence Welling "I'd say socially. I'm also Friend
acquainted with the business
he was connected with at one
time. I believe he is retired,
but I had no business
relationship with him
individually." T586
Ann Neisser "I know her socially, and her Friend;
family. I have had some Spouse of Acquaintance
business relationship with her
husband.... [I have known
her i]n excess of 20 years."
T586
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Verna M. McTavish "[I have known her for Spouse of Acquaintance
pirobably about five or six
years.... She is the wife, or
the widow, of a lawyer."
T881
Sam Sarkisian "[I have known him for Church, Civic Org., or
about] five of six years.... Club
He was a member of an
organization to which I
belonged.... The Town Club
of Santa Monica." T881
Hortense D. Fishbaugh "[I knew her for] about three Friend
(nominated three times) years [before nominating
her].... She was a friend of
my wife's." T881-82
John Carlton Bennett "He was recommended to Recommended
me. I didn't know him
personally." T882
George A. Carter "He was a friend; I would Friend
say more an acquaintance
than a friend, a close
acquaintance." T882
JUDGE WILLIAM B. NEELEY
T781
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Wilma Imm "I believe [I met her] in Friend;
connection with one of the Church, Civic Org., or
community organizations in Club
Glendale, but I have been
president of practically all of
those organizations at one
time or another, and I have
worked with these
people.... Yes, she was [a
personal friend]." T782
Irma Corbett "I think her husband was the Church, Civic Org., or
famous jockey, and they were Club
interested in Chevy Chase
Country Club and active in
Glendale.... I got to know
her through maybe my wife's
activities with the Tuesday
Club, and social engagements
through that." T783
Ralph Robison "[H]e was-used to be head Friend
of Streets and Parks, or
something, in the City of
Glendale, and I nominated
him after he retired .... I had
known him, oh, let's say 25
years." T784
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Audrey Small "[W]e have always had her in Friend
and among our social group,
and I have probably known
her 20 or 25 years. She will
be a guest in my home in
about two weeks." T784
Dorothy Brewster "I didn't know Mrs. Brewster Church, Civic Org., or
as well, but I got acquainted Club
with her through one of these
Community Concerts, or
Glendale Symphony
Orchestra, and I worked with
her there, but she has not
been as much of a family
friend as these others have
been." T784
Frances Doll "Her husband is in the Church, Civic Org., or
electrical business in Club;
Glendale. She was another Neighbor
one that I became well-
acquainted with in connection
with Community Concert
activities. She lives about five
blocks from us." T785
Essie Hunter "Well, I think I have Church, Civic Org., or
probably known her, before Club
her nomination, probably 15




and I was on the County
Music Commission, president
of the Glendale
Symphony . T..." 785
Hilma Treidler "Mrs. Treidler was known to Church, Civic Org., or
me again through Community Club
Concerts, her work there."
T785-86
Marjorie Noble "Mrs. Noble was a member Church, Civic Org., or
of our church group, to which Club
I belonged, and I knew
her... I think I knew her
primarily through Charity
League." T786
Helen Erickson "Mrs. Erickson is very active Friend;
in my church, which is the Church, Civic Org., or
First Methodist Church of Club
Glendale.... She is also, and
her husband, are friends of
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Mary Fessenden "She is also a lady whom I Church, Civic Org., or
became acquainted with Club
through the church. She
doesn't belong to our church,
but she is a soloist at the
Pasadena Methodist Church,
and I got acquainted with her
through Mrs. Erickson."
T786-87
Eric House "Mr. House is a retired Uncharacterized
engineer. I first met him at a
dinner at the Erickson's, and
he had just retired at that
time. I had probably known
him as little as any one
person I ever nominated to
the Grand Jury, but my
conversations with him, his
background and experience
and so on and his availability,
caused me to nominate him."
T787
JUDGE H. BURTON NOBLE
T743
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Elmer Wilson "[I have known him for] 30 Friend,
years... [a]s a social Business Acquaintance
acquaintance.... I do
business with him." T744-45
John Davidson "[I have known him for] 30 Friend:
years ... [as a s]ocial Church, Civic Org., or
[acquaintance], and when he Club;
was in business, I did Business Acquaintance
business with him." Member
of Kiwanis Club. T745-46
John H. Bigger Knew him for same time and Friend;
in same capacity as John Church, Civic Org., or
Davidson. Member of Club:
Kiwanis Club. T745-46 Business Acquaintance
John Sample "[I have known him for] 15 Friend
years or more, and as a social
acquaintance." T745
Verne Orr "Social acquaintance, and a Friend;
number of these that you are Church, Civic Org., or
mentioning belong to the Club
same service club [Kiwanis
Club] I belong to, did belong
I to." T745-46
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Donald La Motte "[I knew him for] 20 years, I Business Acquaintance
would say, 15 or 20 years,
and he was manager of the
Sears store in Pasadena. I
knew him in that capacity."
71747-48
James P. Morgan "He was recommended to Recommended
me. I am not acquainted with
him.... I think it was Judge
Newell, an ex-member of this
Court, but I am not real sure,
but he was highly
recommended, and I
nominated him on that
basis." T747
JUDGE RALPH H. NUTTER
T683
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Betty V. Harvey "She was a next-door Neighbor
neighbor when I lived in
Altadena for many years."
T684
Gladys Smith "I knew Mrs. Smith since Friend;
1948. She was the wife of my Spouse of Acquaintance
former law partner." A
friend. T685
Everett Franklin "Mr. Franklin was the Friend;
international representative of Church, Civic Org., or
the United Automobile Club
Workers, a Negro, and a
member of the United Civil
Rights Congress.... I knew
him both professionally and
socially [since 1948]." T685-
86
Helen Schwartz "She was the wife of a Spouse of Acquaintance
lawyer who took my place
when I went on the bench. [I
have known her slince about
1959, I think. I knew her
husband many years before
that." T686
Eloise Davis "My recollection is, I may be Recommended
wrong in this, I think she was
a minority group, a Negro
who was recommended to me
by someone else, [who] was
trying to get minority group
representation on the Grand
Jury.... I think it may have
been a Judge." T686-87
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Ann Kennedy "I knew her as a personal Friend
friend when I lived in
Altadena, since about '49,
and I still know her socially."
T688
Margaret Lloyd "I have known her since Friend
about six or seven years
socially." T688
Mavis Fehr "I think I have known her Neighbor
since about 1957 or '58. She
is a neighbor where I live
presently. She lives about a




Grant Goodale "Oh, I have known him for Friend;
30 years, I guess.... A Business Acquaintance
business acquaintance, friend,
socially." T661
Ruth Stransky "[I have known her] I Friend;
1958 suppose 10 or 12 years, Neighbor
__ neighbor." A friend. T661
Colonel K. Charles Bean "Well, I guess I have known Church, Civic Org., or
him about 25 years, and I Club
have met him through the
church association." T662
Kenneth Payne "Oh, [I have known him] Church, Civic Org., or
probably 15 years, and I met Club
him also through the
church." T662
Charles Fuller "[I have known him Friend;
pirobably 30 years. I met Business Acquaintance
him, he was the director of-
or the head of the Department
of Weights and Measures of
the County, and I became
acquainted with him when I





Harold Dryden "[I have known him for Friend;
a]bout eight or nine Church, Civic Org., or
years.... I met him through Club
various Camellia societies
that he belongs to and that I
belong to.... He is now [a
friend]." T663
Albert Dekker "The same as Mr. Dryden." Friend;
T663 Church, Civic Org., or
Club
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Elmer Struebing "Oh, I've known him Friend
probably 20 years. I got
acquainted with him through
his children and my children
when they were going to L.A.
High, and Pomona
College.... He was [a
friend]." T663-64
Raymond Abernathy "He was [a friend and], I Friend;
think, chief toxicologist of Business Acquaintance
the Coroner's Office, and I
had met him through the-
my work in the Attorney
General's Office." T664
Philip Couturier "I met him, I think, in Church, Civic Org., or
1952.... He was a member Club
of my Masonic Lodge."
T664
Avery Munger "I think I got acquainted with Church, Civic Org., or
him through our children in Club
Sunday school, and they must
have been about eight or nine
then, and that would make it
about 20 years ago." T665
Jack Finch A friend for" 10 or 15 Friend
years." T665
Ralph 0. Chick "I became acquainted with Church, Civic Org., or
him I think at the time of the Club;
X Olympic games in Los Business Acquaintance
Angeles in 1932. I was in the
Attorney General's Office,
and I think he had something
to do with the operation of
the Coliseum at the time....
He is also a member of my
Masonic Lodge, but he
doesn't attend very often."
T665-66
William Coberly "I have known him about six Church, Civic Org., or
or seven years. He is a Club
member of the board of
trustees of my church." T666
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JUDGE RAYMOND R. ROBERTS
T733
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Catherine Beachy "[She was recommended by] Recommended
several friends of mine."
T734
Lucille Bernardi "[I have known her for] 20 Friend
years, socially, politically,
economically.... Her
husband is a member of the
Los Angeles City
Council .... T735
Veronica Dysart "I have known her for about Friend
1967 15 years as a social
acquaintance." T735
Eleanor Brown "I made a canvass of all of Recommended
1968 my friends and acquaintances




Bradley or Councilman Mills
nominated her as a person
who was of the black race
and lived in the Watts area,
and on their
recommendations I
nominated her, because there
was a paucity of nominees
from that area." T736
Dorothy Seifert "I have known her for Friend
perhaps 15 years socially."
T736-37
JUDGE EUGENE E. SAX
T836
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Gertrude Burton "[She is my n]ext-door Neighbor
neighbor. [I have known her
for a]bout 10 years." T837
Illeana Hamilton "[I know her a]s a friend and Friend;
as the wife of an attorney Spouse of Acquaintance
whom I knew very well some
years ago. His name was
Fairfax Cosby, [and he] was a
City Attorney of Los
Angeles." T838
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Nominee Relationship Characterization
Otto Ferninger "[I have known him for] Business Acquaintance
about eight to ten years...
[o]n a business basis .... I
think he was the next to the
top position in a real estate
department in the Farmers &
Merchants Bank, and I had
some real estate
transactions.. . with the
bank, and he was the
gentleman with whom I had
to discuss most of that, and I
got to know him quite well."
T838-39
Harry Levinsky " [I have known him for] Friend
between six and eight years
[in a social capacity]." T839
Ella Barnes "[I have known her for Friend;
albout 15 years [in a social Business Acquaintance
capacity], and also [as] a





Dorothy Schoon "Oh, I knew her socially. She Friend
was a friend of my wife's,
friend of mine, and her
family, her mother was a
friend of our families." T850
Estelle Masaryk "She is a friend of another Recommended
Judge whom I know, and I
had talked to her on a couple
of occasions. I don't know
her well." Recommended by
the other judge. T850
Maureen McCormick "Oh, again over five years. Friend
1966 She and her family are
friends of our family." T851
Anita Chaikin "Oh, probably about five Friend
years, and she and her
husband are friends of mine
and our family." T851





Arthur Logan Spring "He was a neighbor who Neighbor
1959 lived across the street." T307
Kenneth A. Murray "I have known him for 15 or Friend
1959, 1960 20 years on a purely social
basis." T307
Laverne Brown Knew him on a "[slocial" Friend
1960 basis for "[a]bout 10 to 15
years prior to" nominating
him. T307-08
Herman G. Lofgren Recommended by another Recommended
1961 judge as "somebody that he
knew well." T308
George M. Scott "I've known him through a Church, Civic Org., or
professional organization Club
since about 1946." T309
Russell Loghe "Through a professional Church, Civic Org., or
1962 organization [the Kiwanis Club
Club], since about 1946."
T309
JUDGE BERNARD S. SELBER
T769
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Barbara Turner Double "I guess I have known her for Friend
approximately 10 years, and
as a personal friend." T771
Edward Kraus "I guess I have known Mr. Friend
Kraus for better than 10
years, and also as a personal
friend." T771
Stacey Williams "I never met her personally, Recommended






JUDGE JOSEPH A. SPRANKLE
T824
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Betsy Farrand "[I have known her] as a Friend
friend, family acquaintance,
15 to 20 years." T825
Elizabeth Hansen "[I have known her] as a Friend;
community worker serving Church, Civic Org., or
on several committees of Club
various types, and as a friend
for probably close to 25
years." T824-25
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William Parker "[I have known him as a] Church, Civic Org., or
casual acquaintance for Club
probably 35 years; as a fellow
club member [at the New
Century Club, a men's club
in Pasadena], probably 15
years." T826
Lorraine Zeutzius "Well, my first acquaintance Friend;
[with her] was as a neighbor Neighbor
living across the street,
probably 15 years. [She is a]
family friend, neighbor."
T826
Hilles Beddell "[I knew him for pjrobably Church, Civic Org., or
20 years. He is primarily in Club
civic activities. My principal
acquaintance with him was in
the Tournament of Roses,
Pasadena." T827
May Lensing "I have known Mrs. Lensing Friend
probably six or seven years. I
was first acquainted with-
her daughter and my daughter
were very close friends, and
we became family friends."
T827
JUDGE JAMES G. WHYTE
M2-78
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Gladys Covington "Oh, I have known her for Friend;
1960, 1962 perhaps 15 years. She had Business Acquaintance
three sons in the same school
that my sons attended. I have
known her in connection with
[her] business, the Betsy Ross
Ice Cream Company. I know
her husband as an attorney in
Ontario [California], and I
have known her both through
school and socially." T281
Stanley E. Barnes "Mr. Barnes was.., in the Church, Civic Org., or
1960 building business, and Club;
constructed a home for me Business Acquaintance
when I first moved into
Claremont. He was a member
of a bridge club where I
played bridge for several
years, and I have known him
as a member of the Chamber
of Commerce, and generally
in the business world in the
community." T282
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Nominee Relationship Characterization
Lt. Col. R.R. Bacon "He was my commanding Church, Civic Org., or
1961 officer when I was in the Club
R.O.T.C. at Pomona College,
1924 to '28. He also is a
member of the same bridge
club I mentioned Mr. Barnes
was a member of." T282
Dudley B. Woodbridge "I knew Mr. Woodbridge Friend;
when he was manager of Business Acquaintance
Pomona Branch of the Bank
of America, and had had
business dealings with him in
connection with estates I had
handled when I was an
attorney. I also knew him
personally. He had been a
friend of my father's during
my father's lifetime." T283
Robert L. Strail "He was my track coach Friend
1964 when I was at Pomona
College, 1924 to '28. 1 have
known him personally and
intimately since that date."
T283
JUDGE THOMAS C. YAGER
T808
Nominee Relationship Characterization
Jean Haskell "I believe it is Miss Haskell, Uncharacterized
as I recall, [who] was a friend
of my late aunt. She was a
school principal, as I recall."
T809-10
Elizabeth Chevalier "I recall I met her a number Uncharacterized
of years ago and I have seen
her very infrequently.... I
believe I met her socially."
T810
Catherine Messner "Well, I first met Mrs. Friend
Messner when she was at
UCLA, and I was just
entering the school, and Mrs.
Messner has been a very
good friend of mine, as her
husband has, for many
years." T810-I1
Lombard Smith "I recall meeting the No Recollection
1962 gentleman, and I really don't
recall much more than
that ... " T811
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Nominee ,, , Relationship Characterization
Gladys Maloney "I have known Mrs. Maloney Friend-
socially for many years. Mrs. Spouse of Acquaintance
Maloney is the wife of the
doctor who is the son of the
doctor who brought me into
the world .. " T812
Leo Hubbard "Mr. Hubbard is a member of Church, Civic Org.. or
the American Legion Club
Luncheon Club which I
sometimes attend, and I have
known him a number of years
in that capacity." T813
Lillian Parks "I have known her for many Friend
years. She is now remarried,
and I don't recall her new
name. She was a very good
friend of my wife's, and a
friend of mine for many
years." T813
Isabella Topper "All I recall about that lady, I Recommended
have met her, had a
discussion with her, and
nominated her, and she was
recommended by other
people." T813
Charles Minsky "I met Mr. Minsky, and Recommended
again had a discussion with
him. Mr. Minsky is the father
of a lawyer whom I
know.... I'm sure [the
lawyer] recommended his
father." T813
Corridon T. Hill "Corey Hill ... has for Church, Civic Org., or
many, many years been a Club
leading member of the
American Legion Post of
which I have been a member
for approximately 20 years."
T814
Marshall Chlavin "Mr. Chlavin is a fellow Friend;
alumnus of Los Angeles High Church, Civic Org., or
School with me. I have Club
known him for many years in
the capacity of the alumni
association of that
school ...." T814
Elizabeth Snayd "I have no recollection of Recommended
her, except as I have
indicated about a few of the
others, that I had met her and
had a discussion with her,
and she was recommended,
and I nominated her." T814
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUDGES AND
GRAND JURY NOMINEES, 1959-1968
Judge Nm. F C BA Nb. 'SA FM R NR U
Breitenbach 14 3 8 2 1 1
Call 11 2 8 3 3
Chantry 8 7 1
Diether 6 6 2
Dockweiler 14 2 1 1 6 1 1 3
Doherty 12 8 1 1 1 1
Farley 6 1 1 1 4
Feinerman 4 2 1 1 2
Fildew 11 11 3 1
Frazer 7 4 2 1 1 1
Greenfield 2 1 1 1
Gumpert 13 10 1 2
Huls 9 7 1 1 1
Irwin 6 6 4 2
Jefferson 8 1 4 2 1 1
Kaufman 4 3 1
Keene 3 1 1 1 1
Koenig 6 6 1 1
Landis 6 6 1
Levit 7 5 3 1 2
Marshall 7 4 1 1 1 1 1
Neeley 12 4 9 1 I
Noble 7 5 3 4 1
Nutter 8 4 1 2 2 1
Rhone 14 8 8 4 1
Roberts 5 3 1 2
Sax 5 3 2 1 1 1 1
Schauer 5 3 1 1
Schweitzer 7 3 2 1 1
Selber 3 2 I
Sprankle 6 4 3 1
Whyte 6 4 2 3 1
Yager 13 4 3 1 4 1 2
Total 1 255 136 66 [34 20 18 4 26 2 9
Percentage* 53% 26% 13% 8% 7% 2% 10% 1% 4%
Legend: Nm. = Nominations; F = Friend; C = Church, Civic Org., or Club; BA = Business
Acquaintance; Nb. = Neighbor; SA = Spouse of Acquaintance; FM = Family Member;
R = Recommended; NR = No Recollection; U = Uncharacterized
* Percentages sum to greater than 100% because many nominees fit more than one category.
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APPENDIX C: THE CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
This appendix compiles in table format the responses of each judge to several
questions regarding the "fair cross section" requirement. Specifically, it tabulates
responses to questions about whether the judge recalled the letter forwarded by the
chief judge regarding grand juror selection; whether the judge agreed with the cross-
section requirement; whether he made any effort to comply with the requirement; and if
so, how, and if not, why not. "[NA]" indicates either that the judge was not asked the
question or that he did not answer it.
JUDGE EUGENE H. BREITENBACH
T426
Recall Letter Yes
Agree with Req. [NA]
EffortTo Comply "I would hardly know where to begin T442
How or Why Not "[I]t would take considerable time to actually seek out persons
who would meet the qualifications, statutory qualifications and
my own qualifications of ability and integrity, outstanding
ability and integrity, and I would want to know this personally."
I_ T442
JUDGE JOSEPH L. CALL
T367
Recall Letter No
Agree with Req. "I didn't follow his thinking T391
Effort To Comply No
How or Why Not "Only as they would come under my observation in the ordinary
affairs of my life, as I met people, as I saw them, as I analyzed
them, as I heard of them as outstanding citizens.... I don't want
I to nominate people I don't know." T393




Effort To Comply " [From time to time I have that duty and obligation." T577
How or Why Not [NA]
JUDGE LEONARD A. DIETHER
T512
Recall Letter Yes
Agreewith Req. "No, I don't." T519
Effort To Comply "No. No more than I would French, or Chinese, or Japanese, or
Russian, or Catholics, or Protestants, or any other
characteristic." T519
How or Why Not "I think it is the duty of each Judge to pick a nominee who he
feels is qualified for the position, regardless of what race,
nationality, or religion he may be. It doesn't make any
difference." T519
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JUDGE GEORGE A. DOCKWEILER
T402
Recall Letter Yes
Agree with Req. [NA]
Effort To Comply No
How or Why Not "I wouldn't know where to go to find these people. You know
what I mean. I didn't know of anybody of Mexican extraction or
Spanish extraction, or Negro extraction, or Japanese, or any-I
didn't know any of those people that I felt would qualify. Of
course, we have had help in the household for years and years
that have been of the Negro extraction, but these are working
people. They obviously couldn't afford to take the time off to
___j__serve as Grand Jurors, as fine people as they were." T414-15
JUDGE EMMEIT E. DOHERTY
T320
Recall Letter Yes
Agree with Req. "I never received any orders.... I was never bound by anything
more than my own discretion." T330
Effort To Comply Yes
How or Why Not "I asked some of the colored men in the court if they could
recommend some persons that were well-qualified...... T332
JUDGE GOSCOE 0. FARLEY
T867
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. [NA]
Effort To Comply "I don't consider race at all." * T875
How orWhy Not "I think if each Judge tried to pick the best people he can, by
and large the races will be equally represented." * T875




Agree with Req. "[N]o. My primary motivation was to get the most qualified
people, regardless of race, color, creed, or religion, or national
origin." T556
Effort To Comply No
How or Why Not "What I was interested in was getting qualified people to serve
on the Grand Jury, regardless of their ethnic and racial
background, because I don't believe in quota systems, per
se .... T556-57
JUDGE RICHARD C. FILDEW
T634
Recall Letter Yes
Agree withReq. "I have no quarrel with it, but if he is inferring [sic] we should
pick someone because they are Mexicans, Japanese, Jewish,
somebody like that, then I am 100 percent against it." T652
EffortTo Compy 1 NA
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"I think that if they are qualified Mexican-Americans, they
should be selected, and shouldn't be excluded because they are
Mexican-Americans, but just because he is a Mexican-
American, or an American-Indian, or a Negro he shouldn't be




Agree with Req. "I think it is a good thing." T538
EffortTo Comply "I did, of those that I know." T538
How or Why Not "Actually, to me, what a person's race is is a minimal
requirement. It doesn't make any difference to me whether they
are Jewish, or black, or Spanish, or Mexican, or Oriental, or
Caucasian, as far as I am concerned. If they are qualified, I




Agree with Req. "[I]t is a proper objective . 724
Effort To Comply "I did not." T724
How or Why Not "It doesn't enter my mind." * T727




Agree with Reg. [NA]
Effort To Comply No





Agree with Req. "Of course." T629
EffortTo Comply "I can't say that I did."T630
How orWhy Not "I frankly didn't know anyone well enough... " T629
JUDGE AUBREY N. IRWIN
T486
Recall Letter Yes
Agree with Req. "I would say that getting qualified people of various races is
good." T493
Effort To Comply "I don't think I was obligated." T493
How or Why Not "I selected the best people that I knew available for the
Ijob ._..." T494
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JUDGE BERNARD S. JEFFERSON
T464
Recall Letter Yes
Agree with Re . "Certainly." T472
Effort To Comply No
How or Why Not "When the groups or races are in the category [that] cannot give
that kind of time, then it is difficult to find them." T474
JUDGE SIDNEY W. KAUFMAN
T447
Recall Letter Yes
Agree with Req. "I don't think it is as important to have various racial
backgrounds in comparison to having people of great ability and
integrity .... T454
Effort To Comply No
How or Why Not "[Hiad I known... of anyone of a minority group who might
have been qualified, and who would have accepted, I would
have gone out of my way to have appointed him, if I could
have." * T457
• Testimony on cross-examination
JUDGE WILLIAM B. KEENE
T755
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Reg. Yes
Effort To Comply "I trust that I will when I finish a few more years." T761





Agree with Req. "I haven't any objection to any racial group... T504
Effort To Comply No
How or Why Not "I have to know the people before I recommend them.... They
never made any effort to communicate with me, either the
organizations or the people, to indicate their desire to serve on




Agree with Req. "I think so." T617
Effort To Comply "I have not, because I don't know any." T617
How or Why Not "[M]y personal conviction is that a Judge can't nominate
anyone unless he knows them intimately, and I have never
I nominated anyone unless I know them fairly well." T618
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JUDGE WILLIAM H. LEVrr
T580
Recall Letter Yes
Agree with Req. Yes
EffortTo Comply "Not at all." T593
How or WhyNot "The only attempt I made, as I have indicated, was to select
people whom I felt were qualified to serve, not on any basis of
I race, or religion, or nationality, anything like that." T597
JUDGE ARTHUR K. MARSHALL
T879
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. "[l]it is a good idea... [but] the first consideration is to get
people who are capable ... " T884
Effort To Comply "I have inquired of people who I think might know some people
in other groups ... " T885
How or Why Not [NA]
JUDGE WILLIAM B. NEELEY
T781
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. "I think it is far better if we have a Grand Jury pool of
individuals who.., have no personal bias or prejudice." T795
Effort To Comply [NA]
How or Why Not "I had a Negro doctor who was invited to my home for dinner
with a number of Judges, and I have the highest regard for
him .... I would gladly nominate him for the Grand Jury, but
he would-he couldn't serve, he is too.., he couldn't take the
time." T800
JUDGE H. BURTON NOBLE
T743
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. "I think they ought to be represented." 1749
Effort To Comply No
How or Wh Not "I wouldn't hesitate to if I knew where to go." 7749
JUDGE RALPH H. NuTTER
T683
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. Yes
Effort To Comply "I made a particular attempt to nominate members of minority
groups." T688
How orWh Not [kA]
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Agree with Req. "I don't disagree with it.... That doesn't mean I agree with it."
T677-78
Effort To Comply No
How or Why Not "I have only taken those persons whom I personally knew and
I could vouch for their qualifications." T679
JUDGE RAYMOND R. ROBERTS
T733
Recall Letter - Yes
Agree with Reg. "Absolutely." T739
Effort To Comply "I do it." T739
How or Why Not "I feel in 10 years... that I will consciously put a name in
nomination of every minority group, whether it be religion,
I geography, or race." T741
JUDGE EUGENE E. SAX
T836
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. "[Jurors] should be those who can best perform the function of
the Grand Jury." T843
Effort To Comply "I have tried ... " T843
How or Why Not "[T]here are very few people who have the qualifications...
and who are able to leave their places of employment or their




Agree with Req. "[Only] to the extent that those persons are known to me, to the
extent that I can verify their background." T856
Effort To Comply "Mentally I have." T856
How or Why Not "[Flor reasons obvious to anybody, and known to me, they
I could not serve." T856
JUDGE HAROLD W. SCHWEITZER
T304
* Testimony on cross-examination
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JUDGE BERNARD S. SELBER
T-769
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. Yes
Effort To Comply "I have attempted [to do so]." T773
How or Why Not "I am not suggesting that we place quota limits on the Grand
Jury, but I certainly think ... it should tend to reflect the
presence of the minority groups, yes." T778
JUDGE JOSEPH A. SPRANKLE
T824
Recall Letter [NA]
Agree with Req. "I wouldn't believe in trying to stack it that way." T830
EffortTo Comply "I don't think it is required." T832
How orlWhyNot "I move about in a very limited circle of people... and it
would present a very difficult problem for me to seek out any
particular race ...." T831-32
JUDGE JAMES G. WHYTE
"I"278
Recall Letter No
Agree with Req. "The matter of the appointments of Grand Jurors was primarily
in the discretion of the particular Judge, and I didn't pay too
much attention to any suggestion from the Executive Officer or
anyone who was not a Judge as to who the nominations might
be." T288
Effort To Comply "[I made no] conscious attempt to put into effect that
policy .... ." T289
How or Why Not "I went out to get the available people who I thought were the
best qualified .... " T289
JUDGE THOMAS C. YAGER
T808
RecallLetter, [NA
Agree with Req. [NA]
Effort To Comply [NA]
How or Why Not [NA]
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APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF GRAND JUROR SELECTION METHODS IN TWENTY
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES, 1999*
IDENTIFICATION OF POTENIAL JURORS FINAL SEL8CTION
County Volunteers Drawn Judges Judge or Jurors
Solicited from Petit Submit Judges Randomly
Jury Pool Nominations Select Drawn from
Pool Pool,.
Alameda X X (30)
Colusa X X (30)
Fresno X465 X4 X X
Imperial X X
Kern X X X (45-60)
Kings x_ _ x (30)
Los Angeles X4_ X X
Madera X X X
Merced X X X (30)W
Monterey X X (30)
Orange X X (30)
Riverside X X X
San Benito X X_ X X
San Bernardino X X
San Joaquin X X47 X (50-75)
Santa Barbara X X (30)
Santa Clara X X X (30)
Tulare X X X (30)
Ventura X X X (30)
Yolo X X X (30)
Total 13 7 11 17 19
Percentage (65%) (35%) (55%) (85%) (95%)
* The counties selected were those studied in California Rural Legal Assistance, A Study of Grand
Jury Service by Persons of Spanish Surname and by Indians in Selected California Counties, U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE
SOUTHWEST 113 (1970). Information was gathered through published documents, web sites, and
telephone interviews with superior court officials; more detailed information regarding each
county is on file with the author.
464. Pool size is indicated in parentheses where information is available.
465. Persons who wish to be considered as potential grand jurors may apply directly to the
court; volunteers are not solicited.
466. Current grand jurors may also nominate persons.
467. Potential jurors are drawn from voter registration rolls.
468. Judges may appoint a foreperson from outside of the pool.
469. Judges nominate grand jurors if an insufficient number of persons apply voluntarily.
470. Judges select grand jurors directly.
471. Mayors of the largest cities in the county, as well as chambers of commerce, may also
nominate potential grand jurors.
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